Table of Contents:

Summary of the Results

A clear majority of the Israeli public (81%) supports the Israeli–US attack on Iran (Operation Roaring Lion). In addition, 63% believes the campaign should continue until the fall of the Iranian regime. Public trust in the security establishment remains high and has even strengthened, while there has been a slight increase in trust in the political leadership. Sixty-nine percent of the public assesses that the military campaign will significantly harm the Iranian regime; of these, 22% believes that the regime may completely collapse. Furthermore, 62% of the public is willing to live in a state of war for up to one month at most.

Methodology

The survey was conducted between March 1–2, 2026, led by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies, following the outbreak of the conflict with Iran as part of Operation Roaring Lion. Data were collected with the assistance of iPanel. A total of 805 respondents completed the survey online in Hebrew and 149 in Arabic. After sectoral weighting, the respondents constitute a representative sample of the adult Israeli population (ages 18 and over). The maximum sampling error is ±3.17% at a 95% confidence level.

Click here to download the full survey data | Survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية | Click here to view trends among the Jewish public |

Click here to view trends among the Arab public

the complete data

The Iran Front

Public attitudes toward this campaign are characterized by broad support alongside significant political and sectoral gaps—particularly regarding the continuation of the campaign and its objectives.

• A clear majority of the public (80.5%) supports the Israeli–US attack on Iran, of which 20.5% “somewhat supports” and 60% “strongly supports.” In contrast, 5% opposes the attack (7.5% “somewhat opposes” and 6% “strongly opposes”), and 6% answered “Don’t know.”

  • Support for the attack is nearly unanimous among coalition voters (96%), compared to 77% among opposition voters (15% opposed).

• Most of the public (77%) reports that the purpose of the campaign is clear, of which 34% claims “to a great extent” and 43% “to a very great extent.” However, 5% of the public reports that the campaign’s objective is unclear (15% “to a small extent” and 5.5% “not at all”).

  • A sharp sectoral gap is evident: 86.5% of the Jewish public reports clarity regarding the campaign’s objectives, compared to 39% among the Arab public.

• 5% of the public assesses that the campaign will harm the nuclear project, of which 46% believes it will be harmed “to a great extent” and 16.5% thinks there will be a “complete dismantling of the project.” In contrast, 26.5% of the public believes the damage will be limited or nonexistent, and 11% responded “Don’t know.”

  • Political gaps are particularly pronounced: 84% of coalition voters predict significant damage or full dismantling of the project, compared to 48% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral differences are also notable: 68% of the Jewish public expects significant damage or dismantling of the project, compared to 41% among the Arab public.

• 73% of the public thinks that the ballistic missile arsenal will be significantly harmed—59% believes it will be harmed “to a great extent” and 14% thinks it will be “completely dismantled.” By contrast, 20% of the public believes the missile arsenal will be harmed only to a small extent or not at all, and 7% responded “Don’t know.”

  • Politically, coalition voters express higher expectations of damage (88%) compared to 65% among opposition voters.

• 69% of the public believes the Iranian regime will be significantly harmed—47% thinks it will be harmed “to a great extent,” and 22% believes the regime will collapse entirely. Another 5% claims that the regime will be harmed only slightly or not at all, and 10.5% responded “Don’t know.”

  • The percentage of coalition voters assessing significant harm is particularly high at 87%, compared to 60% among opposition voters.

• A majority of the public (63%) believes the campaign should continue until the fall of the Iranian regime. Another 16% supports a ceasefire after maximizing damage to military capabilities, and 15% believes a ceasefire should be pursued as soon as possible. An additional 6% responded “Don’t know.”

  • A significant political gap exists: 86% of coalition voters support continuing the campaign until the regime falls, compared to 52% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral gaps are particularly sharp: 74% of the Jewish public supports continuing the campaign until the regime falls, while only 17.5% of the Arab public holds this view. A majority of the Arab public (61%) prefers a ceasefire as soon as possible.

• The level of concern about the escalation of the campaign is lower than that measured at the beginning of the military operation in June 2025. Some 56.5% of the public reports being concerned (38.5% “somewhat concerned” and 18% “very concerned”), compared to 79% at the beginning of the previous operation (June 16, 2025) and 65.5% toward its end (June 23, 2025).

  • By political segmentation, 62% of opposition voters report concern compared to 46% of coalition voters.
  • By sectoral segmentation: 80% of the Arab public reports concern compared to 51% of the Jewish public.

