For years, the United Arab Emirates has invested in the oil pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi’s oil fields to Fujairah, one of the federation’s seven emirates, located outside the Gulf on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. Now, against the backdrop of the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz — which is reshaping the Gulf’s trade and energy map — it appears that this was only the beginning.
The UAE is currently advancing an ambitious plan to build a new port and expand container facilities in Fujairah. At the same time, it is considering increasing the volume of oil transported there through additional pipeline infrastructure. The Abu Dhabi–Fujairah oil pipeline currently enables the export of approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil per day outside the Gulf and has itself been targeted by Iranian attacks. Abu Dhabi’s objective is clear: to increase the volume of oil exported through a route that bypasses Hormuz and reduce its dependence on Jebel Ali Port — the Middle East’s most important trade hub — which lies inside the Gulf and is severely affected whenever the Strait of Hormuz is closed or threatened. The port’s facilities have also been struck by Iran.
Yet this move creates a strategic paradox. The more Fujairah becomes the UAE’s alternative maritime gateway, the more it will also become a strategic target for Iran. Whereas Hormuz has traditionally been the principal chokepoint for regional trade, Fujairah itself could become the “new vulnerability.” Concentrating ports, oil terminals, storage facilities, pipelines, and logistical infrastructure in one area may indeed enhance the Emirates’ economic resilience, but it could also increase the incentive to strike that area during a crisis.
The broader lesson is clear: the Gulf states are not giving up on Hormuz, but they are building a contingency plan. Yet that contingency plan is not invulnerable; it merely shifts the strategic center of gravity from one point of friction to another. In other words, Fujairah does not replace Hormuz, but it is becoming the next critical link in the struggle over freedom of navigation and trade in the Gulf.
For years, the United Arab Emirates has invested in the oil pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi’s oil fields to Fujairah, one of the federation’s seven emirates, located outside the Gulf on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. Now, against the backdrop of the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz — which is reshaping the Gulf’s trade and energy map — it appears that this was only the beginning.
The UAE is currently advancing an ambitious plan to build a new port and expand container facilities in Fujairah. At the same time, it is considering increasing the volume of oil transported there through additional pipeline infrastructure. The Abu Dhabi–Fujairah oil pipeline currently enables the export of approximately 1.5 million barrels of oil per day outside the Gulf and has itself been targeted by Iranian attacks. Abu Dhabi’s objective is clear: to increase the volume of oil exported through a route that bypasses Hormuz and reduce its dependence on Jebel Ali Port — the Middle East’s most important trade hub — which lies inside the Gulf and is severely affected whenever the Strait of Hormuz is closed or threatened. The port’s facilities have also been struck by Iran.
Yet this move creates a strategic paradox. The more Fujairah becomes the UAE’s alternative maritime gateway, the more it will also become a strategic target for Iran. Whereas Hormuz has traditionally been the principal chokepoint for regional trade, Fujairah itself could become the “new vulnerability.” Concentrating ports, oil terminals, storage facilities, pipelines, and logistical infrastructure in one area may indeed enhance the Emirates’ economic resilience, but it could also increase the incentive to strike that area during a crisis.
The broader lesson is clear: the Gulf states are not giving up on Hormuz, but they are building a contingency plan. Yet that contingency plan is not invulnerable; it merely shifts the strategic center of gravity from one point of friction to another. In other words, Fujairah does not replace Hormuz, but it is becoming the next critical link in the struggle over freedom of navigation and trade in the Gulf.