On April 17 the New York Times revealed that in January US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote a memo to National Security Adviser James Jones on the need to develop policy options regarding Iran’s drive to develop nuclear weapons. One senior White House official is quoted as describing the memo, which came after President Obama’s end of 2009 diplomatic deadline had come and gone, as “a wake-up call” testifying to the US’ lack of a workable long term policy for confronting the Iranian nuclear challenge. The day after the...
On April 5, 2009, President Obama presented in Prague an ambitious three-part strategy to address the international nuclear threat: 1) proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear arsenals; 2) strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and halting proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states; and 3) preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials. President Obama set a time target of four years for securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world. In the Nuclear Posture...
The announcement that China was joining the new round of talks over sanctions against Iran was received initially as welcome news, although this does not necessarily indicate a change in Chinese policy or suggest that the international struggle against Iran will now gather renewed momentum. Nevertheless, it is important to examine what is motivating China to join the talks and the possible ramifications of this move.
With any hope of a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran now postponed until June, and the understanding that if at all, these will be weak and ineffective measures, Obama’s diplomatic initiative is slowly grinding to a halt. Taking into account Iran’s steady progress in developing fissile material, its work on producing a nuclear warhead, and its ever-improving missile capabilities — together with low expectations that anything in this dynamic will impress upon the Obama administration the need to...
In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on February 26, 2010, Defense Minister Ehud Barak made extensive reference to Iran, its attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities, and the policy ramifications for the major powers and Israel towards Iran. Despite a certain measure of opacity in his address, Barak did make some unequivocal statements of interest. These express the situation assessment prevalent in Israel regarding Iran’s nuclear goal and the gaps between Israel and the American administration and their...
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the US administration has already arrived at the tacit conclusion that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is inevitable, in spite of all US and international efforts to prevent this. What would the repercussions be if this conclusion became known? How would the administration behave if its conclusions became known to the public? How would it work to minimize the ensuing damages from this revelation, both internally and internationally?
On Tuesday, February 8, 2010, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, announced that Iran began enriching uranium from 3.5 to 20% uranium-235. Iran claims that it needs this uranium for its Tehran Nuclear Research Reactor (TNRR). This announcement was made since the deal whereby Iran would receive fuel for its reactor in return for removing a significant amount of 3.5% uranium from the country did not materialize. Although the announcement specified a limited rate of enrichment, this statement has...
Recent international media reports have mentioned the accelerated deployment of American defensive missile systems in the Persian Gulf as preparation for the possibility of an Iranian missile attack in the Gulf region. In a rare statement released to the media, CENTCOM commander General Petraeus also referred to this deployment.
If its domestic situation were not so serious, Iran’s government could be very happy indeed. Iran managed to gain another crucial year in its quest for a nuclear weapons capability, and every passing day brings it closer to its ultimate goal: having the potential to produce deliverable nuclear weapons in short order, if it so decides. It successfully delayed the West from pursuing a more severe sanctions regime, and the West is behaving as if it has all the time in the world. It does not.
The book, which continues the annual Strategic Balance series, includes thirteen analytical essays written by INSS researchers. The focus is on developments in the internal, regional, and internaional arenas that shape Israel’s strategic environment and the strategic options before it. Special emphasis lies on the Middle East as it adjusts to a new US administration and a newly-elected Israeli government.
Efforts by the international community to confront and contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions over the past seven years have been marked by tension between two focal points. The first has been the tendency to deal solely with the nuclear activity itself, through the prism of NPT provisions, with the goal of bringing/forcing Iran back into the fold of this international non-proliferation treaty (which Iran is party to as a non-nuclear state). The second tendency has been to include a wider spectrum of regional realities and state...
Despite the tendency to denote any simulation exercise on security issues a “war game,” the recent simulation designed and held at INSS did not focus on the option of a military attack. Rather, it developed the scenario of a bilateral US-Iranian negotiation over Iran’s nuclear program. With Barack Obama – in line with his self-imposed end of the year deadline – currently poised to assess the progress made with his diplomatic outreach to Iran, the importance of understanding the implications of a possible direct...
