Table of Contents:

Summary of the Results

The arena that most concerns the Israeli Jewish public is Judea and Samaria (77%). Fewer than one-third of the Jewish public (28.5%) believes that the security situation in the north provides sufficient security for residents, with almost half thinking that the situation requires a return to limited fighting. A majority of the Israeli public (59%) believes that the decisions made by the political echelon are not based on professional considerations. Notably, 61% of the Israeli Jewish public opposes resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict on the basis of two states for two peoples.

Methodology

The survey was conducted between November 13–16, 2025, led by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Fieldwork was carried out by iPanel. During the survey, 801 men and women were interviewed online in Hebrew and 150 in Arabic, constituting a representative sample of Israel’s adult population aged 18 and above. The maximum sampling error for the full sample is ±3.17% at a 95% confidence level.

Click here to download the full survey data | Survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية | Click here to view trends among the Jewish public | Click here to view trends among the Arab public

the complete data

Perception of Threats and Challenges

• Fewer than one-third of the Israeli public (29%) rates the national-security situation today as “good” or “very good.” Twenty-seven percent of the public rates Israel’s national-security situation as “bad” or “very bad,” and 44% rates it as “moderate.”

  • The data show a clear gap between the Jewish and Arab publics: Among Jews, 31% rate the national-security situation as “good,” while only 23% see it as “bad.” In contrast, among Arabs, only 17% rate the situation as “good,” while 42% think it is “bad.”
  • Significant gaps also appear between coalition and opposition voters. Coalition voters tend to evaluate the national-security situation positively (44% “good” or “very good,” and only 13% “bad” or “very bad”), whereas among opposition voters, one-third (33%) think the situation is “bad” and only 18% consider it “good.”

• The future of national security is more optimistic than pessimistic. When Israelis are asked to assess Israel’s national-security situation five years from now, 41% believe it will improve (31% anticipate it “will improve somewhat” and 10% assert that it “will improve considerably”), compared to 22% who think it will worsen and another 24% who expect no change at all.

  • Among the Jewish public, nearly half (46%) believes the national-security situation will improve, while only 19% foresees deterioration. Among the Arab public, the pattern is reversed: 35% thinks the situation will worsen and only one quarter (25%) foresees improvement.
  • By political camp, optimism is most pronounced among coalition and right-wing voters: 58% of coalition voters and 53% of right-wing voters believe the national-security situation will improve, compared with only 35% of opposition and center-left voters.

• Concern is high regarding external security threats. A majority of the Israeli public (72%) reports being very or fairly concerned about external security threats to Israel, while only 27% is not concerned at all or are somewhat unconcerned.

  • Concern is relatively widespread across sectors: About 73% of Jews and 69% of Arabs report that they are concerned.
  • Concern is especially high among opposition voters (84%), compared with 61% among coalition voters. By political camp, a clear majority in both the right (66%) and the center-left (78%) is concerned about external threats.

• Concern is even higher about internal-societal tensions. A majority of the public (83%) is concerned about internal-societal tensions in Israel, while 15% is not. The public perceives Israel as coping simultaneously with significant external security threats and a continuing internal crisis—both viewed as potential threats.

  • Among Jews, 86% are worried about internal societal tensions; among Arabs, 75%.
  • Political gaps are also evident here: 90% of opposition voters are concerned about societal tensions, compared with 78% of coalition voters; yet in both camps, this represents an overwhelming majority. In the broader political breakdown, 80% of right-wing voters and 88% of center-left voters express concern.

• Personal security has sharply declined. Moving from national-level security to personal security yields a significant drop: Whereas 37% of the Israeli public reported in October having a high or very high sense of personal security, only 28% does now. Another 47% says their current sense of personal security is “moderate.” Only 28% of the public reports having high or very high personal security, versus 24% who claim they have low or very low personal security—an increase compared to October (19%).

