In September, the Wall Street Journal reported that approximately 1,300 shipments of dual-use components were sent from China to Iran during the first half of the year. These included GPS-based tracking and positioning devices, electric motors, and aircraft engine parts that could be used in UAV propulsion and flight-control systems, as well as missile navigation and guidance systems. These components also have civilian uses.
China also supplies Iran with chemicals, including sodium perchlorate and ammonium perchlorate, which are used in the production of solid fuel for ballistic missiles. U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran's missile industry have heightened the importance of Chinese supplies for its rehabilitation. Following the U.S. naval blockade, Tehran expanded its air freight from China. In the first week of September 2026, the number of weekly flights between the two countries doubled compared to the period before the war, and many may have been dedicated solely to cargo transport.
At the same time, China is assisting Iran's proxies. In October, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Houthis are developing a medium-range ballistic missile using Chinese components, based on Iran’s "Kheiber Shekan" missile. The Yemeni government expressed concern to Beijing over the supply of weapons-manufacturing components to the Houthis, and a senior Saudi official claimed that actors in China and Russia are contributing to Iran's and the Houthis' capabilities.
China rejected these allegations, emphasizing that it regulates defense and dual-use exports in accordance with its laws and international commitments.
For Israel, the supply of dual-use components from China to Iran and the Houthis poses a potential threat, as it aids in the production of missiles and UAVs, as well as the replenishment of stockpiles. The expansion of air freight in response to shipping restrictions highlights the flexibility of supply networks and the need to counter them across all channels. Israel should make full use of intelligence coordination with the United States, regional partners, and European countries—which are also confronting Chinese supplies to Russia’s defense industry—and leverage Operation Economic Outcast to increase pressure on Iranian procurement and financing networks. Concurrently, Israel should enlist Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a joint approach to Beijing, make clear the diplomatic and economic costs of continuing these supplies, and encourage China to use the oversight tools at its disposal. Given statements by the U.S. administration and President Trump that he does not believe China is aiding Tehran, Israel and its partners must continue to monitor shipments and procurement networks, and assess whether these statements translate into the actual cessation of aid.
In September, the Wall Street Journal reported that approximately 1,300 shipments of dual-use components were sent from China to Iran during the first half of the year. These included GPS-based tracking and positioning devices, electric motors, and aircraft engine parts that could be used in UAV propulsion and flight-control systems, as well as missile navigation and guidance systems. These components also have civilian uses.
China also supplies Iran with chemicals, including sodium perchlorate and ammonium perchlorate, which are used in the production of solid fuel for ballistic missiles. U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran's missile industry have heightened the importance of Chinese supplies for its rehabilitation. Following the U.S. naval blockade, Tehran expanded its air freight from China. In the first week of September 2026, the number of weekly flights between the two countries doubled compared to the period before the war, and many may have been dedicated solely to cargo transport.
At the same time, China is assisting Iran's proxies. In October, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Houthis are developing a medium-range ballistic missile using Chinese components, based on Iran’s "Kheiber Shekan" missile. The Yemeni government expressed concern to Beijing over the supply of weapons-manufacturing components to the Houthis, and a senior Saudi official claimed that actors in China and Russia are contributing to Iran's and the Houthis' capabilities.
China rejected these allegations, emphasizing that it regulates defense and dual-use exports in accordance with its laws and international commitments.
For Israel, the supply of dual-use components from China to Iran and the Houthis poses a potential threat, as it aids in the production of missiles and UAVs, as well as the replenishment of stockpiles. The expansion of air freight in response to shipping restrictions highlights the flexibility of supply networks and the need to counter them across all channels. Israel should make full use of intelligence coordination with the United States, regional partners, and European countries—which are also confronting Chinese supplies to Russia’s defense industry—and leverage Operation Economic Outcast to increase pressure on Iranian procurement and financing networks. Concurrently, Israel should enlist Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in a joint approach to Beijing, make clear the diplomatic and economic costs of continuing these supplies, and encourage China to use the oversight tools at its disposal. Given statements by the U.S. administration and President Trump that he does not believe China is aiding Tehran, Israel and its partners must continue to monitor shipments and procurement networks, and assess whether these statements translate into the actual cessation of aid.