Control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is determined not only by who holds its shores, but also by who can threaten vessels passing through it. This distinction is critical to understanding the war in Yemen, the Houthis’ power, and the challenge facing Saudi Arabia and the international community.
The question of who controls Bab el-Mandeb may sound simple, but the answer is far more complex. Geographically and militarily, the Houthis do not control all of the strait’s coastline, and certainly not all the islands and surrounding territory. Important sections of Yemen’s western coast are held by forces opposed to them. But control of territory is not the same as control of maritime traffic. In today’s military reality, a force need not hold both sides of a strategic strait to disrupt navigation through it.
The Houthis clearly illustrate the distinction between territorial control and control through firepower. Utilizing anti-ship missiles, UAVs, unmanned surface vessels, and other weaponry, they are capable of threatening vessels from far beyond the coastline. In fact, the Houthi threat is not limited to the strait itself; it extends across vast parts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, even if the Houthis lose more territory along the coast, that does not necessarily mean they will lose their ability to disrupt maritime traffic.
The Houthis do not need to sink every ship, or even hit most of them. A credible, sustained threat is enough to drive up insurance premiums, deter shipping companies, and divert maritime traffic to longer, more expensive routes.
This leads to an important conclusion about the war in Yemen. Even if forces opposed to the Houthis manage to advance along the western coast, seize ports, or push them away from the strait, such territorial gains will not necessarily guarantee freedom of navigation. That would require a sustained effort to undermine the Houthis’ ability to identify targets, launch weapons, and replenish their stockpiles. Even successful military operations cannot guarantee that the threat will be eliminated entirely, especially when dealing with an organization capable of operating through mobile, dispersed arrays.
The implications reach far beyond Yemen. For Saudi Arabia, which wants to rely on the Red Sea as a strategic alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, this creates a double vulnerability. Even if oil and other goods can be transported westward, it offers no complete solution if the Red Sea’s southern exit remains under threat. For the global economy, the threat undermines confidence in one of the world’s most important trade routes.
The Houthis may not necessarily be capable of shutting down the strait entirely, but they can make passage through it dangerous, costly, and unpredictable. Any effort to guarantee freedom of navigation that focuses only on who holds Yemen’s coastline, and not on who can launch attacks from it, will miss the heart of the problem.
Control of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is determined not only by who holds its shores, but also by who can threaten vessels passing through it. This distinction is critical to understanding the war in Yemen, the Houthis’ power, and the challenge facing Saudi Arabia and the international community.
The question of who controls Bab el-Mandeb may sound simple, but the answer is far more complex. Geographically and militarily, the Houthis do not control all of the strait’s coastline, and certainly not all the islands and surrounding territory. Important sections of Yemen’s western coast are held by forces opposed to them. But control of territory is not the same as control of maritime traffic. In today’s military reality, a force need not hold both sides of a strategic strait to disrupt navigation through it.
The Houthis clearly illustrate the distinction between territorial control and control through firepower. Utilizing anti-ship missiles, UAVs, unmanned surface vessels, and other weaponry, they are capable of threatening vessels from far beyond the coastline. In fact, the Houthi threat is not limited to the strait itself; it extends across vast parts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, even if the Houthis lose more territory along the coast, that does not necessarily mean they will lose their ability to disrupt maritime traffic.
The Houthis do not need to sink every ship, or even hit most of them. A credible, sustained threat is enough to drive up insurance premiums, deter shipping companies, and divert maritime traffic to longer, more expensive routes.
This leads to an important conclusion about the war in Yemen. Even if forces opposed to the Houthis manage to advance along the western coast, seize ports, or push them away from the strait, such territorial gains will not necessarily guarantee freedom of navigation. That would require a sustained effort to undermine the Houthis’ ability to identify targets, launch weapons, and replenish their stockpiles. Even successful military operations cannot guarantee that the threat will be eliminated entirely, especially when dealing with an organization capable of operating through mobile, dispersed arrays.
The implications reach far beyond Yemen. For Saudi Arabia, which wants to rely on the Red Sea as a strategic alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, this creates a double vulnerability. Even if oil and other goods can be transported westward, it offers no complete solution if the Red Sea’s southern exit remains under threat. For the global economy, the threat undermines confidence in one of the world’s most important trade routes.
The Houthis may not necessarily be capable of shutting down the strait entirely, but they can make passage through it dangerous, costly, and unpredictable. Any effort to guarantee freedom of navigation that focuses only on who holds Yemen’s coastline, and not on who can launch attacks from it, will miss the heart of the problem.