Publications

It is important to be clear about what issues were part of the negotiations with Iran. The country’s role in Syria and its support for different terrorist organizations in the Middle East were not at any point discussed in the negotiations, nor was it part of the agreement signed in Vienna. Similarly, progress on the nuclear file was not made conditional upon Iran changing its regional policy. Therefore, those who are expecting to see a significant change in Iranian policies are likely to be disappointed. The fear is that despite optimistic public statements by Western states on hoped-for change in Iranian policy, the nuclear deal gives Iran de facto recognition of its role as a threshold nuclear power and of its hegemony in the Gulf. With that, there is in practice implicit Western acquiescence to Iran’s support ─ through training, arming and financing ─ of Hizbollah, Hamas, and other groups. Supporters of the nuclear deal counter-argue that the agreement on nuclear proliferation should be looked at separately and that it does not change the international condemnation for Iranian support of terrorism or for its role in Syria. In fact, following an agreement, Iran can be expected to see substantial financial gains as a result of the unfreezing of its assets and bank accounts, removal of restrictions on commerce, and the opening of its market to the outside world. This will allow Iran to increase its support for terror organizations and provide them with money, equipment, and greater and more sophisticated weapons than in the past. In addition, a nuclear agreement that fully ignores Iran’s terror policy is an alarming sign of the status of deterrence capabilities of Western states, first and foremost the US, set against the Iranian regime’s policy of terror proliferation in a way that threatens the stability of the Middle East and Israel’s borders.