Table of Contents:

Summary of the Results

The Israeli public’s assessment of the likely damage to Iran as a result of the campaign has continued to decline. While in the first days of the campaign, 69% of respondents estimated that the regime would be significantly harmed, only 43.5% think so today. A similar decline is evident regarding the expected damage to Iran’s nuclear project. At the start of the campaign, 62.5% believed it would be significantly harmed compared to 48% today. The same applies to the ballistic missile array: The percentage of respondents assessing significant damage fell from 73% to 58.5%. At the same time, the decline in support for continuing the campaign until the regime is overthrown has also continued, from 63% in the first days of the war, dropping to 54% after about two weeks, and to currently 45.5%. On the northern front, the public is divided on the question of whether Hezbollah can be disarmed. Public trust in the IDF remains high at 77%, while trust in the government remains low at 30% and is characterized by pronounced political polarization. In addition, 63% of the Jewish public believes that the chief of staff was right to warn that many missions imposed on the IDF across different arenas, together with the failure to expand the recruitment base, could cause the army to “collapse into itself.”

Methodology

The survey was conducted by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies between March 29–30, 2026, approximately one month since the beginning of the military campaign against Iran, as part of Operation Roaring Lion. Data were collected by iPanel, with 805 respondents completing the online survey in Hebrew and 154 in Arabic. After sectoral weighting, the sample constitutes a representative sample of the adult Israeli population (aged 18 and over). The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ±3.16%, at a confidence level of 95%.

Full Data

Security-Political Threats and Challenges

The Iran Front

The trend toward more moderate public attitudes regarding the outcomes of the campaign in Iran and the preferred objective for ending it is continuing. The public is now more cautious in its assessment of the expected damage to Iran’s nuclear project, the missile arsenal, and the ayatollah regime. At the same time, as the campaign continues, more respondents believe that the home front can endure beyond one month of war.

• 48% of the Israeli public believes that the Iranian nuclear project will be significantly harmed during the campaign, including 39% of respondents who assess that damage will be “to a great extent” and 9% who think that the project will be fully dismantled. By contrast, 45% of the public believes that the damage will be slight or will not occur at all. Compared to the beginning of the campaign, the share of the Israeli public who believe the campaign will damage the nuclear project has dropped significantly, from 62.5% to 48%.

  • A clear political gap is evident in this context: 70% of coalition voters believe that the campaign will cause significant damage to the nuclear project or its full dismantling, compared to only 30% among opposition voters.

• 58.5% of the Israeli public thinks that the campaign will significantly harm Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, including 52% of respondents who believe the damage will be “to a great extent” and 6.5% who think that Iran’s arsenal will be fully dismantled. By contrast, 36% of respondents believe that the damage will be slight or will not occur at all. Here too, compared to the beginning of the campaign, there has been a decline from 73% to 58.5%.

  • The political gap remains pronounced: 74% of coalition voters assess significant damage or full dismantling of Iran’s missile arsenal, compared to 48% among opposition voters.

• 43.5% of the Israeli public believes that the ayatollah regime will be significantly harmed during the campaign, including 33.5% of respondents who assess that damage will be “to a great extent” and 10% who believe that the regime will fully collapse. By contrast, 48% of respondents think the regime will be harmed only slightly or not at all. Compared to the previous survey (March 15–16, 2026), the share of the Israeli public who believe the campaign will harm the ayatollah regime has dropped from 58% to 43.5%, and compared to the beginning of the campaign, the decline is even sharper from 69% to 43.5%.

  • Here too, a political gap is evident: 63% of coalition voters assess significant damage or regime collapse, compared to only 27% among opposition voters.

• Only 45.5% of the Israeli public thinks that the campaign should continue until the regime in Iran is overthrown. By contrast, 30% of respondents support seeking a ceasefire after inflicting the maximum possible damage on Iran’s military capabilities, while 19% believe that a ceasefire should be pursued as soon as possible. Here too, a moderating trend is evident: Support for continuing the campaign until the regime is overthrown fell from 63% in the first days of the war to 54% after about two weeks, and to 45.5% today. At the same time, support for seeking a ceasefire after inflicting maximum possible damage on Iran’s military capabilities rose from 16% in the first days of the war to 22.5% after two weeks, and to 30% today.

  • The political gaps are significant: 74% of coalition voters support continuing the campaign until the regime is overthrown, compared to only 28% among opposition voters. By contrast, 47% of opposition voters support a ceasefire after inflicting maximum possible damage on Iran’s military capabilities, compared to only 22% of coalition voters.
  • A marked sectoral gap is also evident: 54% of the Jewish public supports continuing the campaign until the regime is overthrown, compared to only 13% of the Arab public. A majority of the Arab public, 69%, prefers pursuing a ceasefire as soon as possible.

• 37% of the Israeli public believes that the home front will be able to cope with wartime conditions for no more than one month (12% said “up to two weeks” and 25% said “up to one month”), while 56% of the respondents think that it will be able to endure for more than one month (34% said “up to two to three months,” 10% “up to half a year,” 5% “up to a year,” and 7% “more than a year”). Compared to the previous survey (March 15–16, 2026), the share assessing the home front’s endurance at no more than one month fell from 46% to 37%, while the share assessing it at more than one month rose from 47% to 56%. Compared to the beginning of the campaign, the decline in the share estimating endurance at no more than one month is even sharper, falling from 62% to 37%.

