Strategic Assessment

The Problem

Civil-military relations in democracies in general and in Israel in particular, where the security situation is always difficult and complex, affect many aspects in the life of the country and its society, and wield decisive influence on how the national security concept is shaped. It is therefore important for the reciprocal relations between the political and military echelons to be based on trust and cooperation, mutual learning processes, and shared responsibility. The absolute subordination of the military leadership to the political leadership must be preserved even when the two echelons disagree, because the supreme authority always rests with the elected political leadership. Relations without crises are rare, but crises must be managed and contained, and should constitute a basis for developing the relations as infrastructure for improving mutual learning.

With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the IDF was deeply involved, some would say too deeply, in management of the crisis, while the National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), which operates in the framework of the Ministry of Defense and is supposed to coordinate government activity in cases of mass disasters, was ignored. The National Security Council (NSC), which is directly subordinate to the prime minister, emerged as the leading staff organization for dealing with the pandemic, although this is not part of its job. Alongside the military's significant role in the COVID-19 crisis, there were several recent examples of distressing events regarding civil-military relations in Israel. These included the exclusion of the senior military command from the discussions that took place with the United States on then-President Trump's "deal of the century" and then-Prime Minister Netanyahu's plan to annex parts of the West Bank; exclusion of the IDF from the Abraham Accords negotiations, including the military aspect involving the purchase of F-35 aircraft by the United Arab Emirates; concealment of the Prime Minister's visit to Saudi Arabia; and failure to approve the IDF's multi-year budget and work plan (“Tnufa”) and questions about the submarines deal with Germany.

Alongside the military's significant role in the COVID-19 crisis, there were several recent examples of distressing events regarding civil-military relations in Israel.

These examples are not unprecedented. Among the most prominent exceptions were the military's exclusion from the 1977 preliminary talks with Egypt before the beginning of the peace process and from the discussions that led to the Oslo Accords, and the decision by the political leadership to withdraw from Lebanon—a decision that was imposed on the military leadership, which objected to it. There were also cases when the military leadership acted against the political leadership's opinion. For example, then-IDF Chief of Staff Mordechai (Motta) Gur spoke about possible deception in Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Israel, and later opposed Israel's total withdrawal from Sinai. The military took control of the Abu Snena hill in Hebron during Shaul Mofaz's term as IDF chief of staff at a time when then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was abroad. In both cases, the Chief of Staff was threatened with dismissal.

Some of these events can be interpreted as limited irregularities that were aired in public because of the singular political circumstances prevailing in Israel at the time. Others, however, raise questions about (im)proper management and decision making involving the connection between the military's actions and the desired political benefit, while political coalition considerations (in contrast to policy and strategy) affect the relations between the echelons. The recent increase in such cases comes at a challenging time of political instability and conflicts within the political leadership, and coincides with allegedly biased political criticism directed at other professional authorities in the Israeli system, in particular the judicial system, the State Attorney, and law enforcement institutions, as well as the professional staff in the Ministry of Finance, including threats to restrict their professional responsibilities.

This article reviews the principal trends in relations between the political leadership and the professional military leadership. It analyzes the risks incurred by these trends given the political situation in Israel, and proposes directions for dealing with these risks.

Civil-Military Relations: Background and Principal Characteristics

Ever since the Zionist vision first materialized in the land of Israel, security has been a central part of the Israeli experience, due to Israel's geographic location and the threats posed to it by its neighbors. Furthermore, since Israel was established, the IDF has also served as a tool for nation-building. The military was charged with civilian tasks, among them education, settlement, immigrant absorption, and more. The military's expanding responsibilities (role expansion), combined with its role as sovereign in the territories conquered in the Six Day War, resulted in its involvement in one of the most sensitive political issues in Israeli society. Under such conditions, it was inevitable that a large security establishment with a major influence on the entire state apparatus would arise in Israel. One prominent example is that the military is responsible (through the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate) for presenting to the government an assessment of the external threats (known as the national intelligence assessment). Some therefore classify the professional military leadership as an attendant partner, albeit not in all cases, in the decision making processes and their implementation in national security affairs.

