Strategic Assessment

Keywords: Israel, Latin America, Asia, UN, embassies, technologies, start-up nation

Introduction

In recent years, parallel to the political crises and regime changes in Latin America, there has been a significant improvement from the left and right in countries on the continent towards Israel. This article discusses approaches in Latin America to relations with Israel over the past decade (2009-2019) and argues that Israel's strengthened image as a start-up nation with a culture of entrepreneurship has played a central role in Latin America placing Israel in the same category as a number of fast growing and hi-tech savvy Asian nations. As a result of this process, Latin American states have started to view Israel as on par with the economic attractiveness of Asia as a new source of technology, and an economic model that is worthy of emulation. This change comes about irrespective of the political situation in the Middle East and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The trend coincides with the way Asia has become more relevant for Latin America and the changing influence of the United States on Latin America over the course of the years, as well as the political changes in the region.

Despite Israel's
image as a technology leader and the entrepreneurial mentality in its relations
with Latin America, to date the trend has not been included in assessments of
Israel's relations with the region or received adequate research attention
(Grossman, 2018; Kacowicz, 2017; Mena & Segura, 2016; Robinson, 2019;
Vigevani & Calandrin, 2019).

This article analyzes
the context of the changes in the perception of relations between Israel and
Latin America over the past decade, and in particular examines the
interpretation of the Latin American media in light of the changes in the region’s
voting at the UN on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also relates to
Israel's policy on international aid in Latin America (Mashav programs), which
is at the main focus of Israel's low-key policy in Latin America.

The "Mobileye Effect": The Change in
Latin America's Relations with Israel, 2009-2019

There are currently
15 embassies of Latin American countries in Israel: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Along with bilateral
frameworks, these embassies operate in Israel along two parallel channels that
create a regional dynamic in relations with Israel: in multinational regional
blocs, and a regional framework that comprises all the Latin American
countries.

In addition to direct relations, Latin American countries manage their relations with Israel in a unified front, via multinational Latin American blocs. Three blocs have been especially relevant to Israel over the past decade, with varying levels of influence. One is Mercosur (the Southern Common Market), a trade bloc established by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, with Venezuela joining a few years ago; the second is SICA (the Central American Integration System), whose members include Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama; and the third is the Pacific Alliance, a trade bloc established by Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Colombia. i The purpose of these sub-regional frameworks is mainly to facilitate trade between countries with similar geographical characteristics, by canceling or reducing tariffs to encourage economic development, to improve their international standing, and prevent economic-political conflicts among the members (Florensa et al., 2015). In the case of Mercosur, the Paraná River passes through four countries that belong to this bloc and the river is used for trade between them. In the case of the Pacific Alliance, the four member states have the option to cooperate on trade with Asia.

Latin America is a
geopolitical region with a population of 750 million people and comprises 33
states, which account for 17 percent of the voting members at the UN General
Assembly. The region is the world's largest food producer, and the third
largest energy producer. The Latin America governments relate to their power in
the international arena primarily on the regional level, which is greater than that
of any individual country on its own. Nevertheless, the cumulative power of
these regional organizations is still limited. Therefore, the significance of regional
frameworks in Latin America can be appreciated despite the disagreements
between the various governments (AFP, 2019).

The relevance of
these frameworks for Latin America's embassies in Israel stems not only from
the agreements and from Israel's involvement in some of them, but mainly from
projects that these countries try to advance in Israel in the framework of the
regional organizations. An example is the free trade agreement that Israel
signed with the Mercosur states in 2007 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2007). In addition, on February 10, 2014, Israel was accepted as an observer
state to the Pacific Alliance (Basuk, 2014). By means of these blocs, Israel
has also succeeded in building connections and even influencing Latin American
countries in the absence of official diplomatic ties or a mission, such as in
the case of Venezuela.

The second
framework of Latin American countries in Israel is GRULAC (Group of Latin
American and Caribbean Countries), which includes all the Latin American
ambassadors in Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). GRULAC is a representative
framework without real operational capabilities and is headed by the ambassador
with the greatest seniority in Israel. Nevertheless, through GRULAC Latin
American ambassadors have succeeded in increasing their countries' influence,
and the group serves as a platform for broader contacts for Latin American
countries that are not generally the major focus of Israel’s foreign policy.
Israeli and Latin American representatives use the framework to advance
projects that would be likely to encounter obstacles in a bilateral framework.
In addition, it serves as a forum for joint consultations for all the Latin
American ambassadors in Israel, and organizes meetings with various sectors of
Israeli society (Embajada de Panamá en Israel, 2019).

The use of these
frameworks by Latin American ambassadors to Israel leads to almost immediate
regional implications for bilateral projects and agreements. For example, the
projects that Israel hoped to advance with the SICA states shed light on the
context in which decisions were made regarding the renewal of relations with
Nicaragua (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Israel attempted to be
admitted to SICA and promoted projects in the fields of renewable energy, water
purification, and others. Another element of importance is the participation of
unofficial actors interested in fostering ties between Israel and Latin America
like the Jewish communities in the various countries, who regularly participate
in the relationship.

