The Abraham Accords provide Israel with a means for deepening its integration in the region. However, the Accords also provide Israel with opportunities to expand its sphere of influence beyond the Middle East and integrate into supra-regional alignments. Such a multifaceted alignment has been forged between India, Israel (I2), the United States, and the United Arab Emirates (U2).
During his upcoming visit to Israel, President Joe Biden is expected to take part in a (virtual) summit of leaders, the first of its kind, with the participation of Prime Minister Yair Lapid, UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This will in fact be the second meeting of the I2U2, whose foreign ministers met in October 2021. In context of this meeting it was announced that the new alignment would focus on relatively "soft" issues, such as economics, infrastructure, shipping lanes, and so on, possibly not to create an image of an organization with a security rationale toward countries in the region.
Since the meeting of the foreign ministers, a number of important developments have taken place, including the signing of agreements for the establishment of a free trade zone between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and a similar agreement between the United Arab Emirates and India. These agreements are expected to increase trade of goods and services between countries and create new opportunities and economic partnerships. Also on the agenda is an agreement to establish a free trade zone between Israel and India; discussions on this issue have been underway for over two years.
The I2U2 has the potential to strengthen cooperation in many areas, including energy, medicine, and food security. The advanced technology in Israel, the production capabilities of India, and the needs and sources of funding of the UAE represent the potential inherent in the new ties. It is estimated that the volume of Israel-India-UAE trade could reach about $100 billion by the end of the current decade.
Beyond the "soft" aspects, the I2U2 also has a strategic aspect. In the Gulf, there are voices calling for compensation for the reduction in American strategic attention by increasing the military presence in the Gulf of other countries, including India. Israel is also interested, for example, in increasing India's naval presence in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, theaters threatened by Iran. India is not seen as having expansionist ambitions such as China or Russia, and its good relations with the United States ensure that advancing relations with it will have America’s blessing.
However, the implementation of the cooperation may encounter political barriers, since the different actors have different priorities and different sensitivities. While the US and India see I2U2 as an opportunity (but not only) to challenge China and limit its presence in the Middle East, Israel, and to a lesser extent the UAE, may see it as an (additional) tool for dealing with Iran. In addition, more than other global powers, India is limited in its economic and military resources and is affected no less and perhaps more by internal political and religious constraints.
Israel should not exaggerate expectations of the emerging I2U2 in the military-security aspect, but the alignment may indirectly contribute to strengthened frameworks for cooperation that relate to Israel, first and foremost with the United States, and bring with them not insignificant economic and political potential.
The Abraham Accords provide Israel with a means for deepening its integration in the region. However, the Accords also provide Israel with opportunities to expand its sphere of influence beyond the Middle East and integrate into supra-regional alignments. Such a multifaceted alignment has been forged between India, Israel (I2), the United States, and the United Arab Emirates (U2).
During his upcoming visit to Israel, President Joe Biden is expected to take part in a (virtual) summit of leaders, the first of its kind, with the participation of Prime Minister Yair Lapid, UAE President Mohammed Bin Zayed, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This will in fact be the second meeting of the I2U2, whose foreign ministers met in October 2021. In context of this meeting it was announced that the new alignment would focus on relatively "soft" issues, such as economics, infrastructure, shipping lanes, and so on, possibly not to create an image of an organization with a security rationale toward countries in the region.
Since the meeting of the foreign ministers, a number of important developments have taken place, including the signing of agreements for the establishment of a free trade zone between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and a similar agreement between the United Arab Emirates and India. These agreements are expected to increase trade of goods and services between countries and create new opportunities and economic partnerships. Also on the agenda is an agreement to establish a free trade zone between Israel and India; discussions on this issue have been underway for over two years.
The I2U2 has the potential to strengthen cooperation in many areas, including energy, medicine, and food security. The advanced technology in Israel, the production capabilities of India, and the needs and sources of funding of the UAE represent the potential inherent in the new ties. It is estimated that the volume of Israel-India-UAE trade could reach about $100 billion by the end of the current decade.
Beyond the "soft" aspects, the I2U2 also has a strategic aspect. In the Gulf, there are voices calling for compensation for the reduction in American strategic attention by increasing the military presence in the Gulf of other countries, including India. Israel is also interested, for example, in increasing India's naval presence in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, theaters threatened by Iran. India is not seen as having expansionist ambitions such as China or Russia, and its good relations with the United States ensure that advancing relations with it will have America’s blessing.
However, the implementation of the cooperation may encounter political barriers, since the different actors have different priorities and different sensitivities. While the US and India see I2U2 as an opportunity (but not only) to challenge China and limit its presence in the Middle East, Israel, and to a lesser extent the UAE, may see it as an (additional) tool for dealing with Iran. In addition, more than other global powers, India is limited in its economic and military resources and is affected no less and perhaps more by internal political and religious constraints.
Israel should not exaggerate expectations of the emerging I2U2 in the military-security aspect, but the alignment may indirectly contribute to strengthened frameworks for cooperation that relate to Israel, first and foremost with the United States, and bring with them not insignificant economic and political potential.