The August 18 strike on the Abu al-Duhur base in northwestern Syria, for which Israel claimed responsibility and asserted was carried out to prevent Turkish military entrenchment there, was a move whose full ramifications may not have been adequately weighed. The Turkish presence and influence in Syria are indeed evident. Yet, contrary to what is portrayed in the video released by the Prime Minister’s Office following the strike, Turkey’s physical control over entire areas of northern Syria is actually diminishing. Nor can it be ignored that Turkey, like Israel, has a distinct security interest in developments in its southern neighbor, particularly given the presence of a Kurdish minority in northern Syria and the implications this has for the Kurdish issue within Turkey itself. In the balance of interests, northern Syria is far more vital to Turkey than it is to Israel. This gap has already influenced Turkish military operations in the past and will also manifest in the future, in each side's willingness to escalate the conflict as the costs rise.
Precisely those who believe that the Turkish threat is growing must examine it in its entirety rather than detaching it from its context in other, even more complex arenas for Israel's security, particularly the Eastern Mediterranean arena and the Palestinians. Ankara’s capabilities allow it, should it choose to do so, to take offensive action against Israel from Turkish territory, and the operational difference between acting from southern Turkey and from northern Syria does not, in itself, justify the Israeli strike that was carried out. It merely reinforces the perception in Ankara that Israel is an irresponsible actor looking for provocations (particularly explained during an election period in Israel) and increases Turkey's need to prepare for conflict scenarios with Israel.
In its action in northern Syria, Israel chose not to make use of the “hotline” mechanism, established between the two countries in May 2025, to prevent aerial friction between Turkey and Israel in Syrian airspace. In doing so, it endangered an important mechanism that has helped ensure that no unusual aerial incidents between the two countries have been reported over the past year. Moreover, Israel is not investing sufficiently in the diplomatic arena vis-à-vis Turkey. It has refrained from appointing a successor to outgoing Israeli Ambassador to Turkey Irit Lillian, and there have even been reports of deliberations over whether to fund the relocation of the Israeli consulate in Istanbul to another building, as though budgetary considerations alone should determine the matter and the Israeli presence there has no important operational or symbolic significance. In the absence of direct channels of communication, Israel relies on indirect channels where the potential for error is considerably greater.
Thus, from the decision to take military action in an area of northern Syria that Turkey regards as part of its sphere of influence, through the failure to consider the ramifications of action in Syria for other arenas in Israeli–Turkish relations, to the neglect of Israel’s direct diplomatic engagement with Ankara, it is evident that the level of risk Israel assumed in the strike in northern Syria extended far beyond that of a limited, localized attack.
The August 18 strike on the Abu al-Duhur base in northwestern Syria, for which Israel claimed responsibility and asserted was carried out to prevent Turkish military entrenchment there, was a move whose full ramifications may not have been adequately weighed. The Turkish presence and influence in Syria are indeed evident. Yet, contrary to what is portrayed in the video released by the Prime Minister’s Office following the strike, Turkey’s physical control over entire areas of northern Syria is actually diminishing. Nor can it be ignored that Turkey, like Israel, has a distinct security interest in developments in its southern neighbor, particularly given the presence of a Kurdish minority in northern Syria and the implications this has for the Kurdish issue within Turkey itself. In the balance of interests, northern Syria is far more vital to Turkey than it is to Israel. This gap has already influenced Turkish military operations in the past and will also manifest in the future, in each side's willingness to escalate the conflict as the costs rise.
Precisely those who believe that the Turkish threat is growing must examine it in its entirety rather than detaching it from its context in other, even more complex arenas for Israel's security, particularly the Eastern Mediterranean arena and the Palestinians. Ankara’s capabilities allow it, should it choose to do so, to take offensive action against Israel from Turkish territory, and the operational difference between acting from southern Turkey and from northern Syria does not, in itself, justify the Israeli strike that was carried out. It merely reinforces the perception in Ankara that Israel is an irresponsible actor looking for provocations (particularly explained during an election period in Israel) and increases Turkey's need to prepare for conflict scenarios with Israel.
In its action in northern Syria, Israel chose not to make use of the “hotline” mechanism, established between the two countries in May 2025, to prevent aerial friction between Turkey and Israel in Syrian airspace. In doing so, it endangered an important mechanism that has helped ensure that no unusual aerial incidents between the two countries have been reported over the past year. Moreover, Israel is not investing sufficiently in the diplomatic arena vis-à-vis Turkey. It has refrained from appointing a successor to outgoing Israeli Ambassador to Turkey Irit Lillian, and there have even been reports of deliberations over whether to fund the relocation of the Israeli consulate in Istanbul to another building, as though budgetary considerations alone should determine the matter and the Israeli presence there has no important operational or symbolic significance. In the absence of direct channels of communication, Israel relies on indirect channels where the potential for error is considerably greater.
Thus, from the decision to take military action in an area of northern Syria that Turkey regards as part of its sphere of influence, through the failure to consider the ramifications of action in Syria for other arenas in Israeli–Turkish relations, to the neglect of Israel’s direct diplomatic engagement with Ankara, it is evident that the level of risk Israel assumed in the strike in northern Syria extended far beyond that of a limited, localized attack.