Orna Mizrahi

How can Hezbollah’s financial resilience—based on a complex and sprawling global system that enables it to withstand IDF infrastructure strikes in Lebanon—be undermined?

Assuming that Operation Roaring Lion does not end in the complete defeat of Hezbollah, the issue of disarming Hezbollah will remain on the agenda at its conclusion—an interest shared by both Israel and the Lebanese state. This article proposes adopting the DDR model—Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration—and advancing an L(ebanon)DDR process as an orderly framework for disarming Hezbollah and integrating it into Lebanon, alongside repairing, rebuilding, and strengthening the Lebanese state. This framework offers an alternative to disarming Hezbollah through military force, which would require Israel to occupy all of Lebanon. Although it is clear that Hezbollah will not relinquish its weapons easily, the current circumstances present an opportunity to force this outcome through combined Lebanese–Israeli, regional, and international efforts. These circumstances include the willingness of Israel and Lebanon to enter into direct political negotiations; the military weakening of Hezbollah (and Iran) following the war; the IDF’s presence in southern Lebanon; and the growing support within Lebanon for disarming Hezbollah. On April 9, Israel agreed to President Aoun’s proposal to open direct negotiations with Lebanon to promote a peace arrangement and disarm Hezbollah. This objective is the central challenge on the path to an agreement between the two states, which would establish the Lebanese government’s monopoly over the use of military force. Experience from DDR processes suggests that this model can help, as it offers a long-term, supervised, and gradual process that combines disarmament with civil, social, and economic rehabilitation, alongside international support and reciprocal incentives for all parties involved.

Why did the weakened organization decide to open a front against Israel following its strike in Iran, how does this campaign differ from previous campaigns in the north, and how should Israel respond?

The Lebanese Army is the weak link on the path to realizing the vision of Lebanon’s new leadership, which seeks to repair and rehabilitate the state. A central aspect of implementing this vision is the collection of all weapons held by the militias, primarily Hezbollah, and their transfer to the Lebanese Army. This goal aligns with Israel’s interest in seeing Lebanon become a sovereign and functioning state, with a responsible central authority, whom Israel can address, that holds a monopoly on weapons through a strong army representing all elements loyal to the state. Hence, Israel and Lebanon share a common interest in strengthening the Lebanese Army so that it can implement government decisions while taking advantage of the growing weakness of both Hezbollah and Iran after the end of Operation Roaring Lion. The significant gap between the vision of Lebanon’s leadership, as reflected in its decisions against Hezbollah thus far, and its inability to realize that vision constitutes a challenge for Israel. This document presents the failures in the functioning of the Lebanese Army and concludes with recommendations for Israeli policy considering the current campaign, even though this document was written during the war and there is no certainty as to how it will end. Its importance also stems from the need to prepare for the international conference in Paris, which will focus on strengthening the Lebanese Army and whose date has been postponed until early April.  

What is the current state of affairs in the Land of the Cedars, one year after Hezbollah’s defeat in the intense campaign against Israel, and what risks and opportunities does this present for Jerusalem?