The nature of the security threats and the Israeli understanding of them have changed over the years. These threats, which were once regarded as "existential," have not been seen as such for a long time. Israel's strength as a country and its defense capabilities are now far more solidly established in face of the current and expected risks. There are naturally always arguments about the right way to maintain national security: not merely between Israel's governments and the political opposition, but also within the successive coalitions and among the ruling parties themselves. As a rule, there is disagreement between those calling for a more activist approach in military intervention and those advocating a more restrained approach, with an emphasis on the inherent advantages of political measures. These disputes of principle obviously have direct consequences for various actions planned or executed over the course of generations. On occasion, the IDF presented its own (not always uniform) opinion and exercised influence (sometimes decisive) on the policy adopted, although there were several prominent cases in which the political leadership imposed actions on the military, for example in the peace agreement with Egypt, the Oslo process, the withdrawal from Lebanon, and the disengagement from Gaza.

In the professional literature on civil-military relations, various theories have been developed that depart from the normative aspects typical of the conventional theories in the field. Relations between the echelons in Israel and other Western countries were presented in concepts of partnership, shared responsibility, dialogue, learning, and more. What many of these later-revised conceptual frameworks have in common is the basic contention that relations between the political and military echelons in Israel, or in other Western democracies, especially in an era of hybrid and asymmetric conflicts, should not be viewed in a stratified hierarchal way that positions the politicians in the upper stratum that makes decisions and the professional military commanders in the subordinate stratum carrying out the politicians' orders. Rather, many claim that the borders between the strata are blurred and indistinct, and in effect create a dynamic symbiosis featuring changing levels and forms of the military's partnership, both in designing policy and implementing it, and not only in the military sphere.

An important question arises, therefore, involving authority and responsibility for the military in both force buildup and application. The IDF chief of staff's subordination to the political leadership was anchored in a basic law only in 1976, following conclusions reached by the Agranat Commission that investigated the circumstances at the outset of the Yom Kippur War. In its conclusions, the Commission issued a warning about the ambiguity that prevailed concerning the military's authority, and concerning the reciprocal relations between the military and the political leadership. The Agranat Commission also stated, "One thing, however, is clear from the constitutional aspect. It has never been decided that the Minister of Defense is a 'meta-Chief of Staff' who is required to guide the Chief of Staff in the latter's area of responsibility on operational matters, or a kind of supreme commander of the IDF by virtue of his being Minister of Defense."

The Basic Law: The Military (March 31, 1976) states that the military is subordinate to the government, and that the Minister of Defense is the minister responsible for the military on behalf of the government. The law does not define a specific officeholder as the supreme IDF commander; it assigns this role to the government as a collective in vague wording in Section 2(a): "The military is subject to the authority of the government." Consequently, there were many interpretations of the law and proposals to amend it. The main advantage of the Basic Law: The Military lies in its stipulation that the military and its leader are subordinate to the political leadership. A number of topics, however, were not addressed by the law:

1. The law does not define the IDF's role and the prime minister's status with respect to the military.
2. The law does not clarify the role of the Minister of Defense as the person responsible for the military.
3. There is a gap between the law and the reality. For example, following the Second Lebanon War, the Winograd Commission gave great weight to the prime minister's influence on the IDF, while according to the law, the military is under the cabinet's authority.
4. The general provisions of the Basic Law: The Government likewise do not define the status of the prime minister with respect to the military.

An echo of the problems with the constitutional framework was heard again following the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when the Winograd Commission concluded, "The political echelon must direct and steer the actions of the professional echelon in the security institutions and foreign policy, and oversee them….To this end, the political echelon will require—and the professional echelon will provide it with—the information that will enable it to conduct such direction and oversight." The Israeli government (Cabinet Resolution No 3115, February 10, 2008) decided "to adopt the principles of the report, and to implement the recommendation in it"; however, this resolution was not implemented.

The General Security Services Law (2002) differs significantly from the Basic Law: The Military. It is very detailed, and addresses a long list of issues, such as subordination of the GSS, the role of the GSS and its tasks, its authority, reporting by the head of the GSS to the government and the Knesset, and more. The bill introduced in 2020 by then-MK Ofer Shelah, which addresses all of these questions, corresponds to the question of civilian oversight (institutional and non-institutional) of the military.

