The US administration is expected to convey soon its response to Iran's comments on the text of the agreement given to the parties by the Europeans at the end of the last round of talks in Vienna. Although defined a "final version," the parties did not announce its acceptance and there are still gaps and Iranian demands, mainly in the area of the guarantees that will be given to Iran if the next administration in Washington decides to leave the agreement again. Both the Iranians and the Americans are taking steps to prepare public opinion, in the wake of expected internal and external opposition, while downplaying the scope of the concessions they have made and highlighting the achievements, if and when an agreement is signed.
So far, no official details have been provided about the content of the agreement, and most of whatever information there is comes from leaks by Iranian sources. The essence of the agreement is that the United States will remove the sanctions that were reimposed on Iran after the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement, and as a result Iran will resume oil exports, will be able to receive the large sums of money frozen in the countries that purchased oil and could not transfer the payments through the banking system, and will be able to enjoy free trade and economic cooperation. All of these, as far as is known, will be carried out in stages over the course of six months in the face of Iranian measures in the field of the nuclear program, but in a way that will meet Iran's demand to examine implementation of the lifting of the sanctions at each stage.
Most of Israel's attention should be directed to the new arrangements with regard to the portions of the nuclear program in which Iran has advanced in recent years. This applies to the high enrichment levels and the consequences of this for the removal of the fissile material outside the borders of Iran, as well as for the operation of new centrifuges that will remain on its territory. Regardless of what is determined in the agreement, the improved capabilities that Iran has earned and tested will enable it to advance its plans in the future on an accelerated schedule from what was true at the time of the American withdrawal from the agreement. Moreover, the open questions before the IAEA still constitute an issue that is far from resolved, and can further cloud both the process of implementing the agreement and relations with the West.
Israel's ability to influence at the current stage is mainly limited, if it is focused on trying to motivate the US administration not to accept the agreement, since the administration still sees a diplomatic solution as the best way. The main efforts, which include a visit by the head of the National Security Council to Washington this week, should be focused on promoting a dialogue to formulate a common position for the two countries the day after the two possible scenarios: the realization of an agreement, or alternatively, its collapse, since it should not be taken as a working assumption that the interests of the United States and Israel are the same and there won’t be differences of opinion regarding the required courses of action.
The US administration is expected to convey soon its response to Iran's comments on the text of the agreement given to the parties by the Europeans at the end of the last round of talks in Vienna. Although defined a "final version," the parties did not announce its acceptance and there are still gaps and Iranian demands, mainly in the area of the guarantees that will be given to Iran if the next administration in Washington decides to leave the agreement again. Both the Iranians and the Americans are taking steps to prepare public opinion, in the wake of expected internal and external opposition, while downplaying the scope of the concessions they have made and highlighting the achievements, if and when an agreement is signed.
So far, no official details have been provided about the content of the agreement, and most of whatever information there is comes from leaks by Iranian sources. The essence of the agreement is that the United States will remove the sanctions that were reimposed on Iran after the Trump administration withdrew from the agreement, and as a result Iran will resume oil exports, will be able to receive the large sums of money frozen in the countries that purchased oil and could not transfer the payments through the banking system, and will be able to enjoy free trade and economic cooperation. All of these, as far as is known, will be carried out in stages over the course of six months in the face of Iranian measures in the field of the nuclear program, but in a way that will meet Iran's demand to examine implementation of the lifting of the sanctions at each stage.
Most of Israel's attention should be directed to the new arrangements with regard to the portions of the nuclear program in which Iran has advanced in recent years. This applies to the high enrichment levels and the consequences of this for the removal of the fissile material outside the borders of Iran, as well as for the operation of new centrifuges that will remain on its territory. Regardless of what is determined in the agreement, the improved capabilities that Iran has earned and tested will enable it to advance its plans in the future on an accelerated schedule from what was true at the time of the American withdrawal from the agreement. Moreover, the open questions before the IAEA still constitute an issue that is far from resolved, and can further cloud both the process of implementing the agreement and relations with the West.
Israel's ability to influence at the current stage is mainly limited, if it is focused on trying to motivate the US administration not to accept the agreement, since the administration still sees a diplomatic solution as the best way. The main efforts, which include a visit by the head of the National Security Council to Washington this week, should be focused on promoting a dialogue to formulate a common position for the two countries the day after the two possible scenarios: the realization of an agreement, or alternatively, its collapse, since it should not be taken as a working assumption that the interests of the United States and Israel are the same and there won’t be differences of opinion regarding the required courses of action.