The regional
character of the work conducted by Latin American embassies with Israel revealed
early in the past decade the complexity of these relations. In 2009, Bolivia
and Venezuela cut off diplomatic relations with Israel following Operation Cast
Lead, the military operation by the IDF in the Gaza Strip (December 2008-January
2009). Nicaragua followed suit in 2010 (AP, 2009; Keinon, 2009). Relations with
these countries began to deteriorate even before the fighting in Gaza over
ideological differences with those countries. However, their decisions had
clear regional implications, in part because the rest of the Latin American
countries felt the need to publicly address the question of how to enable continued
relations with Israel despite the decisions of their partners in various regional
blocs.

At the outset of
the previous decade, Israel's standing in Latin America was problematic,
especially in the largest and most influential countries in the region. In 2010,
the Brazilian government officially recognized the Palestinian Authority as an
independent state within the 1967 borders, including all of the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem—a decision that was
adopted by almost all of the Latin American countries in 2010-2011. However, from
Israel's perspective the problematic stance of Latin American governments
toward Israel in those years was not only related to the conflict with the
Palestinians. An example of this was Brazil’s organizing of a summit in May
2010 with Turkey and Iran in order to discuss various ways for Iran to progress
in its nuclear program. The Brazilian move came despite explicit requests by
the Israeli government in international forums against such moves and the total
awareness of Latin American countries of the implications for Israel
(Barrionuevo & Arsu, 2010).

Israel's standing
in Latin America continued to be problematic in 2011. There were reports in the
Argentinian press on direct negotiations between the governments of Argentina
and Iran for improving their relations and jointly investigating the 1994 attack
on the Jewish community center building in Buenos Aires (Eliaschev, 2011).
Following the Argentinian government's decision, other countries in the region
also began to strengthen their ties with Iran, Uruguay among them (EFE, 2011).
During that period, Israel opposed the interim agreement on the nuclear issue,
the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) (Landau and Kurz, 2014), which was finalized as
the JCPOA in 2015. In Latin America, the public believed the rationale for this
was Iran's support for terrorism, such as the attack on the Jewish community center
in Buenos Aires, and not the Israeli position that Iran constitutes a direct
threat to the State of Israel and a destabilizing force for additional
countries in the Middle East (Clarín Política, 2013).

The negative attitude of Latin American governments toward Israel early in the decade can also be seen in discussions at international forums. In 2009, for example, there were five votes at the UN General Assembly on the topic of the "Palestinian territories," and four votes on the "Palestinian question." ii There was a total of 135 votes by the 15 states that had embassies in Israel in 2019. The results of the nine votes in 2009 were 107 against Israel, 20 abstentions, and five not present. Only the government of Panama supported Israel on three occasions. The following year the results were even worse from Israel’s perspective. iii

International
developments in 2009 were especially complex from the perspective of Israel’s
standing in Latin America. The relationship must be viewed from within the
framework of Latin America-Middle East relations and the tension between
ideology and pragmatism in Latin America, especially toward the Middle East
(Funk, 2016). Operation Cast Lead took place when Barack Obama began his term
as President of the United States, which can be defined as the beginning of a
new era in US-Latin America relations. Latin America was not a high priority
for the Obama administration. Nevertheless, the period coincided with the term
of Hugo Chavez as a defiant President of Venezuela and the US administration’s
attempts to strengthen relations, and the renewal of relations with Cuba (which
became official in 2015 despite the opposition from Congress). In addition, the
reform of the US health system by President Obama was viewed in Latin America
as a left wing policy (de la Torre, 2017; Reid, 2015).

Despite the global economic crisis in 2008, Latin American governments felt confident in their decisions in the international arena and sensed that they had the power to manage an independent policy in international forums. Examples of this were Brazil's support for Iran's position on the nuclear program (Lopes & Faria, 2016), and the ability of certain Latin American countries to fund development projects on their own. Similarly, Latin American governments felt they were capable of establishing new multinational regional frameworks that left the United States outside of Latin America's decision making processes (Petersen & Schulz, 2018). In May 2008, the governments of South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela) signed an agreement to establish the UNASUR bloc (Cancillería Colombia, UNASUR). Nearly two years later all of the countries in Latin America decided to establish a new bloc separate from the United States and Canada named the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños, Celac). iv

During this period, a broad consensus developed in the region regarding the failure of neoliberal policy, which was seen as part of the United States interest in international financial organizations (Ruckert et al., 2017). The support of Latin American countries for Palestinian claims was connected not only to discussions in the international community on the Palestinian demand for self-determination. It also stemmed from internal socio-political discussions and policy in Latin America, which focused on topics related to human rights and the integration of minorities and those in need and not from an anti-Israel stance (Redacción BBC Mundo, 2010).

