From its inception, Lebanon has been a mosaic of diverse communities: Sunnis, Shiites, Christians (with all their sects), Druze, and Alawites. The ability of these groups to exist as a state in the area between Jebel Amal in the south and Tripoli in the north is based on an accepted division of power in the political system according to community. The president is a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament a Shiite Muslim. A set division also exists in the parliament, in which a fixed...
Operation Cast Lead against Hamas in the Gaza Strip filled both the IDF and the Israeli public with a sense of success, and justifiably so – at least militarily speaking. In the course of the fighting, Israel managed to greatly reduce the rocket fire at the Israeli home front, with relatively little loss of life and property; the air force managed to render severe blows to the Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip and eliminate senior operatives in the military and political wing of the organization; and the ground forces...
In the past two and a half years, Israel has waged two military campaigns – against Hizbollah in Lebanon and against Hamas in Gaza – and in both, the campaigns were labeled in the public discourse in Israel and abroad as wars against terrorist organizations. The use of this term to describe the enemies Israel fought and the characteristics of these battles is not only imprecise and misleading but also shrouds the character of the enemy and the nature of the confrontation in a haze, minimizes their complexity, and creates unrealistic...
At the end of the Second Lebanon War, many claimed that the State of Israel had not succeeded in strengthening Israel’s deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah. An examination of the organization’s response to Operation Cast Lead and a comparison with its response to Operation Defensive Shield demonstrate that Israel’s actions in the Second Lebanon War did in fact result in considerably stronger Israeli deterrence.
On the morning of January 8, 2009, katyusha rockets were fired at Israel from Lebanon. Hizbollah hurried to deliver an official announcement that the organization had not carried out this operation. Muhammad Fneish, Labor Minister and Hizbollah’s senior representative in the Lebanese government, even added that Hizbollah had no idea who fired the rockets. To a great extent this response contradicts the spirit of Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, who in a series of speeches at the beginning of the Israeli operation in Gaza...
The arguments against attacking Lebanon as a principal objective in context of a confrontation with Hizbollah eclipse the arguments in favor of this posture. This article examines the political and strategic objectives that drive the various strategies, as well as their ethical and moral aspects and their legal, political, public appearance-related, economic, and military dimensions. The author urges an approach that focuses less on sovereign Lebanese targets and more on ground maneuvers against targets that directly serve Hizbollah...
A lively discussion has developed recently concerning the IDF’s new response policy in the event of a renewed confrontation with Hizbollah. An article in Haaretz by Amos Harel; an interview given by GOC Northern Command Gadi Eisenkot to Yediot Ahronot; the INSS Insight of early October by Gabriel Siboni; and a forthcoming piece in Strategic Assessment by Giora Eiland are among the recent forums for this debate.
The book includes ten analytical essays written by INSS researchers that dwell on Israel’s strategic environment in the period under review. The ongoing challenges represented by the Palestinian issue and the Iranian nuclear program are well documented, as well as developments elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world and in Israel.
The recent events in Lebanon are like a play in three acts. In the first act, the pro-Western government chooses to take steps challenging Hizbollah’s independent security activity (placing cameras at the airport and planting an internal communications network). In response, on May 7, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah dispatches his fighters to take control of western Beirut and various areas in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Approximately 80 Lebanese citizens are killed in clashes that hint at Lebanon’s...
One tangible aftermath of the current confrontation in Lebanon and the Doha agreement that concluded it is an increase in Hizbollah’s strength. In fact, this agreement increases the possibility of Hizbollah’s taking over all or large parts of Lebanon, which entails severe dangers for Israel. For Hizbollah, war against Israel is a supreme goal, and it has indeed inflicted many significant casualties. It is responsible for a long list of terrorist attacks against Israel and Jewish targets, including two atrocities in...
The steps taken by Israel and the international community have thus far not succeeded in weakening the organization. This study argues that in addition to considering Hizbollah’s military power, the organization’s other assets must be taken into account, including its Iranian connection; developments along the Israel-Syria axis; and its domestic Lebanese standing. Weakening Hizbollah rests on reducing it to an unimportant actor on the regional scene, and the study offers some proactive strategies toward this end.
Humor, especially black humor, sometimes captures political reality even better than the most incisive analysis. According to a joke popular in some circles in Lebanon, an ambulance on the way to the hospital signifies one of two things: another bombing of an anti-Syrian personality or another Shi’ite baby about to be born. The two possibilities represent, respectively, the focus of Lebanon’s near-term government crisis, whose outcome is uncertain, and the essence of its longer-term identity crisis, whose outcome is...
