A few points about the terrorist attacks in Beer Sheva and Hadera, for which ISIS claimed responsibility:
a. ISIS has not gained a foothold and has not enjoyed widespread support among Arab citizens of Israel or among Palestinians, even when the Islamic State was at the peak of its power.
b. There are still a lot of unknowns versus knowns, and presumably the picture will become clearer as the Israel Security Agency (ISA) investigation progresses. ISIS, which claimed responsibility for the attacks in Beer Sheva and Hadera, is the link between the two. At this stage, however, it is not clear whether such a connection existed, and if so, what was it. We know that in the past the terrorists were identified with the organization and there was an attempt to enlist in its ranks in Syria. It is still not clear if the organization had any recent connection with the perpetrators or whether it knew about the attacks in advance.
c. We should not be misled by the manifestations of support from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and even Hezbollah in the face of ISIS activity. They may be rejoicing over the murder of Israelis and the undermining of Israeli security, but the hostility and mutual disgust between them and ISIS equates and even outweighs their hatred of Israel.
d. Despite the tragic outcome of the two attacks, they differ in kind. The attack in Beer Sheva was improvised and carried out by a lone wolf (even if it turns out that he was assisted by someone with prior knowledge), armed with a vehicle and a knife, able to murder several individuals due to a very slow counter-reaction. In contrast, the attack in Hadera was planned and required advance preparation, including the acquisition of weapons, and was carried out by two attackers (who likely received assistance). Only thanks to the courageous and especially rapid counterattack was a much more serious outcome, compared to what happened in Beer Sheva, prevented.
e. Once again it was shown that a quick and effective response is required when there is no prior intelligence and is what determines the outcome of an attack.
f. Despite the “success” attributed to ISIS, the organization is not Israel's main adversary, and Israel is not at the top of the ISIS priorities. That said, prompt action is needed to neutralize networks and terrorist operatives affiliated with Salafi-jihad in Israel. This is an imperative for the ISA, which is already working to implement measures in this regard, while also drawing lessons from the failure to thwart terrorism based on preliminary warning information. I am confident this is the ISA view.
g. The element of imitation and inspiration provided to other organizations and individuals is clear and familiar. In the already tense period of Ramadan, Land Day, and ongoing joint political activity between Israel and Arab countries – which convened in Israel for a summit designed to create a common front against Iran and terrorism – there is increased motivation among these groups to harm Israel (and its partners).
h. In order to prevent terrorist operatives from achieving what they want, beyond murdering Israelis, inflating their image of power beyond their proportions, and disrupting strategic political moves, targeted action is needed to thwart impending
attacks and differentiate between those who plan and perpetrate terrorism and the majority of the Arab and Palestinian population, which is neither involved in such terrorism nor supports violence. This is the first rule in the fight against terrorism.
i. What is most necessary now is to calm the public and replace widespread quarreling and accusations with calm and cool-headedness.
A few points about the terrorist attacks in Beer Sheva and Hadera, for which ISIS claimed responsibility:
a. ISIS has not gained a foothold and has not enjoyed widespread support among Arab citizens of Israel or among Palestinians, even when the Islamic State was at the peak of its power.
b. There are still a lot of unknowns versus knowns, and presumably the picture will become clearer as the Israel Security Agency (ISA) investigation progresses. ISIS, which claimed responsibility for the attacks in Beer Sheva and Hadera, is the link between the two. At this stage, however, it is not clear whether such a connection existed, and if so, what was it. We know that in the past the terrorists were identified with the organization and there was an attempt to enlist in its ranks in Syria. It is still not clear if the organization had any recent connection with the perpetrators or whether it knew about the attacks in advance.
c. We should not be misled by the manifestations of support from Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and even Hezbollah in the face of ISIS activity. They may be rejoicing over the murder of Israelis and the undermining of Israeli security, but the hostility and mutual disgust between them and ISIS equates and even outweighs their hatred of Israel.
d. Despite the tragic outcome of the two attacks, they differ in kind. The attack in Beer Sheva was improvised and carried out by a lone wolf (even if it turns out that he was assisted by someone with prior knowledge), armed with a vehicle and a knife, able to murder several individuals due to a very slow counter-reaction. In contrast, the attack in Hadera was planned and required advance preparation, including the acquisition of weapons, and was carried out by two attackers (who likely received assistance). Only thanks to the courageous and especially rapid counterattack was a much more serious outcome, compared to what happened in Beer Sheva, prevented.
e. Once again it was shown that a quick and effective response is required when there is no prior intelligence and is what determines the outcome of an attack.
f. Despite the “success” attributed to ISIS, the organization is not Israel's main adversary, and Israel is not at the top of the ISIS priorities. That said, prompt action is needed to neutralize networks and terrorist operatives affiliated with Salafi-jihad in Israel. This is an imperative for the ISA, which is already working to implement measures in this regard, while also drawing lessons from the failure to thwart terrorism based on preliminary warning information. I am confident this is the ISA view.
g. The element of imitation and inspiration provided to other organizations and individuals is clear and familiar. In the already tense period of Ramadan, Land Day, and ongoing joint political activity between Israel and Arab countries – which convened in Israel for a summit designed to create a common front against Iran and terrorism – there is increased motivation among these groups to harm Israel (and its partners).
h. In order to prevent terrorist operatives from achieving what they want, beyond murdering Israelis, inflating their image of power beyond their proportions, and disrupting strategic political moves, targeted action is needed to thwart impending
attacks and differentiate between those who plan and perpetrate terrorism and the majority of the Arab and Palestinian population, which is neither involved in such terrorism nor supports violence. This is the first rule in the fight against terrorism.
i. What is most necessary now is to calm the public and replace widespread quarreling and accusations with calm and cool-headedness.