Against this
backdrop, Latin America lost interest in Israel during a period when Israel was
changing some of its outlets for dialogue with Latin American society. This
included the closure of the Ibero-America institute for Israeli culture (2010),
which operated as a conduit for dialogue with figures with influence on public
opinion in Latin America, including in countries without official relations
with Israel. The decision was taken for budgetary reasons and due to the
erosion of the institute's effectiveness. Various players in Latin America
viewed this as an additional example of the problematic attitude of the Israeli
government toward Latin America during those years, namely, canceling a channel
of communication without offering suitable alternatives (DB-GB, 2010).

After the March 2009 change of government in Israel and the appointment of Avigdor Liberman as Foreign Minister (2009-2012), there was an attempt to improve Israel's standing in Latin America. Liberman himself announced on the Foreign Ministry's website in Spanish, "The purpose of [my] visit is to emphasize the great importance that the Foreign Ministry attaches to the region" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009) but it was seen as too little, too late. Indeed, when in July 2009 Lieberman went on an official visit to Colombia, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina, the local press did not display much interest in his visit. From the viewpoint of Latin American countries, Israel should have presented its firm stance on the Iranian issue before Iran improved its relations with Latin America. Even though the Foreign Minister's message, as reported in the media, was "to take action against Iran's increasing activity in South America" (AFP, 2009), there were no assessments indicating any benefit in relations with Israel. Instead, it was perceived mainly as a "symbolic gesture" from Israel that merely aimed to influence public opinion in Latin America. v

In contrast with the apathy expressed during that period regarding relations with Israel, there was increasing interest in Latin America in the Arab countries (NA, 2009). The visits of Arab leaders such as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s in July 2010 to Latin American countries (Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina) were viewed in the local media as an economic opportunity to increase exports to Arab markets, vi as offers of trade agreements were raised regarding the export of agricultural products and beef from Latin America (Ayuso et al., 2018).

Israel's lack of attractiveness
to Latin America during that period was also expressed within the frameworks of
Israel's low-key aid, which operated in a similar manner to that during the
1990s. The Mashav projects (from Israel's
Agency for International Development Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs) that included
participants from Latin American countries are a good example. Mashav programs
in Latin America in 2010 (MASHAV, 2010) were not very different from the 1996
programs (MASHAV, 1996) and their impact on improving Israel's standing in the region
was limited.

The unprecedented deal opened up a lively debate on the role of higher education in advancing economic modernization and on the future needs of the region through the development of scientific, technological, and innovation capabilities.

The first signs of
change in attitudes toward Israel in the Latin American media emerged in late
2011 (Reuters, 2011), when articles began to appear in Spanish on the Israeli
hi-tech industry. This was accompanied by official Foreign Ministry publicity
in Latin America about new technology projects. In that year an article was
published on the website of the Israeli embassy in Argentina entitled
"Science, Technology, and Business" about the success of several
Israeli hi-tech projects; among those cited was Mobileye. The article explained
how large companies in the United States and Europe such as Coca-Cola have
integrated Israeli innovative technology (Embajada de Israel en Argentina,
2011).

The case of Mobileye provides a look at the change in Latin America's attitude toward Israel and opened up a lively debate on the role of higher education in advancing economic modernization and on the future needs of the region through the development of scientific, technological, and innovation capabilities.

The case of
Mobileye provides a look at the change in Latin America's attitude toward
Israel. The developer of advanced driver assistance systems was acquired in
2017 by Intel for $15.3 billion, in the largest acquisition ever of an Israeli
company. The unprecedented deal opened up a lively debate on the role of higher
education in advancing economic modernization and on the future needs of the
region through the development of scientific, technological, and innovation
capabilities. This development was seen not only as an opportunity for the
future of the region but also as a way to cope with the socioeconomic
challenges of the immediate future. For example, the UN Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) published a report in 2010 that
recommended cooperation between the business sector and academia (universities
and research centers) in order to improve economic performance in the region
while at the same time building new opportunities (CEPAL, 2010). Thus, in this
context, concepts such as "technology transfer" and
"ecosystem" began to reverberate. In 2011, for example, an article
was published in the Chilean press on the success of Israeli academia, how it influenced
the economy, and in what way it could be emulated in order to create new paths
for economic growth in Latin America (Rojas, 2011).

Even though Israel had started publicizing the country’s technological developments in Latin America as early as the 1960s mainly in the fields of defense, agriculture, and medicine (Oded, 2009) the case of Mobileye was different. It was seen as an example of a trend that began at that time in Latin America, namely, entrepreneurship that was the result of an innovative means of solving an existing problem relevant to the entire population that is unrelated to the defense industry and is derived from academic research. The example also generated considerable interest among various circles in Latin America where Israel receives little notice, such as university graduates who were starting to develop professional careers during the period when Silicon Valley became a euphemism for success (Clarín Mundo, 2013).

