Beyond explaining where Israeli intelligence erred in the Yom Kippur War, the book probes expectations of military intelligence in general and the relationship between military and political assessments. It considers what kind of assessment an intelligence branch is capable of producing with a great degree of certainty, and conversely, what kind of assessment it should not be asked to produce. Based on the intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War, this book also reviews possible organizational changes and methodological...
For a military option to be adopted against the Iranian nuclear program, four different questions demand clear answers. The first concerns the scenario: what scenario will we be living in, especially in 2010? The second deals with the result of a strategic situation assessment, which weighs the risk of living with an Iranian bomb against the risk of trying to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb. Third, what will the American policy towards Iran be? And the fourth is the purely military issue. I will attempt to focus primarily on the...
Any state at war attempts to steer the conflict to the point where it can demonstrate its relative advantage. Thus underlying each war is a struggle over its particular nature, and in a dynamic process each side attempts to shape a war paradigm that suits its own relative strengths, while the adversary attempts to impose its preferred paradigm on the conflict. Israel, for example, seemingly has an edge in military effectiveness, and has therefore always preferred short, decisive wars. Its enemies, however, have an overall advantage...
In a democratic state the question of when it is appropriate to embark on a war is within the purview of the government, because it is the body responsible for any activity touching on relations between states and other political entities. This question has ramifications for defense of the state, its citizens, and its soldiers. Similarly, the question of what is appropriate action after the war, when working towards peace, is within the government’s purview because any step towards a settlement between the parties is of political...
This essay discusses the response to the threat at the strategic level and to some extent also the operative level, but does not address the response at the technical or tactical level. Likewise at the tactical level, one must always ask what requires the most attention.
This essay suggests responses that the State of Israel – not necessarily the IDF – should provide to five types of problems presented elsewhere in this volume: (a) the problem of Lebanon; (b) the high trajectory threat, which although it relates to Lebanon is a more general threat, as also appears from the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Iran, and harbors great damage potential that may not have been presented in its full the preceding discussions; (c) what is the right way of prosecuting a war with Syria; (d) coping with the Iranian nuclear...
In a democratic state the question of when it is appropriate to embark on a war is within the purview of the government, because it is the body responsible for any activity touching on relations between states and other political entities. This question has ramifications for defense of the state, its citizens, and its soldiers. Similarly, the question of what is appropriate action after the war, when working towards peace, is within the government’s purview because any step towards a settlement between the parties is of political...
The central questions regarding military force for a democratic nation state are: can war be expected, does military force deter a war, and should a war erupt, can the state endure it and emerge victorious. Force buildup derives from the operational response to the threat. The problem that states and militaries face today is that there is no generic formula for force application and force buildup relevant to a threat that combines large scale – even global – terrorism and conventional capabilities, all under the threat of a nuclear...
In light of talk about the northern sector heating up and the possibility of a deterioration into war, the question of the change in the threat facing Israel – from the longstanding situation in which the state’s reference scenario was a surprise attack for the purpose of conquering either limited or more extended territory to the new reality that includes extensive rocket and missile fire at Israeli population centers together with the use of terrorism and guerilla tactics – again rises to the surface.
This essay focuses primarily on the threats against the State of Israel and touches little on the responses to these threats. Over the last sixty years, the threats Israel has been forced to tackle have assumed different emphases, but the fundamental principle for understanding them has not changed, namely: the world around us, the Arab world, most of the Muslim world – not necessarily “most” in the numerical-statistical terms, but in terms of those determining the outlook of that world – does not consent to the existence of an...
The purpose of this conference is to try to understand the changes in the threat against the State of Israel that have taken place in recent years, and to examine the components of the optimal response to the threat. Today’s seminar is organized within the framework of the INSS Military and Strategic Affairs Program, which aims to enhance the public discourse on subjects relevant to this discipline through conferences and the Military and Strategic Affairs journal.
An article on domestic developments in Israel published last year in the INSS annual strategic survey noted that while 2007 was a good year for Israel, clouds appeared on the horizon towards the end of the year. These challenges, which emerged in 2008 in the areas of security, economics, political stability, and national resilience, are also on Israel’s agenda in 2009.
