Donald Trump has made time a central component of his strategy against Iran: as he sees it, the longer the war and economic pressure drag on, the more Tehran’s resources will be depleted, the greater the internal pressure it will face, and the higher the likelihood that Iran will be forced to compromise. In a contest of endurance between the United States and Iran, time should theoretically work in Washington’s favor.
However, the war is not being waged between these two countries alone. Positioned between them are the United States’ Gulf allies, foremost among them Saudi Arabia—and they are running on a different clock. In fact, the vulnerability of the Gulf states is one of the main reasons Washington has struggled to achieve its war objectives so far. The United States' ability to continue exerting pressure on Iran is constrained not only by Tehran’s resilience, but also by the price being paid by Washington’s regional partners.
Saudi Arabia finds itself caught between two maritime choke points critical to its economy. To the east lies the Strait of Hormuz, where disruptions have affected maritime traffic and exports. The Kingdom managed to mitigate the damage via the East-West Pipeline, which pumps oil to Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. Yet this alternative has also grown vulnerable due to the Houthi threat to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In practice, Riyadh is forced to navigate simultaneous pressure on both of its main outlet routes.
Saudi Arabia views Iran and its proxies as a direct threat, and has strongly condemned Iranian attacks targeting the Gulf states. But precisely because of its vulnerability, its interests do not fully align with those of the United States. From Washington’s perspective, several more months of pressure may be a worthwhile investment toward securing better terms. For Riyadh, every additional week risks a strike on a tanker, a port, an energy facility, or further damage to investor confidence.
This is also the source of Iran’s strategic advantage. Tehran does not need to defeat the U.S. militarily or turn the Gulf states into allies. It only needs to demonstrate to them that prolonging the war poses a greater risk than reaching a partial settlement with Iran. As pressure builds in Hormuz and the Red Sea, the incentive for Gulf states to seek independent avenues for de-escalation grows stronger.
Recent developments in Oman illustrate this well. Muscat and Tehran are working to advance understandings regarding traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, even though the move has met with strong opposition from Washington. If such an arrangement restores a measure of stability to trade routes, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states will find it difficult to disregard simply because it does not fully align with American war objectives.
This is the paradox at the heart of Trump’s time-based strategy: the Gulf states are not merely a peripheral arena in this war. Their exposure allows Iran to exert indirect leverage over Washington, making it difficult for the United States to translate military superiority into a political gain. Ultimately, the key question is not just how long Iran can hold out, but how long the United States' allies are willing to bear the costs of the war.
Donald Trump has made time a central component of his strategy against Iran: as he sees it, the longer the war and economic pressure drag on, the more Tehran’s resources will be depleted, the greater the internal pressure it will face, and the higher the likelihood that Iran will be forced to compromise. In a contest of endurance between the United States and Iran, time should theoretically work in Washington’s favor.
However, the war is not being waged between these two countries alone. Positioned between them are the United States’ Gulf allies, foremost among them Saudi Arabia—and they are running on a different clock. In fact, the vulnerability of the Gulf states is one of the main reasons Washington has struggled to achieve its war objectives so far. The United States' ability to continue exerting pressure on Iran is constrained not only by Tehran’s resilience, but also by the price being paid by Washington’s regional partners.
Saudi Arabia finds itself caught between two maritime choke points critical to its economy. To the east lies the Strait of Hormuz, where disruptions have affected maritime traffic and exports. The Kingdom managed to mitigate the damage via the East-West Pipeline, which pumps oil to Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. Yet this alternative has also grown vulnerable due to the Houthi threat to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In practice, Riyadh is forced to navigate simultaneous pressure on both of its main outlet routes.
Saudi Arabia views Iran and its proxies as a direct threat, and has strongly condemned Iranian attacks targeting the Gulf states. But precisely because of its vulnerability, its interests do not fully align with those of the United States. From Washington’s perspective, several more months of pressure may be a worthwhile investment toward securing better terms. For Riyadh, every additional week risks a strike on a tanker, a port, an energy facility, or further damage to investor confidence.
This is also the source of Iran’s strategic advantage. Tehran does not need to defeat the U.S. militarily or turn the Gulf states into allies. It only needs to demonstrate to them that prolonging the war poses a greater risk than reaching a partial settlement with Iran. As pressure builds in Hormuz and the Red Sea, the incentive for Gulf states to seek independent avenues for de-escalation grows stronger.
Recent developments in Oman illustrate this well. Muscat and Tehran are working to advance understandings regarding traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, even though the move has met with strong opposition from Washington. If such an arrangement restores a measure of stability to trade routes, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states will find it difficult to disregard simply because it does not fully align with American war objectives.
This is the paradox at the heart of Trump’s time-based strategy: the Gulf states are not merely a peripheral arena in this war. Their exposure allows Iran to exert indirect leverage over Washington, making it difficult for the United States to translate military superiority into a political gain. Ultimately, the key question is not just how long Iran can hold out, but how long the United States' allies are willing to bear the costs of the war.