From 2011 onwards, following the buzz created by the book Start-up Nation: The Story of Israel's Economic Miracle (Senor and Singer, 2009), there were articles in the Latin American media that began to use terms like start-up and hi-tech with regard to Israel. That year there was also increasing concern about the impact of the BDS movement in Latin America, and here too the book's rationale became more attractive in Israel's dialogue with Latin American society. vii

The first Mashav course on the topic of start-ups was only held in 2014 Innovative Entrepreneurship: From Idea to Business (MASHAV, 2014). But already three years prior to that, Israel slowly started to become a popular destination for new players from Latin America who were interested in entrepreneurship, innovation, and hi-tech. 2014 was problematic for Israel's relations with Latin America due to Operation Protective Edge (July 8-August 26), and led five Latin American countries (Ecuador, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru) to recall their ambassadors for consultations (AFP, 2014). Nevertheless, in contrast to 2009, Latin American countries took steps to strengthen their economic relations with Israel. Thus, articles in the Latin American press dealt not only with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also with the "Silicon Valley of the Middle East" (Fernández, 2014).

At this stage, Latin American businesspeople, politicians, public opinion leaders, and academics started to take notice of a veteran Israeli product (namely, original technological innovation) in a new way and that was not directly connected to the geopolitical situation in the Middle East, the arms industry, or US policy. This in turn influenced and strengthened the development of relations between Latin American countries and Israel. The emphasis on concepts such as start-up, hi-tech, and innovation ultimately contributed to the "Asianization" viii of Israel in the eyes of Latin American public opinion. Israel gradually became part of the "Asian path" to economic modernization and worthy of emulation. This was not only for the sake of increasing the export market, but mainly for creating new opportunities related to innovative technologies. This concept was almost completely separated from the political situation in the Middle East. ix

The Technology Dream in Latin America: The Change
in UN Voting (2009‑2019)

In 2009 there were four UN General Assembly votes regarding the rights of the Palestinians. x The results were especially harsh for Israel, as reflected by how the 15 Latin American countries that in 2019 had embassies in Israel voted. There were 46 votes against Israel, nine abstentions, and five absences (four by Honduras, which was in the midst of a political crisis that ended with a military coup that year, and one by Panama). No Latin American government supported Israel on this issue. The countries in the region that voted in the manner perceived as most friendly to Israel were Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. All of them voted against Israel twice and abstained twice.

A decade later, in an identical vote, the results were significantly different: 37 votes against Israel, 14 abstentions, and nine votes in support of Israel. xi In 2019, Guatemala, for example, voted in support of Israel three times and abstained once. Guatemala was not alone: most of the Latin American countries changed the way they voted regarding Israel, especially the largest countries in the region Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.

The five votes held in 2009 on the "Palestinian territories" were based on the work of the committees connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Looking back, we can discern a significant change. In 2009 there were 61 votes opposed to Israel's position, 11 abstentions, and only Panama's three votes were in favor of Israel. xii Ten years later, the number of votes against Israel dropped to 49, with five votes in favor of Israel's position and 25 abstentions. xiii

The justifications for the changes in voting at the UN and/or in attitudes toward Israel, as they are expressed in the media in Latin America, allow us to identify a transformation in the approach of the region's countries, a change that is shared by both sides of the political map. In 2009, the President of Panama, Ricardo Martinelli, who began his term that year (2009-2014), justified the UN vote in the local media as supporting the position of the US government in the conflict in the Middle East, without indicating a specific rationale directly connected to Israel (EFE, 2010). In other words, not only did only one country in Latin America support Israel's position in a debate on the Palestinian issue; the President of that country did not even publicly indicate the desirability of relations with Israel as a reason for the support. Panama's support was not reflected in a preferential approach in Mashav programs. In 2009 only 15 people from Panama participated in Mashav programs in Israel (MASHAV, 2009), while 65 participants came from Ecuador, a country that voted decisively against Israel that year. xiv

A year later (2010), the positions of Latin American governments against Israel at the UN were harsher. In votes held on the Palestinian issue there were 48 votes against Israel (compared to 46 in 2009) and 12 abstentions. xv In the debates in 2010, Israeli policy regarding the conflict with the Palestinians was severely criticized, and the governments that voted in a friendlier manner towards Israel on this issue were Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru; all of them voted against Israel twice and abstained twice. As for debates on the Palestinian territories, there were 61 votes against Israel (no change from 2009), 11 abstentions, and only two votes in favor of Israel (Panama, which was absent from voting on one occasion). xvi The President of Panama explained to the Spanish media after his visit to Israel in March 2010 that his support for Israel at international forums stemmed mainly from the shared democratic values of the two countries an ineffectual message in the region (Benarroch, 2010).

