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    Orna Mizrahi, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studiesjoined INSS in December 2018, after a long career in the Israeli security establishment: 26 years in the IDF (ret. Lt. Col.) and 12 years in the National Security Council (NSC) in the Prime Minister's Office (she served under 8 heads of the NSC). In her last position (2015-2018) as Deputy National Security Adviser for Foreign Policy, she led strategic planning on regional and international policy on behalf of the NSC for the Prime Minister and the Israeli Cabinet, and was responsible for preparing the papers for the Prime Minister's meetings with leaders in the international arena. During her service in the IDF she served as an intelligence analyst in the Military Intelligence Research Division and as a senior officer in the Strategic Planning Division. She specialized mainly in research and strategic planning on regional issues, with an emphasis on the countries of the first circle and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ms. Mizrahi holds an M.A. (cum laude) in History of the Middle East from Tel Aviv University and two B.A. degrees from Tel Aviv University: one in History of the Middle East and the other in General History and the Bible (summa cum laude). She is active in Forum Dvorah, which promotes the inclusion of women in the political-security establishment.
    Orna Mizrahi
    Orna Mizrahi
    Senior Researcher
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    ornam@inss.org.il
    03-6400471
    INSS Insight
    Hezbollah 2.0—One Year After Nasrallah’s Elimination
    A Year After Nasrallah’s Elimination: Where Does Hezbollah Stand, and What Are the Implications for Israel?
    16 October, 2025
    Special Publication
    Fracturing the Axis: Degrading and Disrupting Iran’s Proxy Network
    This article examines the unprecedented transformation in the proxy network of the Ayatollah regime across various arenas, and analyzes its implications for Israel and the United States
    11 September, 2025
    Policy Papers
    An Opportunity to Shape a New Reality with Lebanon
    This policy paper proposes a strategy to translate the IDF’s achievements in the war against Hezbollah—along with the disintegration of the Shiite axis, the collapse of the Assad regime, and the consequences of the war between Israel and Iran—into a new security reality along the border with Lebanon, and to foster better relations with Lebanon’s new leadership. The strategy combines ongoing military action to weaken Hezbollah and prevent its recovery with political and economic measures designed to diminish the organization while simultaneously strengthening Lebanon’s pro-Western leadership. This approach differs from the one recently presented to Lebanon by the US administration, as it considers the constraints of Lebanon’s weak leadership and the necessity of bolstering it in light of the challenge of disarming Hezbollah. It outlines a more realistic timetable and offers Israel greater flexibility, thereby increasing the chances of success—even if progress is slow and gradual—toward establishing a new security reality and improving bilateral relations.
    8 September, 2025
    INSS Insight
    After the Israel–Iran War: Hezbollah’s Decline and Israel’s Opportunity
    Hezbollah’s avoidance of attacking Israel during its war with Iran highlights the organization’s weakness. What are the challenges Hezbollah is facing—and how should Israel take advantage of the situation?
    1 July, 2025
    INSS Insight
    Time to End UNIFIL’s Mandate in Southern Lebanon?
    During the war in the north, it became evident that the UN peacekeeping force failed in its duty to prevent Hezbollah’s entrenchment in southern Lebanon. Given this, how should Israel act in the upcoming discussion on the extension of the force's mandate?
    22 May, 2025
    Strategic Assessment
    The Development of Hezbollah's Deterrence Strategy Toward Israel
    2022 marked 40 years since Hezbollah’s establishment and 30 years since Nasrallah became the leader of the organization. Over the years Hezbollah has developed from a classic terrorist organization into a multifaceted and multi-identity organization that is a military force with conventional capabilities and the spearhead of the Shiite “axis of resistance.” Throughout these years, and especially since the Second Lebanon War (2006), the organization has gained military strength but refrained from exercising its offensive capabilities against Israel; its activity is driven by the goal of maintaining and consolidating its balance of deterrence with Israel, in the interest of avoiding deterioration into another full-scale war. This article examines the elements that have shaped the “deterrence equation” between Hezbollah and Israel, which combines kinetic military activity and cognitive warfare, its gradual development over the course of the 40 years of conflict, and the nature of the current balance of deterrence; this is the background to assess how Israel might best deal with the challenge posed by the organization. The article contends that the balance of deterrence is rooted in Hezbollah’s origins and evolution and constitutes a central component of the organization’s current strategy. However, given Nasrallah’s tendency to take risks and the changing regional reality, this does not guarantee the prevention of a future large-scale conflict between the organization and the IDF, which could develop into a multi-arena war.