Publications

On April 5, 2009, President Obama presented in Prague an ambitious three-part strategy to address the international nuclear threat: 1) proposing measures to reduce and eventually eliminate existing nuclear arsenals; 2) strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and halting proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states; and 3) preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.President Obama set a time target of four years for securing all vulnerable nuclear material around the world. In the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) published on April 6, 2010 by the US secretary of defense, the first key objective of the NPR is defined as “preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.” The latter part of this objective served as an introduction to the Nuclear Security Summit, convened in Washington, D.C. by President Obama on Monday, April 12.

The explicit purpose of the summit was “discussion of the nature of the threat and development of steps that can be taken together to secure vulnerable materials, combat nuclear smuggling and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism," and"agreement on a joint communiqué pledging efforts to attain the highest levels of nuclear security, which is essential for international security as well as the development and expansion of peaceful nuclear energy worldwide." The US State Department statement then added that “the summit will focus on the security of nuclear materials, leaving other broad topics such as nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful nuclear energy to different forums, according to the White House.”Forty-four states and three international organizations participated in the summit. Israel, India and Pakistan, the three non-NPT states were among the invitees; North Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya and others, not friendly towards the organizers, were not invited, since the outcome of the summit was to be consensual. In his speech at the summit on April 13, President Obama said that “the risk of a nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up." While this statement is debatable, given Iran’s rapid progress towards achieving a nuclear weapons capability, there is no doubt that the security of nuclear materials is a serious issue that should be taken care of, with far reaching consequences if this is not done properly.

Two documents emerged from the summit: a “Communiqué from Washington Nuclear Security Summit,” and the “Washington Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan.”[1] The Communiqué serves as the preamble to the work plan. It emphasizes the importance of dealing with the issue of nuclear security. The Work Plan “constitutes a political commitment by the Participating States to carry out, on a voluntary basis, applicable portions of this Work Plan, consistent with respective national laws and international obligations, in all aspects of the storage, use, transportation and disposal of nuclear materials and in preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information required to use such material for malicious purposes.”

The Work Plan is thus a voluntary agreement between the participants to work individually and together – though not in a formal or binding way –to reduce the threat from nuclear terrorism. This agreement specifically refers to the following legal instruments and other activities that have a role to play in this endeavor: The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540  on preventing non-State actors from obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their means of delivery and related materials; the activities of the IAEA; the activities of the UN and initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; and last but not least, the responsibility of each state for the use and management of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction.

Thus the good intentions are there, but will they be effective? There should be no doubt that the summit will be a catalyst for states to take action and shore up any loopholes in their material accounting and security systems. However, each state will probably not change its procedures dramatically, and certainly not divulge any misdeeds to the outside world. Still, the basic question is how realistic is the threat of nuclear terrorism.[2] Although there have been confirmed reports of some black market trade in nuclear materials, the quality and quantities involved were not significant. There have been many rumors concerning the fate of USSR “tactical” weapons that have gone astray, but without confirmation. One could wonder whether this is a clear and present danger, or a pure fear of the horrible consequences should a terrorist organization obtain the capability to cause a nuclear explosion. Other than the evident interest of terrorist organizations, no concrete evidence was presented that they were on the road to achieving success in this effort. As such, the summit dealt with a collective preventive effort. Another important aspect of the summit was the utilization of the opportunity for President Obama to meet with some of his colleagues, including the presidents of China and Russia, in the effort to defuse tensions and reach agreement on action to be taken in the battle against Iran’s nuclear weapons development program. However, these drives were apparently of limited success.

One of the presumed reasons assumed for Prime Minister Netanyahu's unwillingness to attend the summit was the fear that this meeting would be used as a stage for bashing Israel on its nuclear program. In fact, this was not the case. The only time Israel’s program came up was during President Obama’s concluding press conference. He refrained from any direct message, but repeated the well known stance that the US calls upon all countries to adhere to the NPT. Israelis thus in the same category as India and Pakistan, who are almost never named in this context.

The US and Russia also made a good start toward fulfilling the first of Obama’s objectives by signing the new START Treaty, dealing with the mutual reduction of strategic nuclear arms. According to this treaty, the arms reduction shall be accomplished within seven years from the entry into force of the treaty. Thus one can say that there was a good start on two of the three objectives, the first and the third. But what of the second objective, the one dealing with halting nuclear proliferation? Isn’t that the most urgent issue today? What are the "different forums" referred to by the State Department? Is it, perhaps, the NPT 2010 Review Conference that will convene in New-York on May 3? If so, there should be little illusion that this forum will accomplish anything worthwhile in this area.

We arrive at the well known conflict between the idealists and the pragmatists: the first will see the summit as a big step forward in the greater scheme of things. The latter will see the most pressing issues of the day not being allotted the priority they deserve. In the case of Iran, we are several steps behind. Should that not have been the top priority?