Nor was Israel attractive enough to the opposition in Panama in 2010 to tip the scales toward voting in its favor. The opposition's message in the media was that Panama's foreign policy stemmed mainly from the pressure of conservative circles in the US Republican Party, which, according to opposition figures, influenced not only the decisions regarding Israel but especially its relations with the rest of the Latin American countries, especially Cuba and Venezuela (Alvarado, 2010). Panama's support for Israel at UN debates was not reflected in Mashav programs. Even with a total lack of any advocacy activity in Panama, there were only 27 participants from the sole country that supported Israel in 2010 (MASHAV, 2010). More participants came from countries antagonistic toward Israel, such as Uruguay, xvii with 44 participants (MASHAV, 2010).

However, in 2011 there was a slight decline in the number of votes against Israel regarding the conflict with the Palestinians. The Latin America media began to relate to Israel in a different manner and also addressed issues connected to its technological capabilities. In UN votes on the Palestinian territories, the number of votes against Israel went down to 60 (instead of 61 during the previous two years), following El Salvador's decision to change its position. That year it voted against Israel three times and abstained twice, unlike four times and once, respectively, in 2009 and 2010. xviii

El Salvador's
Foreign Minister at that time, Hugo Martinez, explained in the local media that
he met with Israel's new ambassador and with the Director-General of the
Israeli Foreign Ministry's Latin America and Caribbean Department in order to
hear about "Israel's point of view regarding the conflict with the Palestinians"
(Cancillería El Salvador, 2012). In addition, Martinez publicly thanked the
State of Israel for the aid it provided following the serious flooding that
occurred in Central America that year, and highlighted the importance of
Israel's technological capabilities, even though the aid was part of a larger
international effort that included other countries, such as Japan and South
Korea (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This change in Israel's favor
in El Salvador's vote at the UN coincided with San Salvador’s recognition of
the Palestinian state, after the visit of representatives of the Palestinian
Authority in Latin America (Cancillería El Salvador, 2012). After that visit,
El Salvador hardened its position: instead of voting against Israel twice and
abstaining twice as in previous years, it voted against Israel four times.

In the votes on the "Palestinian question" that year, Honduras also changed the way it voted, not voting against Israel even once, but chose to abstain (three times) and be absent from voting once. xix However, this decision took place in parallel with its recognition of the Palestinian state that same year, in accordance with the decisions of the rest of the Latin American countries (EFE bis, 2011). The change in Honduras's position was explained by its desire to contribute to dialogue between the sides (Redacción El Heraldo, 2014).

Despite Israel's military operations in Gaza (Cast Lead in 2009 and Pillar of Defense in 2012), the number of Latin American countries that voted against Israel decreased instead of increasing, as might have been expected.

In 2011, Israel
expanded its aid to Latin America through Mashav (MASHAV, 2011). The number of
participants in Mashav programs from Latin America grew from 603 participants
from 20 countries in 2010 to 702 participants from 23 countries in 2011. In
this context, 46 participants came from Honduras instead of the 15 that had
participated in 2010. The country with the largest number of participants in
Mashav courses in Israel was Ecuador, with 115 participants (MASHAV, 2011). Nevertheless,
the government of Ecuador voted against Israel at UN debates, both on the
Palestinian question and at debates about the territories. While it could not
be expected that participation in Mashav courses would change Ecuador’s votes
(at that time Ecuador was a member of the Bolivar bloc), it was expected that
there would be some connection between participation in the Mashav program and
policy towards Israel.

The year 2012 was especially complicated for Israel at the UN, as not only was the Palestinian status at the UN decided then (Redacción BBC, 2012), but Israel also carried out a military operation in the Gaza Strip (Operation Pillar of Defense, November 14-21, 2012). In this context, Honduras significantly changed the way it voted at the UN regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and instead of voting against Israel four times and abstaining once at a debate on the Palestinian territories, it abstained four times and voted against Israel only once. Consequently, the votes of 15 Latin American countries against Israel in the vote on the Palestinian territories declined from 61 in 2009 to 57 in 2012, and the number of abstentions rose from 11 to 15. xx Despite Israel's military operations in Gaza (Cast Lead in 2009 and Pillar of Defense in 2012), the number of Latin American countries that voted against Israel decreased instead of increasing, as might have been expected.

In the local media, there were not many references to Honduras's foreign policy that could explain the change in its voting, especially given the political, economic, and military crisis that many Central American countries experienced, Honduras in particular. Nonetheless, regarding relations with Israel, Honduran President Porfirio Lobo Sosa (2010-2014) insisted on the importance of relations with Israel, which aided Honduras in various instances through its technological knowledge and experience, such as the Israeli ambassador's offer of assistance from Israeli companies in constructing modern, fire-proof prisons, in order to cope with the crisis experienced that year by Honduras in general, and its prison system in particular (Notimex, 2012). xxi

Along with the aid
to Honduras, Israel again increased the number of participants from Latin
America at Mashav programs in Israel: 753 participants from 27 countries—including
even Venezuela (three), Bolivia (two) and Nicaragua (two)—countries
that had cut off their relations with Israel a few years earlier (MASHAV,
2012). The country with the largest number of participants in Mashav courses in
Israel was Colombia with 108 participants, followed by Ecuador (83), whose government
unfailingly voted against Israel in votes on the Palestinian question and
debates on the territories, without abstaining or being absent even once.

