Judging by the initial dynamics, the stakes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) that began on May 3 are high. The basic positions of the different parties remain very much as they were at the last RevCon, held in 2005: the US wants to focus primarily on the ongoing challenge of NPT violators, especially Iran; the non-nuclear weapons states demand that the nuclear states do more to address their NPT commitments – both to disarm and to allow transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the non-nuclear states; Egypt is leading the...
On April 17 the New York Times revealed that in January US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates wrote a memo to National Security Adviser James Jones on the need to develop policy options regarding Iran’s drive to develop nuclear weapons. One senior White House official is quoted as describing the memo, which came after President Obama’s end of 2009 diplomatic deadline had come and gone, as “a wake-up call” testifying to the US’ lack of a workable long term policy for confronting the Iranian nuclear challenge. The day after the...
On April 5, 2009, President Obama presented in Prague an ambitious three-part strategy to address the international nuclear threat: 1) proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear arsenals; 2) strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and halting proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states; and 3) preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials. President Obama set a time target of four years for securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world. In the Nuclear Posture...
The announcement that China was joining the new round of talks over sanctions against Iran was received initially as welcome news, although this does not necessarily indicate a change in Chinese policy or suggest that the international struggle against Iran will now gather renewed momentum. Nevertheless, it is important to examine what is motivating China to join the talks and the possible ramifications of this move.
The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which the presidents of the United States and Russia signed a few days ago in a festive ceremony in the ancient castle in Prague, is a continuation of START I, signed between the United States and the former Soviet Union in July 1991. The treaty dealt with a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads and the means of launching nuclear weapons. This is likewise the stated purpose of the new treaty: to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal of both countries. The treaty also allows the...
On March 19, 2010, the Quartet, established in 2002 in Madrid as a mediating body whose decisions carry advisory status, met in Moscow. Present at the meeting were the foreign ministers of Russia, the United States, and the European Union, as well as the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Quartet’s envoy to the Middle East. The present meeting was the first time the Quartet met in a special session rather than as ancillary to international conferences; it took place at Russia’s behest.
With any hope of a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran now postponed until June, and the understanding that if at all, these will be weak and ineffective measures, Obama’s diplomatic initiative is slowly grinding to a halt. Taking into account Iran’s steady progress in developing fissile material, its work on producing a nuclear warhead, and its ever-improving missile capabilities — together with low expectations that anything in this dynamic will impress upon the Obama administration the need to...
In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on February 26, 2010, Defense Minister Ehud Barak made extensive reference to Iran, its attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities, and the policy ramifications for the major powers and Israel towards Iran. Despite a certain measure of opacity in his address, Barak did make some unequivocal statements of interest. These express the situation assessment prevalent in Israel regarding Iran’s nuclear goal and the gaps between Israel and the American administration and their...
On March 3, 2010, the Arab League foreign ministers’ follow-up committee, meeting in Cairo, adopted a decision supporting the start of ג€proximity talksג€ between Israel and the Palestinians. At stake are negotiations that would be conducted in a similar format to that of the Israel-Syria negotiations with Turkish mediation during Prime Minister Olmert’s term in office, i.e., with the negotiating teams situated in the same city while the Turkish mediator moved between them. In this case, it is likely that the American...
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the US administration has already arrived at the tacit conclusion that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is inevitable, in spite of all US and international efforts to prevent this. What would the repercussions be if this conclusion became known? How would the administration behave if its conclusions became known to the public? How would it work to minimize the ensuing damages from this revelation, both internally and internationally?
Recent international media reports have mentioned the accelerated deployment of American defensive missile systems in the Persian Gulf as preparation for the possibility of an Iranian missile attack in the Gulf region. In a rare statement released to the media, CENTCOM commander General Petraeus also referred to this deployment.
The U.S. is currently engaged in the attempt to revive final status negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and the government of Israel. While Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has declared his wish to open negotiations without prior conditions, Palestinian President Abbas (Abu Mazen) has repeatedly asked for a complete settlement freeze for at least several months. He also wants “clarifications” on the American proposal to resume negotiations in proximity talks, i.e., no face-to-face negotiations between Israelis...