The Political Aspect

From a political and organizational standpoint, the governmental system in Israel has always featured coalition governments. This has made it difficult, especially in recent decades, to maintain orderly governance. In such governments, which often comprise opposing political parties and factions, deep disputes have surfaced. During periods when the prime minister also served as minister of defense (Ben Gurion, Eshkol, Begin, Rabin, and Barak), there was a greater degree of coherence in civil-military relations, even in cases of sharp disagreements, such as the waiting period in the Eshkol government before the Six Day War and the appointment of Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense, and the military's conduct at the outset of the second intifada, when it appeared that the military was not following the orders of Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Barak concerning restraint in the use of military force.

The situation has worsened in the past two decades. The coalitions became more complex and sensitive, and the attitude of some of the Ministers of Defense (such as Liberman, Bennett, and Gantz) featured political rivalry, for example between them and Prime Minister Netanyahu. In many cases, the state security cabinet also does not act as an organized mechanism. The State Comptroller's Report following Operation Protective Edge stated, "The cabinet's authority, including the question of what matters are subject to the cabinet's decision, is not regulated or established in writing. As a result, even the cabinet ministers do not know…which matters require a cabinet decision." This situation is liable to have challenging implications for the relations between the political echelon and the senior military echelon, and certainly in the context of making decisions about actions in the field. The basic laws determine only a general framework for relations between the political leadership and the military leadership in Israel in general, and for decisions about embarking on military operations in particular.

Another problem is the political echelon's inclination to be vague in decisions requiring the IDF to take action in the field. This vagueness is useful for decision makers because it provides them with room to maneuver in rapidly changing circumstances, and perhaps also for preventing a situation that will require them to assume responsibility in the event of failure. This vagueness, however, exacts a high price in relations with the military echelon, which is forced to interpret the policy directive, or to seek validation for it from the political echelon, and not always successfully. In this way, Israeli governments avoid discussions about the security concept, even if an "oral national security doctrine" exists in Israel in practice. As such, it is shared by most generations of decision makers, with each government choosing its particular emphases.

Alongside the military's significant role in the COVID-19 crisis, there were several recent examples of distressing events regarding civil-military relations in Israel.

Former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot publicly challenged these trends in two exceptional papers published during his term as chief of staff: IDF Strategy (2015 and 2018). In these documents, the chief of staff called for correcting distortions in the political echelon's relations with the military echelon by creating a dialogue for developing a common language, coordinating expectations, and receiving guidelines from the political echelon in a way that ensures that military action corresponds to the policy's purpose. He also raised the need to clarify the chief of staff's status at the head of the military pyramid, and his authority and responsibility for how the military is used after guidance is received from the political echelon. In other words, the political echelon determines when the military will be used and for what purpose, and the military echelon is responsible for how military force is used. These statements by the chief of staff did not spark an extensive public discussion, and did not even evoke a renewed discussion between the echelons, or a change in the behavioral patterns reviewed here (even if their influence on the means of building and using military force was clear).

In these circumstances, there are ramifications for the status of the chief of staff vis-à-vis the political echelon concerning his ability to exert influence. When the political echelon is divided or occupied with an internal conflict, the chief of staff's influence becomes relatively stronger, and his ability to maneuver between the prime minister and the minister of defense and the other ministers ostensibly increases. It is also likely to put him in a more powerful position on certain issues, including operational issues in the use of force, and also budget questions in the sphere of force buildup. This possible scenario is liable to weaken the political echelon's status in matters pertaining to the effectiveness of civilian oversight on both the military and military policy in the sense of the decision to use military force in order to achieve a policy goal. It could make the military an active partner with influence extending beyond the limits of its obligatory professional influence, rather than merely an instrumental agency and a tool in the hands of the elected political leadership, in the processes of designing policy and making decisions of significance for policy and internal politics. 

Thus despite the ongoing systemic faults presented above, which have more than once resulted in mishaps and even crises between the echelons, the general picture has always featured some degree of cooperation, and in general has facilitated a base of agreements, usually in the spirit of the military's recommendations, about the needs and strategic principles guiding the building and use of force, and in many cases, about the need to use or not use force in order to achieve policy goals. This attribute is also based on an agreement in principle between the echelons—certainly by most of the senior commanders—about the binding authority of the elected political leadership over the military professional echelon. This agreement is also supported by a broad public consensus in Israel.

Is the Traditional Framework of Relations Weakening?

