Israel must adhere to the policy of ambiguity – while doing much and saying little. This applies to foreign reports of covert activity within the framework of the campaign between wars or on Iranian soil, and applies to air defense alliances.
I am often asked about the effect of political instability on security activity. I remind everyone that the security establishment is accustomed to this issue, and that in Israel there are enough checks and balances to prevent the possibility of political influence spilling over to security decision making.
The same checks and balances apply to the heads of the security forces, the heads of the intelligence services, and the security-political cabinet, which is obligated to convene any time there is a possibility of significant escalation to the point of war.
It goes without saying that the IDF must have a commander. It can’t work otherwise. Therefore, the process of appointing the next chief of staff must continue. The IDF must be removed from any political affair.
Israel must adhere to the policy of ambiguity – while doing much and saying little. This applies to foreign reports of covert activity within the framework of the campaign between wars or on Iranian soil, and applies to air defense alliances.
I am often asked about the effect of political instability on security activity. I remind everyone that the security establishment is accustomed to this issue, and that in Israel there are enough checks and balances to prevent the possibility of political influence spilling over to security decision making.
The same checks and balances apply to the heads of the security forces, the heads of the intelligence services, and the security-political cabinet, which is obligated to convene any time there is a possibility of significant escalation to the point of war.
It goes without saying that the IDF must have a commander. It can’t work otherwise. Therefore, the process of appointing the next chief of staff must continue. The IDF must be removed from any political affair.