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A series of factors, including the situation in Yemen, the return of Afghan “alumni” (the current generation), Iraqi “alumni,” and former Guatanamo inmates may test the relative effectiveness demonstrated by the security forces in the Arabian Peninsula in recent years in their struggle against terror. This is particularly relevant in light of what appears to be renewed attempts by terror organizations to strike at senior figures and strategic facilities. Recent attempted terror attacks follow a series of other plots: according to Saudi authorities no fewer than 160 attempts have been thwarted since May 2003. The wave of terror that hit the kingdom was largely contained following a number of executions, mass arrests, close supervision of web sites, mosque activity, and religious clerics, and the process of “rehabilitating” terror activists – in itself a somewhat controversial program.

The relative calm since 2006 came to an end in August 2009 with a failed attempt by the Yemenite “branch” of al-Qaeda to harm a member of the Saudi royal family, the first such attempt since the terror organization began to operate in the kingdom. The target, who was lightly wounded, was the son of the third in line to the throne and a leading figure of the kingdom’s anti-terrorism operations, Prince Mahmad Ben-Naif. An attack that was prevented in October also involved a Saudi citizen who came from Yemen, and he too appeared on the “85 most wanted” list released by the Saudi authorities in February 2009 (all except the two Yemenites were of Saudi origin). In the past year a number of activists connected to al-Qaeda operations in Hijaz were arrested, with explosives belts on them that were primed for use, arms, and other components used to produce explosive devices. In general, the main objectives of such operations are:

a. A change in the pro-American policy, and expulsion of the American forces stationed in the Gulf states.

b. The release of terrorists arrested in the Gulf states, or reprisals for past attacks on terrorists.

c. The fall of regimes that “have distanced themselves from religion,” to be replaced with “proper” regimes.

The Yemenite branch of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) comprises Yemenites and Saudis who found shelter in Yemen, reinforced by fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan, and activists released from Guatanamo. Members of the organization in Yemen enjoy relative freedom of movement in Saudi Arabia’s backyard, mainly due to the inability of the country’s central administration to effectively control areas outside the capital San'a.

Kuwait has also recently been faced with attempted terror attacks. Its security forces arrested a number of citizens who were suspected of planning to smuggle a truck full of explosives into the Camp Arifjan US military base south of Kuwait City, strike at the Kuwait security forces headquarters, and attack oil refining facilities. Newspapers in the Gulf, which reported on the attempted terror attack, claimed that the terror cell was captured as a result of information obtained during exposure of a sleeper cell in neighboring Bahrain.

It was also reported that the security forces of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) succeeded in thwarting a plan to blow up the tallest building in the world, Burj Dubai, and other buildings. It is not clear who is behind this attempt, but investigations are underway to ascertain if al-Qaeda affiliates were involved that received help from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards with a view to striking the financial heart of the Gulf. This attempt reflects the strategy devised by al-Qaeda, to attack strategic and symbolic targets, and it may indicate that the UAE has been added to the list of its enemies. Indeed, thus far al-Qaeda has not marked the UAE as a target, probably because a significant part of its budget comes from donations from the UAE, and possibly also because UAE authorities largely turned a blind eye to its activities, in the hope that it would thereby prevent terror attacks at home. Recently it appears that the UAE government has changed its mode of operation and has begun to act against the organizations’ funding sources. Not long ago, the UAE federal court sentenced an American businessman of Lebanese origin, on charges that he contributed to a charity organization identified with al-Qaeda, so that the latter could fire rockets into Israel.

In this context the Saudi-owned daily newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat claimed that another al-Qaeda cell in Iran is planning to carry out terror attacks on targets in the Gulf. The paper inferred that Iran is also involved in the attempt to assassinate Mahmad Bin-Naif on his departure from Yemen, noting that such a complex operation required the support of an intelligence organization of a foreign country. Whether Iran initiated and encouraged the recent attempted attacks or turned a blind eye is not entirely clear. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran terror became a means of trying to enforce its policy and boost its influence in the Gulf. In most cases it was not possible to prove direct Iranian involvement and thus Iran could deny any connection with such activity, and alongside covert activity, could maintain open diplomatic relations with the Gulf states.

The latest attempted attacks follow several years in which the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, achieved some notable successes in the fight against terror. Around 330 al-Qaeda activities in Hijaz were tried and convicted (most received light sentences). This is the first time in the history of the kingdom that such judicial activity was carried out, via a new court that was established as part of the fight against terror. Improvements and adjustments have also been made in the kingdom’s prison system – five new prisons have been opened, and the anti-terror units have been reinforced. Although the latest changes provide enhanced means for fighting terror it is not clear how effectively the Saudi security forces will operate. It is no secret that their loyalty is questionable, and some of them even support ideas of al-Qaeda.

In addition, despite Saudi claims that the rehabilitation program, which provides former terrorists with housing solutions and employment, is a success story, there are other views on the situation. In testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of America’s National Intelligence Dennis Blair spoke out against this claim, saying that most of the rehabilitated terrorists were “small fry” while the main terrorists did not undergo any sort of rehabilitation process, and in any case do not forsake terror. Nonetheless, Yemen also intends to adopt the Saudi model of terrorist rehabilitation, and with the aid of the United States, hopes to successfully absorb other former Guatanamo inmates. The Yemenite government’s inability to ensure imprisonment of the 97 Yemenite detainees is today perceived as one of the obstacles to fulfilling President Obama’s promise to close the prison by the end of the year.

Supporters of the “soft” strategy for combating terrorism in Saudi Arabia avoid tackling the long term solution for the problem, particularly because it requires wider political involvement, more cooperation from the religious establishment, a fairer distribution of oil wealth, and comprehensive reform in education. It is unclear if the kingdom is willing to undertake such changes, which may challenge the existing governmental system. Many Saudis who until recently refused to accept that their country, the birthplace of Osama bin Laden, has become a hotbed of terrorism, now better understand that they have long become its victims. To what extent do recent events represent a change in al-Qaeda’s modus operandi in the Arabian Peninsula? It is too early to say. Even if the attacks escalate it is unlikely that they will present the regimes with an immediate threat, but they require effective handling and addressing the social, religious, and economic roots that feed terror.