It appears that in recent years, developments have emerged that are liable to change the rules of the game—and not for the better—in all matters pertaining to civil-military relations in Israel. For our purposes, three of these are the most important:

1. The first is the (fragile) security stability, which was challenged in May 2021 by the events that culminated in Operation Guardian of the Walls (when the violent disturbances in cities with a mixed Jewish-Arab population prompted consideration of using the military to restore public order).
2. The second is the constitutional-political crisis of recent years, which upset Israel and its governmental systems. Even after the formation of the new government, the political situation remains fragile and unstable.
3. The third is the COVID-19 crisis, which raised questions about various spheres of life in Israel, and throughout the world. 

Other matters in dispute can be added, headed by the issue involving the right way to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the security sphere, Israel faces challenges both on the external front—against Iran, against Hezbollah in the north, and in the Palestinian theater, with an emphasis on Hamas in the Gaza Strip—and on the internal front, where Israel confronted and still faces the multi-faceted COVID-19 crisis, involving health, the economy, social aspects, and governance. This contributed, especially in the first and second waves, to the virtual removal of security issues from the public agenda. The proportions of the traditional threats assumed a different complexion when the risks from natural causes were given priority. The violent clashes between Arabs and Jews during Operation Guardian of the Walls were a setback for Jewish-Arab relations, due to the nationalistic sentiments attributed to the Arab violence.

The role of the military in managing the efforts to counter the pandemic raised questions, even if the role of the Home Front Command in the civilian campaign won universal praise. During the pandemic, however, the IDF found itself, to its detriment, a topic of political dispute between rival political groups, and no less important, between the Prime Minister and two of the ministers of defense who served during the crisis period: Naftali Bennett and Benny Gantz. They both advocated greater IDF involvement in managing the civilian crisis, and received public and media support from many opinion-makers. Sixty-five percent of the public wanted the COVID-19 crisis to be handled by the military. Bennett and Gantz were nevertheless blocked by then-Prime Minister Netanyahu, likely due at least in part to political considerations. The IDF preferred the middle road, whereby it would contribute to the best of its ability and as needed aid in the national effort, but would refrain from taking responsibility for managing the crisis or parts thereof. Overall, the pandemic left, or at least coincided with, deep scars in the social order in Israel, reflected, inter alia, in plunging public confidence, at various levels, in leadership, governmental institutions, the government, and even the IDF. The IDF, the Mossad, and the Israel Security Agency still enjoy a high level of public confidence—around 80 percent, which is, however, less than in previous surveys. In contrast, there is a clear and steep drop in confidence in the Supreme Court—43 percent, Israel Police—34 percent, and the Israeli government—only 25 percent.

At the same time, it is clear that the greatest influence on the processes discussed in this article are related to the severe constitutional-political crisis that has afflicted Israel in recent years: four elections campaigns with no winner, with transitional governments, governmental chaos, poor performance by important government ministries, the absence of a state budget, and an almost complete loss of public confidence in the government. The formation of a new government has not yet stabilized the political system or increased public confidence in it, and it is therefore unclear whether the new government will succeed in changing these characteristics.

The Impact on Inter-Echelon Relations

How do these trends and challenges affect civil-military relations? The answer is framed by a multi-level picture, including the potential weakening of the value and institutional base of Israeli democracy, undermined functional capabilities of the central government in Israel, and growing public indifference, reflected in a lack of confidence in the government, protests against it, and relatively low voter turnout in the frequent Knesset elections in Israel. Another reflection of destabilization in the foundations of democracy is the behavioral norms that shape the relations between the political and professional military echelons described in the first part of the article. While this also occurred in the past, such occurrences have become more frequent and more acute in recent years. Politicization has increased greatly in Israel's governmental systems, in the sense of decision making at the state level affected by considerations of political survival and by considerations that are perceived as personal and political party-based, rather than statesmanlike and objective. In the absence of adequate regulation anchored in detailed legislation that clearly defines the relations between the political and military echelons, behavioral norms that have developed over the years governing the complex relations between the two echelons and the substance of shared responsibility in the broader sense are especially important. 

Although the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Chief of Staff apparently acted in reasonable harmony during Operation Guardian of the Walls, care should be taken to avoid damage resulting from the disruption of relations, which is liable to severely damage the system's ability to realize its purpose and potential in the long term.