In 2013 there was an additional decline in the number of votes against Israel on the Palestinian issue. In voting on the situation in the territories, there were 54 votes against Israel instead of 57 the previous year, with 18 abstentions and two votes in favor both by Panama, which again was absent from one vote. xxii There was a marked change in how the government of Paraguay voted. Throughout the presidency of Horácio Cartes (2013-2018), the government of Paraguay abstained in votes on both the Palestinian question and that of the territories.

However, the most significant change in the case of Paraguay, similar to that of Panama in 2013, was the way the local media covered relations with Israel, in part in order to explain the foreign policy irrespective of the conflict with the Palestinians or the situation in the Middle East, while emphasizing Israel as a relevant model for technological-economic modernization, especially given the success of its hi-tech industry and the connections to that industry. Gustavo Leite, Paraguay’s Minister of Industry and Commerce, emphasized in his visit to Israel following the reopening of the embassy in Tel Aviv that "the delegation was also received by the Hebrew University's center for technology and business incubators" (Morán, 2013).

The discourse on
Israel in the Latin American press in 2013 shows that this public reference to
Israel was a combination of the results of the Foreign Ministry's work with
Latin America and various developments in the world of hi-tech itself. Articles
were published on Facebook's decision to open a development center in Tel Aviv
(AP, 2013) and on Google's purchase of Waze from Israel (ABC Tecnología, 2013).
At the same time, articles of a political-commercial nature were published,
such as on the technological cooperation agreement signed between Mexico and
Israel (REDACCIÓN SIPSE, 2013) and the free trade agreement between Colombia
and Israel. The local press in Colombia interpreted this agreement as an
opportunity for Colombia, because "the Jewish state stands out in the
global context thanks to its technological innovations, productive alliances
and technological cooperation" (Redacción Semana, 2013). Despite the
continued centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the press and in
various circles in Latin American countries, the media spotlight on Israel was
increasingly directed toward its hi-tech industry.

The year 2013 was also one of political-diplomatic changes in Latin America, in part due to the death of Hugo Chavez and the beginning of Maduro's presidency in Venezuela (Ellner, 2015). This change was made clear in several issues related to regional decisions in Latin America, such as the cessation of various integration projects with Arab countries and projects that Chavez pursued (for example, the cancellation of the program for academic exchanges between the regions, the cessation of talks on free trade, and more). xxiii

Coinciding with the period of weakened relations between Latin America and Arab countries, Israel's international aid agency offered for the first time the field of innovation and entrepreneurship at its center for training programs. Latin American countries received a new official message from Mashav that made clear that "in Israel there are more start-ups per capita than any other country, an achievement that is the result of close cooperation between businesses and government, a culture that rewards risk-taking, embraces innovation and entrepreneurship, and encourages imagination” (MASHAV, 2013). There were courses on subjects such as entrepreneurship for small and medium-sized business; innovative entrepreneurship from idea to the opening of a business, support systems for entrepreneurs, and more (MASHAV, 2013). In 2013, there were participants from more Latin American countries (20), although there were fewer participants in total (565), with broad participation surprisingly from the Caribbean countries. Once again the country with the largest number of participants was Colombia (117), and almost all of the countries sent participants to programs related to science and technology.

The following year, which included Israel’s extended military operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip, tested the trend of improved attitudes of Latin America towards Israel. Only Honduras and Panama changed the way they voted at UN debates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but in debates on the "Palestinian question," Honduras was the only country that voted in favor of Israel. xxiv This was a new government whose President was the first Latin American president to have also been a graduate of a Mashav programa fact that the President himself made sure to publicize on his official website (Cancillería Honduras). In these debates, Honduras abstained four times, instead of abstaining twice and voting against Israel twice as in the previous years. In votes on the Palestinian territories, Honduras abstained three times and voted against Israel twice (instead of opposing once as in the previous years). The international relations of the new Honduran government that year, especially with Israel, did not receive much public attention. Nonetheless, in the local press, there are mentions of the importance of the technological aspect of relations with Israel, such as in the case of acquiring radar for the war against drug cartels (see for example Baide, 2014).

