On December 23, 2006 the UN Security Council (SC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1737. The Resolution imposes sanctions on Iran for failing to comply with previous SC demands and again insists that Iran suspend proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, including all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, research and development, and work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water. There is nothing new in these demands, which have been made time and again...
The Global Reach of Iran’s Ballistic Missiles describes and interprets the Iranian missile program within the context of Iran’s threat perception, armament policies, and overall ambitions. Charting the origins of Iran’s missile program and its development, the study presents a clear picture of where Iran’s missile capability stands today and where it is likely headed. Iran’s space program is a symbiotic adjunct to the missile program, and is reviewed here as well.
On August 31, Iran clarified that it had no intention of suspending uranium enrichment activities as demanded by UN Security Council Resolution 1696.Nevertheless, the expiration of this deadline has not opened the door to immediate discussions on sanctions. In fact, any resolve the international community once had to force Iran either to acquiesce or be exposed as a defiant nuclear proliferator is quickly dissolving, and only the US is now pressing for sanctions. European leaders, who earlier this year were widely reported to be firm...
Iran has ignored the deadline set in the UN Security Council’s ultimatum and continues to reject any suspension of uranium enrichment. Although the Security Council is now required to decide on next steps, the United States is the only Council member supporting early political and economic sanctions. If no agreement is reached in the Council, Washington may try to create some mechanism for sanctions that bypasses the Council.
On July 31, 2006, the UN Security Council (SC) adopted resolution 1696, which makes it mandatory (under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter) for Iran “to take the steps required by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors… which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme”… The IAEA was requested to report by August 31 on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution, as well...
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced last week that the US is now willing to engage in dialogue with Iran on the nuclear issue within the framework of multilateral talks with the EU-3, on condition that Iran suspends its uranium enrichment activities. This announcement was hailed as a major change in US policy on the Iranian nuclear crisis, as the US has not held direct official talks with Iran since diplomatic ties were severed by the US in April 1980, in the wake of the hostage crisis.
Last week, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected Europe’s most recent offer to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for various incentives, this time including a light-water reactor. “Your incentives,” he said, “are definitely not more valuable than nuclear technology. How dare you tell our people to give up its gold in return for chocolate?”
On April 11, Iranian officials began to make public statements detailing Iran’s achievements and future plans for its indigenous uranium enrichment program. The gist of these and later proclamations was: Iran has operated its first gas-centrifuge “cascade,” comprising 164 centrifuges, and has achieved a 3.5% uranium enrichment in this cascade; Iran plans to construct, as a first stage, several cascades totaling some 3000 centrifuges; Iran plans to construct a full-scale, 54,000-centrifuge uranium enrichment plant;...
The decision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council (SC) has not put an end to illusory rhetoric about that country’s ultimate intentions. Iranian spokesmen and Iran’s apologists continue to use slogans defending Iran’s “inalienable right” to a comprehensive nuclear program and to insist that “more time is needed for negotiations.” And indications are that the SC, at least at this stage, will probably confine itself to...
On Saturday, February 4, 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors finally adopted an action resolution on the issue of Iran’s nuclear development. The resolution “…requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that [confidence-building] steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue…” The steps specifically mentioned in the resolution...
At a conference on NATO’s role in Persian Gulf regional security held in Doha in late November, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General Abdul Rahman al-Attiya portrayed Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a direct threat to the security of the Gulf states and to NATO. According to some reports, he also noted Iran’s interference in the domestic affairs of Gulf states and expressed fears that a nuclear Iran would spark further proliferation in the region.
