Strategic Assessment

• Book: "Storm" toward Iran [Hebrew]
• By: Ilan Kfir
• Publisher: Yediot Ahronot Publishing
• Year: 2019
• pp: 243

In his new book, "Storm" toward Iran, Ilan Kfir describes at length and in great detail Israel's policy in 2009-2019 on the Iranian question. The focus of the book is the author’s assertion that three times in 2009-2012, Israel was on the verge of launching an air attack on the nuclear sites in Iran, but due to a host of different considerations - some of them pertinent and others not - the IDF plan was not carried out.

The book contains many particulars (sometimes too many) about the policy of the Israeli and international leadership on the question of Iran and other closely related issues during this period. It is clear that the author did a thorough job of gathering facts and conducting research, and was successful in obtaining new primary source information. Furthermore, the extensive information that he assembled enabled him to portray in minute detail the complexity of the decision making processes in Israel, including how the difficult relations between Prime Minister Netanyahu and United States President Barack Obama influenced these particular decisions. At the same time, the claim that much of the book’s information and insights are published here for the first time is exaggerated, given that in recent years many details about the differences of opinion on the handling of the Iranian nuclear question, both between different decision makers in Israel and between Israeli decision makers and the American administration, were already made public.

Of all the details in the book about the events that accompanied Israel's policy toward Iran during the years in question, most important are the insights relevant to the main issues that affected and/or were at the center of the many discussions conducted by the state's leadership at various levels during those years. These insights are also likely to be of major influence in the decision making processes regarding the Iranian question in the future. This is especially so in view of Iran’s current measures to renew its uranium enrichment program in response to the American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and the renewed sanctions imposed on it.

Certain issues are particularly noteworthy, led by the complex, and sometimes both close and difficult relations within Israel's political leadership. In the book, readers are exposed in great detail to the dynamics between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, who championed the militant stance toward Iran and, according to the book, wanted to go ahead with an attack on its nuclear facilities. This dynamic fluctuated between close cooperation and coordination and concern about underhanded actions designed to promote personal agendas. While leaving psychological analyses and Israel's unique situation aside, it is clear that a move with historic effects on the nation's security, and consequently on the status and legacy of a leader, influences the behavior of decision makers, even leaders with smaller egos than those of Netanyahu and Barak. In Israel’s coalition system, this fact is also likely to have implications for future considerations of decision makers, under the assumption that regardless of who the leader is, he will find it difficult to separate his professional assessment from the effect on his personal future.

A second issue concerns the position of the defense establishment. How Israel deals with the threats resulting from Iran's conduct – and as shown by the responses to other threats, illustrated well in the book – clearly relies on the assessments and opinions of the leaders of Israel's defense establishment. The blurb on the book’s back cover states that the book "describes the persistent efforts by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Barak to carry out Operation King Solomon's Palace – the name of the proposed operation – and how every such effort was thwarted by the heads of the defense establishment." However, the use of the word "thwarted" (which also appears in the book’s Hebrew subtitle) seems inappropriate, given the negative connotation of the stance attributed to the heads of the defense establishment.

From my experience, and based on the confidence I have in the leaders of the Israeli defense establishment, there are no grounds for attributing unprofessional motives to them. As such, it can be safely assumed that their views rely solely on considerations derived from the staff work typical of organizations like the IDF and the Mossad, and reflect a profound professional understanding, in this case, taking into account arguments for and against the attack and the expected ensuing consequences.

In any case, the details in the book clearly show what is also clear today, and will probably also be clear in the future – that Israeli leaders will find it difficult to go ahead with military operations that can have fateful consequences for the security of Israeli citizens without the support of the IDF chief of staff, and in many cases also that of the other defense establishment leaders.

Due to the many complicated defense issues facing the country, and under the reasonable assumption that the actions taken by the defense agencies in Israel are professionally motivated and taken for the sake of the country, even if Israel is a democracy with separation between the political and military/defense leadership, it is important for the defense agencies to serve as watchdogs by preventing political and personal considerations from affecting decision making by politicians on defense issues with far-reaching consequences.

The book emphasizes the weight attributed to the evaluation of the consequences and response to an attack, and to the decision itself whether to attack. The cost-benefit considerations of a military action are taken into account, even if it is clear that there is an essential need for the attack in order to halt the enemy's technological progress. In the current case, it should be considered in all seriousness whether a regional war liable to develop following an attack that will result in hundreds of thousands of casualties and substantial damage liable to be caused to strategic infrastructure are essential prices that must be accepted. This consideration is even more critical when it cannot be determined in advance (as in the case of an attack against the nuclear facilities) that the result will be immediate and certain, and will last for many years. Israel has carried out hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of operations against enemy targets. These were executed when the decision makers were presented with possible scenarios derived from an assessment of the other side's intentions and capabilities, and Israel's ability to deal with them.

A further issue concerns the position of the United States. Kfir discusses the American role in Israeli decision making processes at length. The book justifiably focuses on the difficult relations between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Barack Obama, and on their mutual suspicions about the other's intentions, as well as on the effect that these misunderstandings had on decision making in Israel and the relations and trust that prevailed between Netanyahu and Ehud Barak.

The author emphasizes how critical the American position is and the extent to which this must be factored into Israel's decisions, certainly on defense matters of great significance. Even if Israel wants to maintain the independence of its decisions and refrain from putting itself in a position in which it will have to report, and certainly in which it will have to obtain the American administration's approval for an action, it will still have to assess the administration's intentions carefully. This is very clear in the book's description of the discussions that took place in Israel at decision making nodes, and the emphasis by the defense agencies of the need to ensure American support in advance as a condition for their supporting the action. Following any significant military action, especially one with as many consequences as an attack against Iran, American support is important, whether in the event of complications during the operation itself or in subsequent developments. In most cases, the United States has better military capabilities, and can help complete missions begun by Israel, if necessary. In the past, American administrations took care to give Israel breathing room to complete its maneuvers, especially in the effort to reject the international community's attempts, including in the UN Security Council, to halt Israel's actions. It was also important to coordinate political steps with the administration necessary to make sure that the military achievements on the battlefield would be translated later into political steps that would serve Israel's purposes and goals.

Overall, Kfir rises to the occasion – to attempt to reveal the dynamic and intrigues that accompanied the decision making process in Israel during the critical years, when Israel was closer than ever to carrying out a large scale attack against Iran. The possible result could have been major deterioration, to an extent and with results that likely could not be predicted in advance.

At the same time, in an interview with Israel Hayom on July 18, 2019, in an answer to the question of whether "we were very close to a military action," Netanyahu answered, "We were very serious. It was not a bluff." But even the many details related in the book are not enough to convince the reader that there is a way to "penetrate" the minds of Netanyahu and Barak and understand whether the two of them together, or each of them separately, truly intended to order an attack, or whether it was clear to them from the outset that an attack would not take place, certainly without ensuring American backing in advance, and that all the processes led by the two were designed mainly to achieve other purposes.