Publications

Key Findings:

Return to pre-Iran-operation trust levels: Following a sharp increase in public trust toward the security and political leadership during Operation Rising Lion against Iran, trust levels have now steadily declined across nearly all indicators. In most cases, public sentiment has returned to levels observed in May, prior to the operation.

• Trust in military institutions: Public trust in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has dropped from 83% at the end of June to 77% in the current survey. This marks a sharp decline and a return to trust levels seen in May. Trust in the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, also declined from 69% to 62%, again nearing pre-operation levels. Trust in the reports by the IDF spokesperson has also weakened: 56.5% now express high trust, compared to 63%–67% in June, similar to figures from May.
• Trust in political leadership: Trust in the government, which temporarily rose to 30%–32% during the Iran operation, has now fallen to 23%. In contrast, 76% report having little or no trust in the government. Trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also decreased from 35% to 30%.
• Trust in the Attorney General: 38% of respondents report high trust in Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, having declined from 44% in March but remaining consistent with the 39% reported in January.

Key Findings:

Belief in victory but less confidence in achieving objectives:

• 62% of the respondents believe the IDF will win the war in Gaza—31% are certain, and another 31% think it is the likely scenario. Conversely, 28% do not believe in victory—21% think the IDF will not win, and 8% are certain it will not.
• In contrast, only 53% of those surveyed think the war’s goals will be fully or mostly achieved, compared to 42% who believe the goals will not be achieved at all or only to a limited extent—a clear gap between a sense of victory and an assessment of goal attainment.

Lack of confidence in current tactics in Gaza—especially regarding the release of the hostages:

• A majority of 61% of the public believes the IDF’s current approach is not advancing the return of hostages—20.5% of the public thinks the IDF is advancing only the collapse of Hamas rule, and 40.5% believes t is not advancing either goal. Only 25.5% of the public thinks the military action is promoting both the return of the hostages and Hamas’s collapse.
• Regarding delays in securing a hostage release deal, the public is divided—52% of the public places all or partial responsibility on Israel: 21% sees Israel as having sole responsibility, and 31% thinks that Israel shares responsibility with Hamas. Another 45% places all responsibility on Hamas.

The day after the war in Gaza—skepticism over dismantling Hamas, support for the Egyptian initiative:

• The Israeli public is split on whether Hamas can be disarmed—52% is confident or thinks it is possible, while 41.5% is sure or believes it is not possible.
• Half the public (50%) supports the Egyptian initiative for an international technocratic government (not affiliated with Fatah or Hamas). Another 27% favors Israeli military rule in Gaza, and only 12% wants the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza.

Humanitarian situation in Gaza—sharp divides between Jews and Arabs:

• A clear majority (80%) believes the IDF is a moral army. However, the Jewish–Arab gap is stark—92.5% of Jews see the IDF as moral, while only 29% of Arabs do. In contrast, 63% of Arabs disagree that the IDF is a moral army (43% strongly disagree, 20% somewhat disagree).
• The public is skeptical about the proposed “humanitarian city” in Gaza—47.5% of the public opposes the move, versus 30.5% supporting it.
• Concern over Gaza’s humanitarian state remains low: only 35.5% of the public is troubled by the situation (18% very concerned, 17.5% somewhat), while a majority of 61.5% is not at all or only slightly concerned. Again, the sectoral gap is notable—just 24% of the Jewish public expresses concern, compared to 82% of the Arab public.

Shared Life with Equality—Public is Mostly Skeptical

• Of those surveyed, 71% believe Israelis and Palestinians cannot live together with full civil equality, while only 24% think they can. Among Jews—81% say it is impossible, versus only 16% who believe in the possibility. Among Arabs—57.5% believe it is possible, while only 29.5% reject it.

Key Findings:

Satisfaction with achievements—alongside expectations of renewed escalation:

• A majority of 62% of the Israeli public is satisfied with Israel’s military achievements against Iran—38% significantly, and 24% very significantly. Only 11% of the public feels dissatisfied. However, only 28% of the Arab public is satisfied, compared to 70.5% of the Jewish public.
• Despite being satisfied, the public expects further conflict: 61% believes Israel will have to resume fighting Iran within the next year, compared to just 22% who think it will not. Again, sectoral gaps appear—69% of the Jewish public foresees renewed escalation, versus 29% of the Arab public.

Key Findings:

The public supports a pragmatic approach but is divided over involvement:

• Given recent developments in Syria, the Israeli public does not support an immediate IDF withdrawal—most favor a cautious or tougher stance. Only 13% of the public supports immediate withdrawal and honoring the 1974 ceasefire agreement, while 38% favors a gradual withdrawal under international supervision, and another 38% supports continued military control in southern Syria. The Jewish–Arab divide is stark: 56% of the Arab public favors immediate IDF withdrawal, versus just 2.5% of the Jewish public. In contrast, 44.5% of the Jewish public supports continued IDF presence, compared to only 12% of the Arab public.
• Regarding Israel’s involvement in clashes between Syria’s new regime and the Druze population, there is relatively strong support for direct military involvement: 53% of the public supports it, versus 34% who is opposed. Compared to the May survey when only 21.5% supported military intervention, this is a sharp increase—and a clear shift in public opinion. In May, 41% preferred diplomatic pressure, and 26% opposed any involvement. Now, the public appears to favor a more forceful approach. Sectoral gaps are also evident: 61% of the Jewish public supports military involvement, versus just 22.5% of the Arab public. Conversely, 66% of the Arab public opposes intervention, versus only 25.5% of the Jewish public.
• A majority of the public (54%) supports establishing direct relations with Syria’s new regime, 26% is opposed, and 20% is unsure. This is a slight drop from May, when 60% supported such relations. Current support is relatively high among both Jews (56%) and Arabs (45%).

Key Findings:

Force exhaustion—An overwhelming majority opposes punishing fatigued soldiers:

• 90% of Jewish respondents believe soldiers who refuse another combat round due to psychological fatigue should not be punished. Only 5% support punishment. This reflects broad public legitimacy for combat stress, especially amid prolonged warfare and security tensions.