• A large majority of the public (82%) estimate that the campaign will last up to one month at most, while only about one-tenth believe it will last longer. 17% of the public thinks it will last “a few days,” while 65% estimates “one week to one month.” Another 10% estimates more than one month, and 8% responded “Don’t know.”
• Satisfaction with the performance of the Home Front Command is high:78% of the public is satisfied (on a scale of 1–5, where 1 = poor performance and 5 = excellent performance—39% rated “4” and 39% rated “5”), compared to 7% who are dissatisfied. Another 13% of the public rated satisfaction at the midpoint (“3”). Overall satisfaction levels are similar to those measured during the previous campaign against Iran in June 2025.
• A majority of 91.5% of the public reports that Home Front Command instructions are currently clear to them in the event of a missile attack alert, compared to 5% who reports that they are clear only to a small or very small extent. Compared with February, this represents a 3.5% increase (from 88% to 91.5%).
• However, clarity was lower during the first hours of the attack: 80% of the public reported that Home Front Command instructions were clear during the initial hours of the operation (35% “to a great extent” and 45% “to a very great extent”), compared to 19% who said they were clear only to a small or very small extent. This rate is slightly higher than that measured on the first night of the previous operation against Iran in June 2025 (75%).
• 62% of the public estimates that the Israeli home front is prepared to live in a wartime situation for up to one month at most—a significant increase compared to the beginning of the previous operation with Iran. Some 25% of the public believes the home front will be prepared for “up to two weeks.” Another 37% estimates “up to one month.” 29% of the public thinks it will last longer than one month, and 9% responded “Don’t know.”

  • Compared to the beginning of the previous campaign against Iran (June 16, 2025), when 49% estimated the home front would be prepared for up to a month, this represents a substantial increase.
  • By sectoral segmentation: 63% of the Jewish public estimates preparedness for up to a month, compared to 59% among Arabs.
  • By political segmentation: Coalition voters are more likely to believe the home front could endure beyond a month (37%) compared to opposition voters (21%).

Israel–Israel Relations

• 45% of the Israeli public believes that US President Donald Trump supports Israel only when it serves his own interests, while 34.5% of the public thinks he is highly committed to Israel’s security, and 16% perceive him as an unpredictable president who is difficult to rely on for Israel’s security matters.

  • Political polarization is apparent: 51% of coalition voters view Trump as committed to Israel’s security, compared to 21% among opposition voters. Conversely, 55% of opposition voters believe his support depends on his personal interests, compared to 5% among coalition voters. The share of respondents who view him as unpredictable is also higher among opposition voters (19%) than among coalition voters (10.5%).
  • Between sectors, differences also emerge: 49% of the Jewish public believes Trump supports Israel only when it serves his interests, compared to 30% among the Arab public. Conversely, 29% of the Arab public views him as unpredictable, compared to 13% among Jews.

• Over the past year, Israeli public trust in President Trump has fluctuated.

  • The share of Israelis who believe Trump is highly committed to Israel’s security fell from 35% in March 2025 (about two months after the start of his second term) to 20% in May 2025 (following his visit to Israel).
  • Trust then rose again to 29% in June 2025 (during the first campaign against Iran) and reached 34% in October 2025 (during the Gaza ceasefire agreement and the return of hostages), similar to the current level.
  • Meanwhile, the proportion of the public who believes Trump supports Israel only when it serves his interests rose from 42% in March 2025 to 5% in May 2025, remained high in June and October 2025 (50%), and has now declined to 45%.
  • The rate viewing Trump as an unpredictable president peaked at 23% in May 2025, fell to 11% in October 2025, and rose again to 16% in March 2026.

Perceptions of Threats and Challenges

• Assessment of the national security situation has improved since the beginning of the campaign against Iran: 38% of the public rates the national security situation as good or very good, 27% rates it as bad or very bad, and 34% rates it as intermediate or moderate. Compared to the survey conducted about a week earlier (February 17–22), this reflects an 8-percentage-point increase in the share rating the situation as good (from 30% to 38%), and a 4-percentage-point decrease in the share rating it as bad (from 31% to 27%).

  • Sectoral gaps are also evident: Among the Jewish public, 45% rates the national security situation as good or very good, compared to only 11% among the Arab public. Conversely, 58% of the Arab public rates the situation as bad or very bad, compared to 19% among the Jewish public.
  • Sharp differences also appear across the political spectrum: 61% of coalition voters rate the national security situation as good or very good, compared to only 24% of opposition voters.

