It has been almost two weeks since Hamas has allowed and orchestrated the friction in several locations along the Gaza Strip border fence. While preparing infrastructure for the comfort of the rioters, Hamas is careful not to allow too large a number of protesters to arrive in the area, so as not to lose control of the events and to avoid an excessively high number of casualties, which could turn the anger toward the organization. At the same time, these events see a form of escalation with regard to the use of firearms (mostly gunfire at IDF soldiers) and explosive charges, which, it seems, consist of regulation-level explosives.
Hamas’s working assumption is that Israel would prefer to contain the provocations in order to avoid a security deterioration in the sector and beyond, in part due to its domestic distress and the government's limited room to maneuver. In its activity along the fence, Hamas succeeds in realizing a number of its important and essential goals:
- Shifting the domestic criticism and pressure toward Israel (a modus operandi that was also used during the Marches of Return in 2018).
- Applying pressure on Israel in order to increase the number of work permits and take additional steps to improve the economic reality in the Gaza Strip.
- Wielding pressure on Israel, leading it to pressure Qatar to cancel the reduction in monthly aid to the Gaza Strip. This joins the understanding that the Egyptian interest in calm will also lead, under the cover of Israeli pressure, to Egyptian pressure on Qatar.
- Moderating the criticism from the terrorist system in the West Bank regarding Gaza’s non-participation in the campaign.
- Responding to the pressure on the leadership of Hamas in Gaza exerted by the leadership of Hamas abroad, with an emphasis on Saleh al-Arouri, who is pushing for an active and significant entry of the Gaza Strip into the terrorist campaign. In effect, the violent provocation of Israel along the fence is also a tool in the Hamas internal political game.
Hamas's provocation incurs serious potential for escalation, while Israel's contained and restrained response continues to erode its deterrence against the other actors in the region. In addition, it also feeds or encourages the Palestinian terrorist system in the territories and creates a comfortable space for Hamas to continue its provocations. If the situation continues to behave as usual, Israel may find itself faced with an uncontrollable escalation in the Gaza Strip, at a time that is less suitable for it, and a further escalation of terrorism in the West Bank, while Hamas continues to undermine the Palestinian Authority and weaken it in a way that does not serve Israeli interests.
It has been almost two weeks since Hamas has allowed and orchestrated the friction in several locations along the Gaza Strip border fence. While preparing infrastructure for the comfort of the rioters, Hamas is careful not to allow too large a number of protesters to arrive in the area, so as not to lose control of the events and to avoid an excessively high number of casualties, which could turn the anger toward the organization. At the same time, these events see a form of escalation with regard to the use of firearms (mostly gunfire at IDF soldiers) and explosive charges, which, it seems, consist of regulation-level explosives.
Hamas’s working assumption is that Israel would prefer to contain the provocations in order to avoid a security deterioration in the sector and beyond, in part due to its domestic distress and the government's limited room to maneuver. In its activity along the fence, Hamas succeeds in realizing a number of its important and essential goals:
Hamas's provocation incurs serious potential for escalation, while Israel's contained and restrained response continues to erode its deterrence against the other actors in the region. In addition, it also feeds or encourages the Palestinian terrorist system in the territories and creates a comfortable space for Hamas to continue its provocations. If the situation continues to behave as usual, Israel may find itself faced with an uncontrollable escalation in the Gaza Strip, at a time that is less suitable for it, and a further escalation of terrorism in the West Bank, while Hamas continues to undermine the Palestinian Authority and weaken it in a way that does not serve Israeli interests.