Economics and National Security

Against the backdrop of the war in Gaza and the global trade war, how did Israel’s trade with China fare last year — and what are the major challenges on the horizon?

Why has the likelihood of a financial crisis in Israel increased?

What are the main characteristics of the budget approved by the government, and why does it fail to meet the broader economic needs of the country or provide a reason for credit rating agencies to reverse their decision to downgrade Israel’s credit rating?

Recent years have seen a noticeable increase in the recourse by states and international organizations to level economic sanctions on various countries, commercial entities, financial bodies, and individuals. This trend, however, does not reflect the success rate of these sanctions, and research indicates that their chances of success are slim. The reasons for the poor success rate of sanctions regimes depend on the specific cases and the importance of the interests of the involved parties. Nonetheless, certain patterns of behavior repeat themselves in each of the countries targeted by sanctions, such as adapting the local economy to the sanctions, resisting the sanctions in the international system, and taking practical steps to bypass them. This article surveys the patterns of behavior that countries employ in dealing with sanctions, focusing primarily on tools to evade them. Looking at North Korea, Russia, and Iran as case studies, it describes the tools that help nations bypass comprehensive sanctions. These modes of behavior also illuminate how various actors perceive sanctions and how countries that impose sanctions implement and enforce them.