Publications

Key Findings:

• 75.5% of the Israeli public continues to express high trust in the IDF (88% among the Jewish public and 26% among the Arab public), alongside a continued upward trend in trusting Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir (56% of all respondents, 67.5% among the Jewish public).
• 77% of the Israeli public continues to have very low or no trust in the Israeli government (74% among the Jewish public and 93% among the Arab public), while 72% of the Israeli public express low or no trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (66% among the Jewish public and 94% among the Arab public).
• 55% of the Israeli public expresses a high level of trust in the reports issued by the IDF spokesperson during the fighting in Gaza (64% among the Jewish public and 17.5% among the Arab public).

Key Findings:

• 61% of the Israeli public believes that the IDF will win the war in Gaza, compared to 30.5% who thinks that the IDF will not win the war.
• 46% believes that the goals of the war in Gaza will be achieved in full or to a fairly large extent, compared to 48% who thinks that the goals of the fighting in Gaza will be achieved only to a small extent or not at all.
• 47.5% of the Israeli public is somewhat or very much opposed to the resumption of fighting in Gaza as part of Operation Gideon's Chariots, compared to 43.5% of the public who is somewhat or very supportive of it.
• 38% of the Israeli public thinks that the IDF’s current course of action in Gaza will not lead to either the collapse of Hamas’s rule or the return of the hostages; 28% believes that the operation advances the achievement of both goals; 3% thinks that it will only bring about the return of the hostages; and 23% expects that it will only advance the collapse of Hamas’s rule.
• 64.5% of the Israeli public is not at all or not very concerned about the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.
• In response to what the reality in Gaza should be the day after the war, 42% of the Israeli public supports a technocratic government without Hamas, backed by an inter-Arab or international force; 23.5% favors the return of Jewish settlement in Gaza; 16% prefers a prolonged Israeli military government; and 10.5% supports transferring control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority (PA).
• In response to whether the public supports or opposes the Egyptian plan—which includes ending the war and returning all the hostages; establishing a technocratic administration to manage the Strip without Hamas in preparation for the return of the PA’s rule in the Strip and steps to establish a Palestinian state; training a Palestinian police force under inter-Arab sponsorship; and providing regional and international funding for the reconstruction of the Strip—59% of the Israeli public is somewhat supportive or very supportive of the Egyptian plan, compared to 33% who is somewhat opposed or very opposed.

Key Findings:

• Regarding how Israel should respond to recent developments in Syria, 42% of the public believes that the IDF should gradually withdraw from Syria as part of a security arrangement with the new regime, under international guarantees to secure the border. Another 34% thinks that the IDF should maintain a permanent presence in southern Syria, while 11% believes that the IDF should immediately withdraw from Syrian territory and rely on the existing ceasefire agreement.
• As for whether Israel should intervene on behalf of the Druze should a conflict break out between the regime in Syria and the Druze population, 41% thinks that Israel should apply diplomatic pressure to stop the conflict; 26% believes that Israel should be prohibited from intervening in internal conflicts in Syria; 21.5% thinks that Israel should use military force against the regime; and 11.5% does not know whether Israel should intervene for the benefit of the Druze.
• 60% of the Israeli public believes that the Israeli government should work to establish direct relations with the new regime in Syria. In contrast, 20% believes that it should not, and another 20% does not know.
• 55.5% of the Israeli public is satisfied to a great extent or very much with how the ceasefire agreement in the north has been enforced so far, compared to 23.5% who is only slightly or not at all satisfied.

Key Findings:

• 55% of the Jewish public has little confidence in the IDF reports regarding the issuance and enforcement of recruitment orders for the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) public, compared to 38% who has high or very high confidence.
• 60.5% of the Jewish public believes that the Israeli government is responsibility for the low rate of ultra-Orthodox enlistment in the army, while 10.5% thinks the IDF is responsible, and 24% blame “other” factors.
• 55.5% of the Jewish public would encourage a family member who had served as a combatant in the reserves during the war to report for another round of reserve duty if called up, compared to 27.5% who would not encourage it.
• 54% of the Jewish public believes that it is inappropriate to refuse to participate in combat due to fear of harming the hostages, while 28% thinks the opposite.
• 74% of the Jewish public believes that it is inappropriate to punish reserve soldiers who refuse another combat duty due to exhaustion, compared to 17% who supports punitive measures.

Key Findings:

• 41% of the Israeli public believes that the joint statement issued by the leaders of Britain, France, and Canada about the current escalation in Gaza being disproportionate to the October 7 attack reflects a lack of understanding of reality. Another 31% of the Israeli public thinks that the statement expresses biased hostility toward Israel, while 19% considers the statement a correct representation of reality.
• There has been an increase in the percentage of the Israeli public who is very or somewhat concerned about the possible international isolation of Israel—at 64% in the current survey, compared to 55% in July 2024. In contrast, 31% of the Israeli public is somewhat unconcerned or not at all concerned.
• 46% of the Israeli public agrees that Israel is missing a historic opportunity to be part of a regional arrangement led by President Trump, compared to 39% who thinks that Israel should continue fighting in Gaza until the collapse of Hamas’s regime, even if this means remaining outside the Trump-led regional arrangement.
• 49% of the Israeli public believes that US President Donald Trump’s visit to the Middle East did not change Israel’s political and security situation, compared to 28% who thinks that the visit worsened the situation, and 11% who believes that the visit improved Israel’s situation.
• 51.5% of the Israeli public believes that Trump supports Israel only when it serves his own interests; 20% thinks he is very committed to protecting Israel’s interests; and 23% believes that he is unpredictable and therefore difficult to trust on security issues.
• 58.5% of the Israeli public considers the peace agreement with Egypt to be very stable or fairly stable, compared to 35% who believes it is not.