Table of Contents:

Summary of the Results

The Israeli public continues to support Operation Roaring Lion, with a majority (78.5%) backing the Israeli–American strikes on Iran—a level similar to that measured at the start of the campaign (80.5%). In addition, 60% of the public is highly satisfied with the military achievements in Iran, comparable to the level recorded about two weeks into the war. Nonetheless, there has been a decline in support for continuing the campaign until the regime collapses: 54% of the public believes the fighting should continue until this goal is achieved, compared to 63% at the beginning of the campaign. At the same time, the share assessing that the war will significantly harm the ayatollah regime has declined from 69% at the outset of the operation to 58% today. As for the home front, 46% of the public assesses that it could cope with a wartime situation for up to one month, while 47% thinks that it could endure beyond that. In terms of the northern front, 48% of the public is doubtful that the current campaign in Lebanon will lead to many years of security calm.

Methodology

The survey was conducted between March 15–16, 2026, led by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies, following the outbreak of the war with Iran as part of Operation Roaring Lion. Data were collected by iPanel, with 805 respondents completing the online survey in Hebrew and 152 in Arabic. After sectoral weighting, the sample constitutes a representative sample of the adult Israeli population (ages 18+). The maximum sampling error for the total sample is ±3.17% at a 95% confidence level.

Click here to download the full survey data | Survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية | Click here to view trends among the Jewish public |

Click here to view trends among the Arab public

the complete data

The Iran Front

A majority of the Israeli public (78.5%) continues to support Operation Roaring Lion, although there has been a noticeable decline in optimism regarding both the extent of damage to the Iranian regime and the desired end state of the campaign. At the same time, assessments of home front resilience have become more balanced between readiness to endure “up to one month” and “beyond one month.”

• A majority of the Israeli public (78.5%) supports the Israeli–US strike on Iran (21% “somewhat supports,” 57.5% “strongly supports”). Conversely, 17% oppose the strike (9% “somewhat opposes,” 8% “strongly opposes”). This is similar to support at the campaign’s outset (80.5%).

  • By political breakdown: 97% of coalition voters support the strike while only 76.5% of opposition voters do.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 91.5% of the Jewish public supports the strike compared to only 25.5% of the Arab public; notably, opposition within the Arab public is high (65.5%).

• 58% of the public assesses that the strike will significantly harm the Ayatollah regime, of which 47% thinks “to a great extent,” 11% foresees “full regime collapse.” Conversely, 35% of the public believes the damage will be minor or nonexistent. This reflects a sharp decline from the start of the war (from 69% to 58%), especially in terms of the expectations of the regime’s full collapse (from 22% to 11%).

  • By political segmentation: 78% of coalition voters think that the strike will harm the regime compared to 49% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral segmentation: 64% of the Jewish public believes that the strike will harm the regime, while 34.5% of the Arab public thinks it will.

A majority of 60% of the public is highly satisfied with military achievements in Iran, compared to 11% dissatisfied and 23% moderately satisfied.

• • By political breakdown: 81% of coalition voters are highly satisfied with the military achievements in Iran compared to 52% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 69% of the Jewish public is highly satisfied with the war’s achievements while only 23.5% of the Arab public is.

• The majority of the public (54%) believes the campaign should continue until the regime collapses, 22% favors a ceasefire after exhausting military damage, 17% supports seeking a ceasefire as soon as possible. Compared to the previous survey on March 1–2, positions have moderated: Support for continuing the operation until regime collapse fell (from 63% to 54%), while support for a ceasefire after military gains increased (from 16% to 22.5%).

  • By political breakdown: 79% of coalition voters think the operation should continue until the regime collapses compared to 42% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 64% of the Jewish public believes that the operation should continue until the regime falls, vs. 13% of the Arab public. Among the Arab public, a clear majority (68%) prefers a ceasefire as soon as possible.

• 46% of the public estimates coping up to one month (13% “up to two weeks,” 33% “up to one month”). Conversely, 47% of respondents estimate that the home front will cope for beyond one month (27% “2–3 months,” 10% “up to six months,” 2% “up to a year,” 8% “over a year”). Compared to the survey on March 1–2, the percentage of respondents who thought “up to one month” dropped from 62% to 46%, while the percentage of those who responded “beyond a month” increased from 29% to 47%. Compared to the previous war against Iran (Operation Rising Lion), the share of respondents who estimated that the home front would be able to cope with the wartime situation for “up to one month” is similar to the current level (49% in June 2025 vs. 46% in the current survey), but the overall picture today is more balanced between the two ranges.

  • By political breakdown: 42% of coalition voters think that the home front will cope with the wartime situation for “up to one month” compared to 55% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 47.5% of the Jewish public thinks that the home front will cope with the wartime situation for “up to one month” compared to 41% of the Arab public.

• 69% of the public thinks that the decisions regarding the Iran campaign are based primarily on security considerations (38% “to a great extent,” 31% “to a very great extent”), while 26% believes that they are based on such considerations to a small or very small extent. This represents a slight decline compared to June 2025 at 75.5%.

  • By political segmentation: 91% of coalition voters think that the decisions regarding Iran are based primarily on security considerations, compared to 60% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral segmentation: 78.5% of the Jewish public believe this is the case, compared to 31% of the Arab public.

 The Lebanon Front

Public opinion on the likelihood of achieving long-term quiet in the north is divided, with significant gaps between political camps regarding the desired end state.

• 41% of the public believes the current campaign in Lebanon will enable many years of security calm (28% “to a great extent,” 13% “to a very great extent”), compared to 48% who thinks this to a small or very small extent; while 11% answered “don’t know.”

  • By political breakdown: 62% of coalition voters think that the campaign will enable security calm for a long time, while only 26% of opposition voters do.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 43.5% of the Jewish public thinks this, compared to 31% of the Arab public.

• A majority of the public (52%) supports a new US-sponsored security arrangement with Lebanon, of which 28% supports full withdrawal and transferring security control to Lebanon, and 24% favors an arrangement that includes temporary Israeli holding of several positions in southern Lebanon. Conversely, 39% supports establishing a permanent Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon; 9% answered “don’t know.”

  • By political segmentation: Among coalition voters, the leading position is a permanent security zone (61%); among opposition voters, there is stronger support for US-sponsored arrangements (70%).
  • By sectoral segmentation: 45% of the Jewish public favors a permanent security zone compared to only 13% of the Arab public; among the Arab public, a high share (59.5%) supports full withdrawal within the framework of an arrangement.

Trust in Individuals and Institutions

The Security Establishment

• A majority of the public (77%) expresses high trust in the IDF (42% “to a great extent,” 35% “to a fairly great extent”), compared to 22% reporting low trust. In comparison to the survey on March 1–2 at the beginning of the war, there has been a slight decline (from 79% to 77%), but compared to February, it is almost stable (76%).

  • By political breakdown: A high degree of trust spans the two political camps at 88% among coalition voters and 82% among opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown: 89% of the Jewish public has high trust in the IDF compared to 28% of the Arab public.

The Political Leadership

• Only 31% of the public expresses high trust in the Israeli government, while 68% reports low trust. Compared to the survey in early March at the beginning of the operation, there has been a moderate decline in high trust (from 34% to 31%), but it remains relatively stable compared to February (30%).

  • By political segmentation: There is a sharp polarization—68% of coalition voters express high trust in the government compared to only 7% of opposition voters.
  • By sectoral segmentation: 38% of the Jewish public has high trust in the government compared to only 6% of the Arab public.