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Since the renewal of fighting in the Gaza Strip, Gaza’s internal front has shown notable signs of change. Feelings of rage, despair, and a growing lack of trust in Hamas’s military and civilian leadership are laying the foundation for an internal uprising that could shake the political balance in the Strip. The slogan “Their lives are not worth more than our lives” reflects a fundamental shift in perception and a breaking of the barrier of fear. Demonstrators have been seen raising white flags—a clear symbol of surrender. Signs of rupture are also evident within Hamas’s core, with reports of field commanders fleeing and an increase in intelligence infiltration into the organization’s ranks. This document reviews the scope of protest activity in the Gaza Strip, based on media reports and an analysis of public sentiment toward Hamas.

According to media reports, there were at least 35 major demonstrations in the Gaza Strip during the Swords of Iron War, approximately 90% of which were directly against Hamas. Of these protests, 46% occurred in the north, 34% in the south, and 20% in the center of the Strip. The demonstrations drew crowds ranging from dozens to hundreds, mainly composed of young men. The protests centered on ending the war, the high cost of living, the reopening of the Rafah Crossing, and the need for food security among the Gazan population.

A review of the timeline shows that the demonstrations reached their peak in March 2025. They began in the northern Strip but quickly spread to the refugee camps in central Gaza and the Khan Younis area. During this period, the Bidna Naish (“We Want to Live”) movement—formed in 2019 against economic protests—played a prominent role in organizing the demonstrations. The movement’s primary goal is to overthrow the Hamas government. Economic issues, including rising food prices and Hamas’s control of food supplies, are just one of the many factors contributing to the escalation of protests. The Fatah movement—despite official denials—has supported the protests, as the organizers are affiliated with it. Despite concerns over foreign interference, the use of fake content generated by artificial intelligence, and fears of Hamas’s retaliation, the message is clear: The public demands an end to the war and the removal of Hamas’s leadership in Gaza (Hamas, bara bara—Hamas, out, out).

In response to these demonstrations, Hamas has pursued a harsh policy of punishment, targeting both the protest organizers and the broader population. Key leaders of the demonstrations have been executed. For example, Uday al-Rubai, a protest organizer, along with six other protesters, was kidnapped, tortured, and killed. The regional response, however, has been largely passive. Egypt, for instance, has opted to close the Rafah crossing and block the delivery of humanitarian aid—signaling a desire to avoid direct involvement while also applying pressure on Hamas. Qatar, which plays a central role in the regional balance, is working to prevent the collapse of Hamas and has tried to curb the wave of protests, despite its traditional support for the Gazan population. While local sources and eyewitness reports paint a clear picture of desperate Gazans who are yearning for change, media networks such as Al Jazeera continue to publish the opposite narrative of widespread support for Hamas and opposition to Israel. This contrast only deepens the sense of alienation and disillusionment among the local population.

It is worth noting that in April and May 2025, there was a decline in the number of demonstrations. However, it is evident that the sense of anger and protest against Hamas has been replaced by another parallel phenomenon—a rise in the looting of Hamas’s food warehouses and convoys, as well as seizing weapons from its fighters.

In conclusion, the population in Gaza is experiencing a profound fracture, marked by distrust of Hamas’s leadership and a growing desire for change—even at the risk of personal danger. This civil awakening could prove pivotal, especially if it receives sufficient external support and internal momentum. Although still in its infancy, the movement has the potential to profoundly change the balance of power in the Gaza Strip.