Publications

As early as midday on October 7, 2023, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared: “Taiwan strongly condemns the indiscriminate attacks against Israelis carried out by #Hamas. We stand in solidarity with #Israel & denounce all forms of terrorism. Our thoughts are with the victims & families at this tragic juncture.” This was a particularly strong statement, even in comparison to expressions of support by other allies of Israel. Since then, Taiwan has remained consistent in its support of Israel, and the bilateral ties have clearly strengthened, becoming more public than in the past, often at Taiwan’s initiative. Even during the war between Israel and Iran, Taiwan expressed its support for Israel through solidarity visits by its representatives to rocket impact sites in Israel and publicly identifying with the Israeli people. For Taiwan, this represented an attempt to return to pre-COVID normalcy, following pandemic-related restrictions that had significantly reduced joint activity with Israel. The war between Israel and Iran also offered Taipei an opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to Israel and advance its diplomatic efforts with Israel, evident in cooperation initiatives and reciprocal visits, and with other countries that are seen as “like-minded.”

Taiwan explains its support for Israel, as well as for Ukraine in its war with Russia, as a reflection of shared values, democracy and liberalism, in opposition to the illiberal autocracies of China, Iran, and Russia. Under China’s “One China” policy, which Israel officially recognizes, a country that maintains diplomatic relations with Beijing cannot also have diplomatic relations with Taipei. As a result, the relationship is limited to only economic and cultural ties that remain below the diplomatic threshold. Taiwan, for its part, hopes that its backing of democracies like Israel and Ukraine will translate into reciprocal support should it face Chinese military aggression.

Official Israel–Taiwan relations began in 1993, although not at a full diplomatic level, when Taiwan opened its Economic and Cultural Office in Tel Aviv. A few months later, Israel established a similar office in Taipei. These are official representations but with a status lower than that of embassies or consulates. Their establishment came after years of clandestine contacts in areas such as the economy, technology, trade, and even security, although these ties did not translate into political support. As early as the 1970s, Foreign Minister Abba Eban defined Israel’s ties with Taiwan as economic in nature and not contradictory to recognition of the People’s Republic of China, a model that has been relatively strictly enforced over the years. Alongside this, and particularly since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, there have been efforts, mainly from the Taiwanese side, to strengthen the relationship. These initiatives have received Israeli support and have sometimes led to objections from China.

Still, the relationship between the two is conducted through mid-level channels and remains limited primarily to “soft” areas such as the economy, innovation, agriculture, and culture. Taiwan, for its part, would prefer to learn from Israel in fields such as drones and robotics, but Israel restricts these initiatives. From Israel’s perspective, Taiwan is a semiconductor powerhouse, and this is the primary field in which it seeks to promote cooperation, particularly by integrating Israeli companies into Taiwan’s semiconductor industry value chain. In this context, there is unrealized potential. The Israeli and Taiwanese economies are complementary; Israel excels in product design while Taiwan leads in manufacturing. At present, Israeli companies provide specific technological solutions to Taiwanese firms, but this has not translated into a broader entry into the Taiwanese market, mainly due to Israeli restrictions on business initiatives that could be perceived as being related to military or security.

Taiwan’s Activity in Israel Since the Outbreak of the War

The Taiwanese Economic and Cultural Office in Israel is highly active, headed by Ya-Ping (Abby) Lee. Since the beginning of her term in January 2022, and especially since the outbreak of the war in Gaza, the office has focused on three main areas: engaging in knowledge exchange with Israeli counterparts, providing support to local NGOs, and developing contacts with members of the Knesset, alongside extensive and successful marketing efforts.

At the beginning of the Swords of Iron war, Taiwan sought to learn from Israel’s operational experience, but Israel was unable to cooperate due to the constraints of the “One China” policy, which prohibits military and security ties between Israel and Taiwan. As a result, a few days after October 7, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense appointed a team to independently study the war, similar to a group formed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Subsequent efforts focused on examining Israel’s social resilience. For example, a delegation from the Taiwanese civil organization Forward Alliance, which focuses on civil defense and national security, arrived in Israel in November 2024 and visited the Eshkol Regional Council. There, they met with community leaders, toured the emergency operations center, and learned how communities in the western Negev supported their residents, including those displaced from their homes.

Alongside learning, Taiwan, through its office in Israel, has worked to assist Israel in three main areas: education, local authorities, and emergency and rescue. The focus on education illustrates the office’s effort to engage with the younger generation in Israel, including collaborations with Reichman University and the Hebrew University, as well as support for programs in the periphery and the Druze sector that leverage Taiwan’s strengths, such as advanced technologies. Taiwan’s connections with local authorities aim to maximize potential for cooperation within the constraints of the “One China” policy. Two particular initiatives in this context are a donation of about half a million dollars to the Federation of Local Authorities for municipal security and the “adoption” of Kibbutz Kfar Aza. Finally, to promote relations in the field of civil resilience and emergency response, Taiwan has formalized partnerships with rescue, emergency, and civil aid organizations, including significant donations to Magen David Adom during the war with Gaza and to ZAKA during the war with Iran. Still, a survey conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies in May 2024 found that Israeli citizens are largely unaware of ties with Taiwan: 56% of respondents stated they could not assess them.

The Israeli organizations that Taiwan donates to are chosen in consultation with Knesset members who work with the Taiwanese office in Israel. The head of the Israel–Taiwan friendship group in the Knesset is Knesset Member Boaz Toporovsky from the Yesh Atid party. He has led two delegations of Knesset members to the island since the beginning of the war, neither of which was classified as an official parliamentary visit. During and after those visits, several Knesset members referred to Taiwan as a “country,” which could be seen as a deviation from the “One China” policy as recognized by Israel. Officially, this is not considered a violation of the “One China” policy since the speakers are Knesset members and not government officials. However, in practice, such statements have drawn criticism from China.

