Executive Summary

International legitimacy is not merely a matter of image or public diplomacy (‘hasbara’). It is a crucial strategic asset that impacts freedom of military and political action, international partnerships, the economy, and Israel’s long-term ability to advance its objectives. Today, Israel’s international standing has reached a particularly low point. The relatively broad support Israel enjoyed immediately following the events of October 7, 2023, has rapidly eroded, and it now faces harsh public and diplomatic criticism, international legal proceedings, growing strain on its political and defense ties, and increasing distance, even from some of its supporters.

However, the discourse within Israel regarding this crisis often tends to treat the world as a single, monolithic bloc. This gives rise to the familiar claim that “it doesn’t matter what Israel does”—it will be condemned for its actions regardless, and therefore there is little point in attaching significant weight to the international cost of its policies. This paper proposes replacing this perception with a more differentiated mapping of the international arena. A distinction must be drawn between a hostile core that seeks to undermine the legitimacy of Israel’s very existence; ideological critics over whom Israel has limited influence; audiences, governments, and institutions that are not hostile to Israel but have grown distant from it; and Israel’s supporters, whose continued backing—and particularly their willingness to voice it publicly—can no longer be taken for granted. Israel’s ability to influence each of these groups varies, and therefore its policy toward each of them should differ as well.

This distinction also prevents two simplistic conclusions. On the one hand, Israel should not be assigned full responsibility for the crisis. For years, it has faced a campaign that includes antisemitism and anti-Zionism, the activities of enemies and hostile organizations, bias within certain international institutions, and systematic efforts at delegitimization. On the other hand, this does not mean that Israel’s own conduct is inconsequential. The scale of casualties and destruction in the Gaza Strip and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, the reality in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), including violence by Jewish extremists against Palestinians and measures perceived as seeking to displace them, extreme and racist statements by public officials, and the absence of a credible political horizon or an Israeli diplomatic initiative—all weigh heavily on attitudes toward Israel among audiences whose views are not predetermined. It is precisely with them that Israel retains real room for maneuver.

This points to the appropriate policy response. Restoring Israel’s international standing cannot be reduced to a public diplomacy campaign, but neither does it require Israel to relinquish vital security interests. It calls for a policy shift across three levels: systematically incorporating considerations of international legitimacy into decisionmaking processes; building professional, factual, and legal capabilities to address allegations, institutional biases, and campaigns against Israel; and adopting differentiated policies toward different audiences—resolutely confronting hostile actors, engaging substantively with those who can be influenced, and actively strengthening Israel’s supporters. The objective is not to persuade Israel’s sworn enemies, nor is it to rapidly restore the previous status quo. The realistic objective is to halt the drift away from Israel, bring non-hostile audiences back toward a balanced and more favorable position on Israel and expand and reinforce the pro-Israel camp—specifically its willingness to support Israel publicly. The core question is not whether the world is “against us” or “with us,” but rather where Israel can still exert influence and what it must change to translate that influence into a tangible improvement in its international standing.