An instructive example is the government's failure to address the IDF's Tnufa multi-year plan. Enormous planning efforts are invested in each five-year IDF plan, which constitutes the basis for the military's force buildup in the years ahead, and for adapting the IDF's deployment to the security challenges. In late 2019, the IDF began advancing the plan, but it has yet to obtain official approval from the state security cabinet, and is therefore not backed by a multi-year budget agreement. For lack of choice, the IDF is furthering the plan according to the current resources allocated to it. This resounding failure is a result of Israel's political instability. Beyond the severe problem posed by the absence of an approved annual budget, a difficult phenomenon is involved (in addition to the unsolved problems of the military draft law and shortened compulsory military service, which is unacceptable to the IDF), indicating extreme irregularity in the management of state resources in an essential matter involving the core of national security. The reason for this disruption was essentially political, pertaining to the decision to not approve the state budget in order to avoid implementation of the prime ministerial rotation agreement. Presumably, however, had the personal relations in the Prime Minister-Minister of Defense-IDF Chief of Staff triangle been on a proper footing in their normative sense before the formation of the new government, rather than influenced by narrow personal and party-political considerations, a solution to this grave problem would have been found, as well as to the issue involving the conscription model.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Since the political instability will likely continue, perhaps for a prolonged period, the characteristics described above can be expected to continue to create additional difficulties in the dialogue between the political system and all elements of the professional security system. Although the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Chief of Staff apparently acted in reasonable harmony during Operation Guardian of the Walls, care should be taken to avoid damage resulting from the disruption of relations, which is liable to severely damage the system's ability to realize its purpose and potential in the long term. In order to reduce the damage, constitutional and normative steps should be taken to restore balance in relations between the echelons. A number of principal recommendations can be cited:

1. Changing the wording of the Basic Law: The Military so that it clarifies the substance of the relations, the obligations, and authority of the political and military echelons. In principle, the amended law should explicitly and fully address a number of critical matters, such as the military's purpose and functions, the nature of its subordination to the government and the minister of defense, the appointment of the IDF chief of staff, delineation of his fields of responsibility and of term limitation to four years, and the appointment of a deputy chief of staff and general staff officers. The law should also address the issue of management of wars and campaigns, including the functions of the government and the Ministerial Committee on National Security; presentation of the external and internal threats in the framework of intelligence agencies assessments; fundamental questions of force buildup, and especially the multi-year plans; the role of the military secretary to the prime minister; and civilian areas in which the IDF is entitled or not entitled to act. The General Security Service Law, in particular its mention of a ministerial committee for General Security Service affairs (Section 5) can serve as a worthy example for the amended Basic Law: The Military. In this context, also proposed is the enactment of a "Mossad Law" according to the special characteristics of this organization that define the principal elements presented above.
2. Improvement of the concept of civilian control of the military and military norms, together with the establishment of clear rules for managing the regular dialogue between the government and the Ministerial Committee on National Security and the security agencies, especially the IDF, aimed at clarifying the situation and infrastructure for shared responsibility. These rules should define, for example, which security spheres are brought up for discussion in these forums, what the format of the dialogue and the required learning in them should be, what the security agencies are required to present in these discussions, and what the format should be for government/cabinet directives to the security agencies, including the aim of the necessary action and guidelines for delineating the boundaries in the use of military force.
3. The Basic Law: The Government should stipulate that it is the government's duty to formulate a document of principles for the security concept. This should be done at specified intervals through the NSC and in cooperation with the security agencies, and certainly whenever a new government takes office. An updated defense directive is to be derived from this document summarizing the map of security threats to Israel and the proper directions for response. It is important that part of the security concept document and security directive derived from it be made public. Even if it is part of the NSC's defined functions and not part of an amendment to the law, this necessary document can serve as a reference framework for a principled discussion between the echelons (and with the public), certainly on matters of principle.
4. Clear and up-to-date rules should be established for Knesset oversight of the security agencies, in particular through the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and its subcommittees.
5. The role of the Office of the State Comptroller as an important public agency for examining the conduct of the security agencies should be strengthened and expanded.
6. In the short term, the government should find a way to approve the IDF's Tnufa multi-year plan and ways of budgeting it. 

Above all, and even if it seems obvious, it is important to emphasize that the necessary solutions for putting relations between the political and professional military echelons on a proper footing must be based on accepted norms of public discourse and appropriate governmental behavior in a liberal democracy. Principles of transparency, objectivity, cooperation, and non-partisan national interest should also be implemented. This requires the total removal of any trace of politics from the security agencies and the way they are used by the government.