These developments, especially the statements of the Knesset members who visited Taiwan, did not go unnoticed by the Chinese embassy in Israel and Israel’s partners in China itself. In response to a question about Knesset Member Toporovsky’s visit to Taiwan, his ties with local officials, and referring to Taiwan as a “country,” the Chinese ambassador to Israel issued a harsh condemnation, which he also posted on his X account. He stated that Toporovsky’s actions “seriously violate the One China principle and undermine the political foundation of China–Israel relations,” and that the embassy had lodged a protest with the Israeli side. Additionally, the Chinese ambassador suggested that the Knesset member “spend time studying Chinese history” and “visit Fujian Province,” where people with familial ties to those living in Taiwan reside, in order to understand why, according to him, Taiwan belongs to China. These remarks prompted a response from Toporovsky, who, echoing the head of Taiwan’s National Security Council, argued that China supports Israel’s enemies.

Another direct confrontation occurred at a ceremony held by the Yad Ezer L’Haver association in Haifa, which maintains extensive ties with the Taiwanese representative office. At the 2024  Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony, Taiwan’s representative in Israel was invited to speak, prompting a demonstrative walkout by the Chinese diplomatic delegation in attendance. In addition, the Chinese ambassador to Israel addressed the matter directly in his articles in Israel Hayom and The Jerusalem Post, and indirectly in another Jerusalem Post piece, in which he claimed Taiwan was attempting to undermine the Israel–China technological partnership. The ambassador also raised the issue in a speech during the Chinese New Year celebration, attended by numerous senior Israeli officials, claiming that businesspeople, journalists, students, and others “oppose Taiwan independence” and “promote unification [of Taiwan with mainland China],” thereby contributing to the strengthening of ties between Israel and China.

In Taiwan, some voices are displeased with the warming of relations with Israel. In its early months, the Israel–Hamas war received broad coverage in the local media, on a scale similar to its coverage in other parts of the world. However, this trend faded in the second year of the war. Consequently, the Israeli Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei, led by Maya Yaron, has focused on public diplomacy, highlighting the atrocities of October 7, the justifications for Israel’s subsequent actions, and providing factual information about those operations. Recently, and in line with public sentiment trends in other countries, five anti-Israel umbrella groups have emerged on the island with the stated goal of ending Taiwan’s cooperation with Israel. Although these groups represent a small and marginal minority, they are vocal and persistent, holding weekly protests and pressuring lawmakers, public figures, and companies to cut ties with Israel and Israeli firms. Most recently, the Taiwanese shipping company Evergreen came under criticism for delivering steel to Israel. Although these efforts have yet to bear fruit, they appear to be having a chilling effect on decision-makers in Taiwan. A particularly disturbing incident involved a leading activist from the majority Kuomintang (KMT) party who wore a Nazi armband and carried a copy of Mein Kampf in public. Making matters worse, the party’s chairman, Eric Chu, instead of condemning the display, compared Taiwan under the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to Nazi Germany, effectively equating the sitting president, William Lai, with Hitler.

Implications and Recommendations

Since the lifting of the COVID-19 restrictions, and even more so following the outbreak of the Swords of Iron war, Israel–Taiwan relations have significantly improved across multiple dimensions. Declaratively, Taiwan has consistently supported Israel, and on a practical level, it has expanded its ties with Israeli organizations and companies. Additionally, Taiwan has intensified its efforts to learn from Israel’s experience in national resilience and emergency response. Yet the “One China” policy continues to limit the relationship by preventing engagement on security matters and restricting senior-level participation in official dialogue, while still allowing the development of economic, trade, cultural, parliamentary, municipal, academic, and civil society ties. However, the war in Israel has hindered visits by Taiwanese businesspeople and delayed the implementation of joint ventures already agreed upon. Moreover, anti-Israel attitudes among a minority of Taiwanese citizens, who consistently voice dissatisfaction with the strengthening of ties, could, if intensified, lead to a reassessment or downscaling of some initiatives.

In light of this, it is recommended that Israel:

1. Deepen economic cooperation by striving to integrate into Taiwan’s semiconductor sector and other industries, including water storage, a field with growing demand for innovative technologies.
2. Establish mutual learning in civil emergency and disaster preparedness while avoiding engagement in adjacent areas with military or security implications. Taiwan can benefit from Israel’s experience in national resilience and civil society organizations, while Israel can learn from Taiwan’s expertise in managing natural disasters, particularly earthquakes.
3. Learn from Taiwan in civil domains such as caring for an aging population and coping with foreign interference and influence campaigns, given Taiwan’s extensive experience in these areas and the growing challenges for Israel.
4. Continue adhering to the “One China” policy. Israel can and should maintain relations with both sides of the strait—full diplomatic relations with China and productive cooperation with Taiwan. While the Israeli government generally upholds this policy framework, it is advisable to brief senior officials and public representatives accordingly.
5. Maintain dialogue with Taiwan through Track 1.5 and 2 channels. In parallel with existing ties, it is important to promote flexible, semi-official dialogue.
6. Monitor emerging anti-Israel sentiment in Taiwan. First, Israel should initiate cross-party and cross-sector discussions on the use of Nazi symbols, clarify the underlying problem, and consider offering support for relevant legislation, as has been done in other countries. Second, Israel should continue efforts to build a positive image of itself within Taiwanese society, particularly among decision-makers and influential sectors, to mitigate the risk of future backlash.