In debates on the Palestinian territories, Panama also changed the way it voted, but in this case, against Israel. It voted twice against Israel, instead of once as in the previous years. xxv Nonetheless, in the local media the government of Panama emphasized its intention to work toward a free trade agreement with Israel, despite the seemingly serious damage to Israel's image following Operation Protective Edge. Why was Panama interested in this agreement that year? Meliton Arrocha, Panama's Minister of Commerce and Industry, clarified that it was because "a strategic alliance with Israel could strengthen Panama in terms of innovation, information technologies, and agricultural technologies" (Redacción Capital, 2014). These two decisions by Panama's government more voting against Israel at the UN with attempts to strengthen economic relations did not constitute an ostensible contradiction. That year, Panama voted in a manner friendlier to Israel than Colombia, a country that had signed a free trade agreement with Israel a year earlier.

Surprisingly, in a
period when technological issues became more central in the public discourse
between Israel and Latin American countries, and Mashav programs began to
emphasize heavily technological innovation and thus also the importance of an
entrepreneurial culture in Israeli aid programs, the number of candidates for
the program from the region declined significantly. In 2014, only 393
participants came to Israel from 24 Latin American countries (MASHAV, 2014).
This time too, the country with the largest number of participants from the
region was Colombia (78), even though it was not the country that voted at the
UN in the manner closest to the Israeli position on the conflict with the
Palestinians.

The following year, Panama, which had a conservative government that advanced a liberal economic agenda, was the only country that significantly changed its UN voting regarding Israel. It voted against Israel four times (instead of once as in the previous years), and supported Israel only once, in a debate on the situation in the territories. xxvi While Panama publicly discussed the possibility of recognizing the Palestinian state due to international pressure, it ultimately became one of the only Latin American countries that did not recognize the Palestinian state. xxvii The statements by Panama's Foreign Minister in the local media about the Middle East, in which she made a clear distinction between relations with Israel and relations with the Palestinians, demonstrate the new tone in Latin America regarding the connection with Israel. When it came to relations with the Palestinians, she commented on moral and ethical issues related to discussions on human rights (EFE, 2015), but as for Israel, she mentioned economic interests related to strategic fields for Panama's future. In her visit to Israel in 2015, she emphasized the need for cooperation between universities in the two countries (EFE bis, 2015).

In other words,
after 2014, the perception of Israel's technological leadership and
entrepreneurial culture constituted a substantial portion of the discourse in
Latin America regarding relations with Israel, and also facilitated a response
to criticism of strengthening the relations with Israel during times of
intensified conflict with the Palestinians. Starting in 2015, there is a
discernable process whereby businesspeople and academics in Latin America and
Israel started to take advantage of interest in technological-economic issues
and to organize private delegations and visits dedicated to these fields. This
was assisted by the Foreign Ministry’s work in Latin American in the areas of
innovation and hi-tech. Programs were organized that to a certain extent
supplemented (sometimes intentionally) Mashav's work in Latin America as in
previous years, both in terms of the nature of the programs and the number of participants
(Consejo Interamericano de Comercio y Producción, Capítulo Argentino, 2018).

The political
changes in Latin America in 2015 contributed to the strengthening of the trend
of referring to Israel in the context of economic interests and business
possibilities due to its technological innovation. This was underscored by the
opposition victories in Argentina and Brazil and growing disagreements between
Latin American governments over issues such as the crisis in Venezuela.

In 2016, the
Israeli government decided for budgetary reasons to close several embassies and
consulates in different regions of the world. This included the embassy in El
Salvador, a country whose votes against Israel at the UN became more vocal under
President Salvador Cerén (2014-2019). Despite negotiations that attempted to
prevent the closure (inter alia, the government of El Salvador emphasized to
the Israeli government that the offices of the SICA bloc are located within its
territory), El Salvador announced that it would keep its embassy in Tel Aviv. However,
it later lowered its level of representation to that of minister-counselor
(until 2020). Here too, the need for continued relations with Israel was emphasized,
especially on economic matters related to technological innovation (Cancillería
El Salvador, 2016).

In May 2016, Costa
Rica opened an official office for promoting trade relations (PROCOMER) in
Israel, even though a free trade agreement was not signed between the
countries. This is the only case in the history of Costa Rica of opening such
an office under these conditions (Rodríguez, 2016). Along with exporting
various products, such as coffee and pineapples, the director-general of
PROCOMER declared that Costa Rica seeks to use the office in Tel Aviv to expand
its connections with Israeli technological innovation, thus expanding its
presence in the Israeli economic system (PROCOMER, 2016). While Costa Rica
voted decidedly against Israel at the UN on the Palestinian issue and only
abstained once in voting at debates on the territories, the office in Tel Aviv
aimed at expanding trade relations with Israel and even to expand its activities
to include overseeing trade relations between Costa Rica and the Palestinian
Authority.