  • The Jewish-Arab gap is stark: Within the Jewish public, one-third (33%) reports that their sense of personal security is high, and only 16% claim it is low. Among the Arab public, only 7% reports having a high sense of personal security compared to 55% reporting a low or very low sense of personal security.
  • The political breakdown also shows major gaps: Coalition and right-wing voters feel more secure—41%–43% report having a high sense of personal security, while only about 12%–13% feel a low sense of personal security. Among opposition and center-left voters, only about 19%–20% claim they have a high sense of personal security, while about 27%–30% report a low sense of security.

Trust in Persons and Institutions

• A majority of the Israeli public (74%) has high trust in the IDF (38% “to a great extent” and 36% “to a fairly great extent”), compared to only 25% reporting low trust. Compared to the previous month (78% high trust), there is a slight decline—yet trust remains very high.

  • By population group, trust in the IDF is very high among Jews (83%), while among Arabs, only 37% report high trust and 60% report low trust.

• High trust in the Israel Security Agency and senior security leaders, with a stark division between Jews and Arabs. A majority of the public (63%) reports having high trust in the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), with 52% having high trust in the Director of the Israel Security Agency, David Zini. In addition, 63% of the public indicates having high trust in IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir.

  • Among the Jewish public, trust levels are especially high: 71% reports high trust in the Israel Security Agency, 73% in the chief of staff, and 59% in the director of the Israel Security Agency. Among the Arab public, trust is much lower: Only about 23%–33% has high trust in these figures and institutions, while 43%–61% has low trust. Trust in the chief of staff remains unchanged from October at 63%, having increased from 58% in September.

• Low trust in the police and the police commissioner, especially among the Arab public. Only 34% of the Israeli public has high trust in the Israel Police, while 65% has low trust (23% has “no trust at all” and 42% has “trust to a small extent”). Only 32% reports high trust in Police Commissioner Daniel Levy, while 58% has low trust.

  • Among the Arab public, trust is particularly low: Only about 19%–22% has high trust in the police and the commissioner, while about 55%–57% reports having no trust at all.

• Trust in the political echelon is extremely low and highly polarized. Of the Israeli public, only 26% has high trust in Israel’s government, 34% in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 29% in Defense Minister Israel Katz, and 27% in Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. Roughly two-thirds of the public (65%–71%) report low trust in all four. Trust in the government and prime minister remains unchanged compared to October 2025 (27% has high trust in the government and 33% has high trust in the prime minister).

  • Among coalition voters, the picture is markedly different: 56% report high trust in the government, 74% in the prime minister, 58% in the defense minister, and 61% in the minister of national security—compared to only 9%–10% of opposition voters who report high trust.

• In the judiciary, trust is divided along political lines. Among the Israeli public, 44% reports having high trust in the High Court, with 40% having high trust in the President of the High Court, Justice Yitzhak Amit, while 52% has low trust in each.

  • Among opposition voters, trust is extremely high: 75% report having high trust in the High Court and 67% in the president of the High Court, compared to only 15% and 13%, respectively, among coalition voters. A similar gap appears by political camp: 64%–70% of center-left voters report high trust in the judiciary, versus only about 16%–19% among right-wing voters.

• Trust in the attorney general highlights the depth of polarization. Only 33% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, compared to 60% reporting low trust (45% has “no trust at all”). These figures continue the downward trend: 44% reported high trust in March and 38% in July 2025.

  • This declining trust is largely driven by political polarization: 62% of opposition voters report high trust in the attorney general compared to only 7% among coalition voters, with 91% of coalition voters expressing low trust. The gap between the right (12% has high trust; 83% reports low trust) and center-left (55% claims high trust; 38% has low trust) is similarly sharp.

• Most of the public thinks that the decisions of the political echelon are not based on professional considerations. A majority of 59% of the Israeli public does not agree with the statement that the decisions of the political echelon on national-security matters are based mainly on professional considerations rather than political or personal ones (30% “does not agree at all” and 29% “somewhat disagrees”), compared to only 37.5% who agrees.