  • Here too, a political breakdown is evident: 65.5% of coalition voters assess endurance for more than one month, compared to only 46% of opposition voters. By contrast, 28.5% of coalition voters believe that the home front will endure for up to one month, compared to 48% of opposition voters.

• 57% of the Israeli public is satisfied with the handling of the home front throughout the campaign, compared to 39% who is not.

  • Here too, political gaps are evident: 75% of coalition voters are satisfied with the handling of the home front, compared to only 44% of opposition voters.
  • In sectoral breakdown: 58% of the Jewish public is satisfied, compared to 51% of the Arab public.

• 55% of the Israeli public expresses trust in the official reports on operational achievements in the various arenas (42% “to a great extent” and 13% “to a very great extent”), while 41% of the respondents trust them only to a small extent or not at all.

  • The political gaps are prominent: 76.5% of coalition voters express trust in the official reports, compared to only 43% of opposition voters.
  • In terms of sectoral breakdown: 61% of the Jewish public express trust in the official reports, compared to only 33% of the Arab public.

The Lebanon Front

• The public is divided on the question of whether Hezbollah can be disarmed: 46% believes this can be done, compared to 43% who disagree, while 11% say they do not know.

  • The political breakdown points to clear gaps: 65% of coalition voters believe Hezbollah can be disarmed, compared to only 36% of opposition voters. By contrast, 55% of opposition voters believe it cannot be disarmed, compared to only 28% of coalition voters.
  • The sectoral breakdown also shows clear gaps: 51% of the Jewish public thinks Hezbollah can be disarmed, compared to only 27% of the Arab public, among whom 58% believes this is not possible.

Internal-Social Threats and Challenges

Military-Society Relations

• A majority of the Jewish public (63%) agrees with the statement by the chief of staff in the political-security cabinet that there is a real danger that the excessive number of missions imposed on the IDF, together with the failure to expand its recruitment base, could cause the army to “collapse into itself.” They also believe that he was right to warn of this danger. By contrast, 19% of the Jewish public believes there is no real danger, and 12% sees the chief of staff’s position as improper intervention in the political process surrounding draft legislation.

  • The political breakdown points to sharp gaps: 90.5% of opposition voters agree that there is a real danger and that it was right to warn of it, compared to only 40% among coalition voters. By contrast, 32% of coalition voters believe there is no real danger and that the IDF will be able to fulfill any mission imposed on it, compared to only 5.5% among opposition voters.

Trust in Individuals and Institutions

The Security Establishment

Public trust in the security establishment remains high, although some indicators have shown moderate erosion since the beginning of the campaign. Trust in the IDF remains high and stable, while trust in the chief of staff and the IDF spokesperson has declined.

• 77% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the IDF (41% “to a great extent” and 36% “to a fairly great extent”), compared to 21% reporting low trust. Compared to the survey at the beginning of the war (March 1–2, 2026), this reflects only a slight decline in the share of respondents expressing high trust, from 79% to 77%. Compared to February’s survey, however, the figure is essentially stable (76% in February).

  • The political breakdown indicates that high trust in the IDF crosses political camps, with 90% of coalition voters and 80% of opposition voters expressing high trust.
  • However, the sectoral breakdown reveals a sharp gap: 88% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the IDF, compared to only 31% of the Arab public.

• 66% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, while 27% reports low trust. Compared to the beginning of the campaign (March 1–2, 2026), this reflects a moderate decline in the share expressing high trust, from 71% to 66%. It is also slightly lower than the level recorded during Operation Rising Lion (June 16, 2025), when high trust stood at 69%.

  • By political breakdown: 73% of coalition voters and 77% of opposition voters express high trust in the chief of staff.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 76% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the chief of staff, compared to only 27% of the Arab public.

• 56% of the Israeli public has high trust in the IDF Spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Effie Defrin, compared to 34% reporting low trust and 10% who answered “don’t know.” Compared to the beginning of the campaign, trust has declined from 64% to 56%. This is also lower than the level recorded during Operation Rising Lion (63% at the beginning of the operation and 68% toward its end).

  • By political breakdown: 70% of coalition voters express high trust in the IDF spokesperson, compared to 55% among opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 64% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the IDF spokesperson, compared to only 23% of the Arab public.

The Political Leadership

Trust in the political echelon remains low and is characterized by sharp political polarization alongside sectoral gaps. Compared to the previous survey (March 15–16, 2026), there has been a slight decline in trust in both the government and the prime minister.

• • 30% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the government, compared to 68% reporting low trust. Compared to the beginning of the campaign (March 1–2, 2026), this reflects a slight decline in the share expressing high trust (from 34% to 30%). Compared to February, however, the level is essentially stable.

    • The political breakdown highlights sharp polarization: 62% of coalition voters express high trust in the government, compared to only 7% among opposition voters.
    • By sectoral breakdown: 36% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the government, compared to only 8% of the Arab public.

  • 36% of the Israeli public has high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, compared to 62% with low trust. Compared to the beginning of the campaign (March 1–2, 2026), the level of trust is relatively stable, declining slightly from 38% to 36%. This is similar to the level of trust recorded during Operation Rising Lion (35%).

    • Here too, a sharp political breakdown is evident: 77% of coalition voters express high trust in the prime minister, compared to only 7% among opposition voters.
    • By sectoral breakdown: 43% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the prime minister, compared to only 8% of the Arab public.