Brazil, the largest economy and one of the most important countries in Latin America, has also expressed increasing interest in Israel. On December 29, 2018, the first joint press conference took place between President-elect Jair Bolsonaro and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who attended Bolsonaro's inauguration. This was the first visit to Brazil by an Israeli prime minister since Israel’s establishment. At this symbolic event, Bolsonaro referred to the possibility of moving Brazil's embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and described how a strategic alliance with Israel could contribute to economic modernization in Brazil due to its hi-tech industry (Few, 2019; Guliano, 2018). xxviii The image of technological leadership and entrepreneurial culture in Israel has played a central role in attitudes towards Brazil-Israel relations (and especially changes in them) and has also enabled other governments in Latin America to offer or present possibilities for a better economic future by adopting work processes developed in Israel. This is without ignoring the religious and political-ideological elements of the Bolsonaro government a government that comprises a complex coalition of evangelical groups (especially those who define themselves as pro-Zionist) and with the support of the Brazilian defense forces. The government was also established at the height of a crisis experienced by the traditional parties from both the left and the right.

Israel's image as a technological leader has encouraged the process of its Asianization in Latin America not only in relation to political decisions. This is clear in Latin American countries' coping with the coronavirus crisis.

Israel-Latin
America relations are seen in Latin American countries as mutually
complementary, where both sides have shared interests in maintaining the
relations. The purpose of the "Shmita program" by the Guatemalan
embassy in Jerusalem was to become a strategic partner for Israel in the years
where according to Jewish law the land must remain fallow every seventh year.
The aim was to strengthen the agricultural sector in Central America technologically.
The program's attractiveness was twofold. Guatemala increased its export of
agricultural produce and took advantage of opportunities for the technological
development of its agriculture. Israel for its part benefited from the supply
of agricultural produce during a period of low domestic agricultural production
and the sale of its agricultural technology in Guatemala. Guatemala's
ambassador to Israel explicitly connected the considerable growth in his
country's agricultural exports to the Middle East to his embassy's move to
Jerusalem (Iton Gadol, 2019).

Israel's
image as a technological leader has encouraged the process of its Asianization
in Latin America not only in relation to political decisions. This is clear in
Latin American countries' coping with the coronavirus crisis. On March 30,
2020, the President of Argentina announced at a press conference that in light
of the spread of the coronavirus, he had begun a round of consultations with
China, South Korea, and Israel (Jastreblansky, 2020), and on May 5, he
announced to the media that his government is learning from the example of
South Korea and Israel in exiting the lockdown (Perfil, 2020).

Conclusion

Israel's technological development has become a strategic issue in Latin America-Israel relations in recent years, and is underscored by the possibilities inherent in relations with the start-up nation. This image has allowed Latin American countries to manage their relations with Israel according to a new paradigm, which separates relations with Israel from the political debate on the Middle East (especially the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also other issues such as the civil war in Syria, Iran's increasing influence in the Middle East, and more). Israel's technological attractiveness and its image as “an Asian high-tech power” have actually strengthened certain ideological attitudes such as those of several evangelical groups and provided legitimacy for changes in other cases. But they have mainly had an impact on the way the future of relations with Israel is perceived, and this has led to a change in Israel’s standing on the international stage. Israel’s technological image and notions on the future role of technology have led to changes in the thinking about future relations. Latin American governments have succeeded in justifying political decisions that are supportive of Israel, both on the international stage and in the field of bilateral economic relations.

However, these
developments raise new and complex challenges. First and foremost, the
technological image directs Latin American-Israel relations mainly along business
and economic considerations. However, the technology sector has its own
interests and dynamics that are not necessarily political. Second, this image
provides Latin American governments with greater latitude: they can strengthen
economic-technological relations with Israel while politically maintaining
significant distance.

The development of this image provides Latin America with the perceived appeal for strengthening relations with Israel; it also provides a limited window of opportunity for complementary bilateral relations. A rapid development of technology will complicate any future cooperation, as the result of an expanding gap in the way the ecosystem operates in each country and how the different players handle technological innovation. Only recently in Latin America, unlike Israel, have institutions been established that will be capable of utilizing and implementing the knowledge accumulated at universities toward commercializing technological innovations. The perceived value in improving relations with Israel could strengthen the connection in the short term but lead to crises due to unrealistic expectations on the part of Latin American countries regarding the results from their relationships with Israel. Furthermore, the challenges of Israel-Latin America relations will not only be connected with current political or defense issues in the Middle East the annexation of territories, military conflicts, and more but will also be closely tied to Latin America's expectations regarding its future in Asia. Thus, Latin America's path to Asia also runs through Israel.

---

Table 1. Participants in the Mashav
program in Israel, 2009-2019

Source: Mashav,
annual reports 2009-2019

Tables 2-4. Votes
at the UN on the “Palestinian question,” 2009-2019

Source: General Assembly. ResolutionA/RES,
2009-2019

Tables 5-7. Votes
at the UN on the “Palestinian territories,” 2009-2019

Source: General Assembly. ResolutionA/RES,
2009-2019

---

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