The interim deal on Iran’s nuclear program, secured in late November 2013 and implemented from January 20, 2014, was intended to create space for the tough negotiations over a comprehensive deal that would close the Iranian nuclear file. The essays compiled in this volume analyze some of the key issues that have emerged regarding efforts to carve out a “good” nuclear deal with Iran, and highlight additional perspectives that have not been at the heart of the debate. Discussed in this collection are general principles for negotiating...
The Interim Deal of November 2013 between the P5+1 and Iran, although only meant to stop the clock and provide time for the real negotiation on a comprehensive deal, is now hailed as a “landmark deal.” The P5+1 are no longer demanding that Iran back away from its military ambitions; they are not even pressing for the weaponization aspects to be confronted head-on and quickly. Rather, they are demonstrating a relatively lax attitude on that front, while quietly shifting the goal of the negotiation from an Iranian strategic U-turn in...
Although the IDF’s abilities to handle the rocket and attack tunnel threats have garnered most of the attention during the latest campaign in the Gaza Strip, it is now clear that Israel was also forced to confront cyber challenges during Operation Protective Edge. More specifically, in the course of the campaign Iranian elements launched a widespread cyber offensive against Israeli targets, including attempts to damage security and financial networks. While these attempts were neutralized relatively easily and quickly by Israeli...
In the course of 2013, Iran became one of the key players in the international cyber warfare theater. This development is a result of both defensive and offensive cyber force buildup processes and a measured relaxation of restraints on the part of Iranian decision makers with respect to offensive activity in cyberspace. Indeed, the Iranian activity points to major qualitative advances in Iran’s technological and operational cyber capabilities. This article examines the activity and progress in Iran’s cyber defense system, and the...
The success by ISIS in Iraq is a failure for Iran, which in recent years has become the most important and influential external actor in Iraq, particularly since the withdrawal of US forces in late 2011. Iran’s goal in Iraq was to build a weak and non-threatening but stable and unified country, dependent on Iran and led by a Shiite majority connected to Iran. To this end, Iran used its ties with many Shiite elements in Iraq, and nurtured these connections through military and financial aid. This influence had limits, but in all,...
Several factors are at the base of the military success of ISIS and other jihadist organizations: the structural and functional weaknesses of Arab nation states; the organizations’ networked and decentralized structure, which makes it easier for them to operate and sustain themselves in the region; the ineffectiveness of the international community, first and foremost the United States, stemming from the lack of a solution to the problem and an unwillingness to become militarily involved; and the erosion of the United States’ image...
Anyone following the development of Iran’s cyber capabilities is not surprised that Iran has slowly become a significant power in the cyber arena. Recently, a long term Iranian cyber espionage campaign in the United States was uncovered that made use of “social engineering” and phishing in order to gather information from important officials in the United States, Israel, Great Britain, and other countries. The campaign is one of a long list of actions in cyberspace attributed to Iran designed to hurt the United States, Israel, and...
The fall of major Iraqi cities to Sunni extremists belonging to the Sunni group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) may well have implications beyond the borders of Iraq. Indeed, all of Iraq’s neighbors, as well as the United States, have cause for major worry about the immediate and long term implications of the recent developments. Paradoxically, a coalition of sorts has formed comprising countries that have an interest in nipping the ISIS territorial entrenchment in the bud. While the United States will need to take the leading...
Over the past eight months of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, Tehran’s ballistic missile program has been mainly relegated to the sidelines. Yet given the attention devoted to the Iranian ballistic missile threat in the context of US plans for missile defense, it is difficult to comprehend why the US would bypass the threat in the nuclear talks. What could account for the US agreeing to concede the issue, focusing only on the nuclear program for now? Is the US worried that inclusion of the ballistic missile threat would...