  • Skepticism is stronger among the Arab public: 66% disagrees and only 31% agrees. Still, a majority of the Jewish public also rejects the statement (57% disagrees; 39% agrees).
  • Political gaps are especially pronounced: 78% of opposition voters disagree that professional considerations are the main driver, while only 20% agree. Among coalition voters, the picture is reversed: 65% agree, while 33% disagree.

• Trust is divided regarding the IDF’s investigations and lessons learned from October 7. The public is almost evenly split on the investigation and the process of lessons learned: 48% reports high trust (11% “very high” and 37% “high”), while 47% reports low trust (32% “low” and 16% “very low”). This level of trust is significantly lower than the overall trust in the IDF, which stands at 74% high trust, suggesting doubts about how the military is handling the October 7 investigation and its lessons. Nonetheless, trust has increased compared to previous surveys, where high trust ranged from 31%–42%, indicating some improvement in public perceptions.

  • Politically, the differences are relatively moderate. Among coalition voters, trust is evenly divided: 48% report high trust and 48% low trust. Among opposition voters, 57% report high trust versus 39% with low trust. This suggests that criticism exists in both camps, although with varying intensity.

Security-Political Threats and Challenges

The Various Arenas

• The public’s top concerns are Iran and the situation in Judea and Samaria; Syria and Yemen rank lowest.

  • A majority of the Israeli public (71%) is concerned about the Iran front, and a majority (70%) is also worried about the security situation in Judea and Samaria. Among Jewish respondents, concern is even higher: 77% are concerned about Judea and Samaria and 74% about Iran. Across political camps, both right and center-left, a clear majority reports being highly concerned.
  • The levels of concern about Gaza and Lebanon are slightly lower but still reflects a majority: 61% of the Israeli public is very or fairly concerned about Gaza and 59% about Lebanon. In contrast, only 36% is very or fairly concerned about Syria and 28% about Yemen—both seen at this stage as less threatening.
  • A significant gap between Jews and Arabs appears across nearly all arenas: While a large majority of Jews are concerned about Judea and Samaria, Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, concern among Arabs is lower. For example, about 49% to 57% of the Arab public reports being only slightly concerned or not concerned at all about Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and Lebanon.

Gaza Ceasefire Agreement

• Most of the Israeli public is dissatisfied with the enforcement of the Gaza ceasefire so far. A majority of the Israeli public (54%) reports being dissatisfied with the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement to date, while only 40% of the public claims to be highly satisfied (to a great or very great extent).

  • Dissatisfaction is more pronounced among the Jewish public: 58% reports being dissatisfied, and only 37% is highly satisfied. Among the Arab public, the pattern is reversed: 52% of respondents report high satisfaction, while only 38% express low satisfaction.

Northern Front

• The pattern is reversed regarding enforcement of the ceasefire in the north. A majority of the public (62%) reports being highly satisfied (48% to a great extent and 14% to a very great extent), while about one-third (33%) is satisfied only to a small extent. This suggests the public distinguishes between the two arenas, viewing enforcement of the northern ceasefire as better managed than enforcement in Gaza.
• Still, most respondents believe the situation in the north requires a return to fighting. When asked whether the current security situation in the north provides sufficient security for residents or requires renewed fighting, only 34% of the public said it provides security. Another 41.5% favors resuming limited fighting, while 10.5% supports a return to intensive fighting, including ground maneuvers. Overall, a majority (52%) believes fighting should be renewed, although most prefer limited fighting rather than a broad campaign.

  • Sectoral gaps are evident: Among the Jewish public, only 28.5% thinks the situation provides security, and a majority supports resuming limited or intensive fighting. Among the Arab public, 56% claims the situation provides security. Politically, the right-wing and coalition voters show higher support for renewed fighting, while center-left voters are more inclined to view the current situation as providing sufficient security.

Resolving the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

• A majority of the Israeli public opposes the two-state framework, but views differ by political camp. The majority of the public (52%) opposes resolving the conflict based on two states for two peoples, while 39.5% support it under certain conditions.

  • Among the Jewish public, opposition dominates: 61% opposes the two-state framework in any case, while only 31% supports it under certain conditions. Among the Arab public, the pattern is reversed: 75% supports it under certain conditions, and only 15% oppose it outright.
  • The political gap is especially pronounced: 85%–86% of coalition and right-wing voters oppose it in any case, compared to 26%–29% among opposition and center-left voters. Conversely, among opposition and center-left voters, a large majority (58%–63%) supports the two-state idea under certain conditions.

Israel’s Foreign Relations

• Israel’s possible international isolation—a concern mainly among opposition and center-left voters. A majority of the public (61.5%) reports being fairly or very concerned about Israel’s possible international isolation, compared to 35% of the public who reports being not very concerned or not concerned at all. Levels of concern are similar among Jews and Arabs (59%–62%).

  • The political gap is sharp: 77%–82% of opposition and center-left voters are concerned, compared to only 41% of coalition voters and 45% of right-wing voters—where the majority is not concerned.

Internal-Societal Threats and Challenges

Civil-Military Relations

• Closing Galei Tzahal (Army Radio): More are opposed, with sharp political polarization. Nearly half of the Israeli public (49%) opposes the defense minister’s decision to close Galei Tzahal, while only 33.5% supports it. Opposition is similar among Jews and Arabs (about 49%–51%).

  • The political gap is particularly large: 55%–61% of coalition and right-wing voters support closing Galei Tzahal, whereas 71%–75% of opposition and center-left voters oppose it. About 15%–26% answered, “Don’t know,” with the highest rates among Arab respondents, reflecting the issue’s complexity and differing levels of familiarity.

• The Bismuth plan for enlisting yeshiva students: The public is split. Forty-five percent of the public opposes the key principles of the proposed bill presented by Knesset Member and Chair of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Boaz Bismuth (25% strongly opposes and 20% somewhat opposes), while 43% supports them (30% somewhat supports and 13% strongly supports). Another 12% answered “Don’t know.” These findings indicate a lack of public consensus for this bill.

  • Politically, coalition and right-wing voters tend to support the bill (54%–57% support), whereas among opposition and center-left voters, a majority opposes it (about 53%–56%).

Jewish–Arab Relations

• A majority of the Israeli public supports some civic participation by Israeli Arabs, but views differ regarding their participation in the coalition. Some 27% favors active participation of Israeli Arabs in the public sector, including in the coalition and government; another 24% supports active participation in the public sector but not in the coalition and government. In contrast, 42.5% of the public does not support active participation at all. In other words, 51.5% of the public supports some form of participation, although most prefers it without partnership in the coalition.

  • Sectoral differences are substantial: Among the Jewish public, 52% opposes active participation, and only 16% supports full participation, including in the coalition and government (another 26% supports participation, excluding the coalition). Among the Arab public, 71% supports full participation, including in the coalition, and only 3% opposes any participation.
  • Political polarization is clear: Among coalition and right-wing voters, 72%–73% oppose active participation, whereas among center-left and opposition voters, a majority supports inclusion (69%–73%). Within the center-left, 44% supports participation, including in the coalition and government.

The Resilience of Israeli Society

• A majority of the Israeli public (65%) believes that solidarity in Israel exists to a small extent or not at all (12% says it “does not exist at all” and 53% claims it “exists to a small extent”). Only 29% believes solidarity exists to a great or very great extent.

  • Sectoral differences are not extreme: The Arab public is somewhat more likely than the Jewish public to say that solidarity does not exist at all, while coalition voters are slightly more likely than opposition voters to say that solidarity exists to a great or very great extent. Across all political groups—right and center-left, coalition and opposition—the prevailing sense is that social solidarity is partial and limited.