• Concern about social tensions within Israel remains higher than concern about external security threats: 82% of the public reports concern about social tensions (42% somewhat concerned and 40% very concerned), compared to 17% of the public who is not concerned. This represents a slight decline of 2 percentage points in the share that reports concern (from 84% about a week earlier to 82% now).

  • Political differences are pronounced: 93% of opposition voters report concern about social tensions, compared to 71% among coalition voters.

• 71% of the public reports concern about external threats (50% fairly concerned and 21% very concerned), compared to 28% of the public who is not concerned (1% responds “don’t know”). There is no significant change compared to February (72%).

  • Political variation is also evident here: 81% of opposition voters are concerned about external threats, compared to 60% among coalition voters.
  • Concern is higher among the Arab public (80%) than among the Jewish public (68%).

• Personal sense of security has weakened with the start of the operation: only 26% of the public reports a high or very high sense of personal security, 41% reports a moderate level, and 32% reports a low or very low level. Compared to the week preceding the operation, this reflects a 4-percentage-point decline in the share reporting high levels of personal security (from 30% to 26%) and an 8-percentage-point increase in the share reporting low levels of personal security (from 24% to 32%).

  • Political gaps are significant: 45% of coalition voters report high levels of personal security, compared to only 14% among opposition voters.
  • Sectoral differences are also substantial: 31% of the Jewish public reports high personal security, compared to only 6% among the Arab public. Conversely, 61% of the Arab public reports low or very low levels of personal security, compared to 25% among the Jewish public.

Trust in Persons and Institutions

The Security Establishment

Public trust in the security establishment remains high, and in most indicators, has strengthened compared to February, against the backdrop of the outbreak of the campaign against Iran in Operation Roaring Lion.

• 79% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the IDF, compared to 19% reporting low trust—up 3 percentage points from the previous week (76%).

  • The difference between the political camps is relatively moderate: 88% of coalition voters express high trust in the IDF, compared to 83% among opposition voters.
  • However, sectoral differences are sharp: 90% of the Jewish public reports high trust in the IDF, compared to only 37% among the Arab public.

• 85% of the public expresses high trust in the Air Force, compared to 13% that reports low trust—an increase of 6 percentage points compared to the previous week (79%). This level is similar to the trust levels measured during the previous campaign against Iran in June 2025 (83%).

  • High trust appears in both political camps: 91% of coalition voters and 88% of opposition voters express high trust in the Air Force.
  • The sectoral gap is significant: 93% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the Air Force, compared to 50% among the Arab public.

• 86% of the public expresses high trust in the Home Front Command, compared to 13% reporting low trust—an increase of 4 percentage points compared to the previous week (82%).

  • By political segmentation, trust remains high among both coalition voters (94%) and opposition voters (88%).
  • The sectoral gaps are sharp: 94% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the Home Front Command, compared to only 56% among the Arab public.

• 74% of the public expresses high trust in the Military Intelligence Directorate, compared to 22% that reports low trust—a level similar to that measured during the campaign against Iran in June 2025.

  • In the sectoral breakdown, 83% of the Jewish public expresses high trust, compared to 38% among Arabic public.

• 71% of the public expresses high trust in the IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, compared to 22% that reports low trust (7% responds “don’t know”)—a significant increase of 8 percentage points compared to the previous week (63%). This also represents a modest increase compared to the campaign against Iran in June 2025, when the share expressing high trust in the chief of staff stood at 69% (June 16, 2025).

  • By political segmentation, 81% of coalition voters express high trust in the chief of staff, compared to 77% among opposition voters.
  • By sectoral breakdown, 81% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the chief of staff, compared to only 33% among the Arab public.

• 64% of the public expresses high trust in the IDF Spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Effie Defrin, compared to 26% reporting low trust (10% responds “don’t know”). This figure is similar to the trust levels measured during the previous campaign against Iran in June 2025. At that time, 63% reported high trust at the start of the operation (June 16, 2025), and 68% reported high trust toward its end (June 23, 2025).[1]

  • By political segmentation, 77% of coalition voters express high trust, compared to 65% among opposition voters.
  • By sectoral segmentation, 72% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the IDF spokesperson, compared to 32% among the Arab public.

The Political Leadership

Alongside the rise in trust in the security establishment, a moderate increase in trust in the political leadership is also apparent, although trust levels remain relatively low and are highly polarized.

• About one-third of the public (34%) expresses high trust in the Israeli government, compared to 65% reporting low trust—an increase of 4 percentage points compared to the previous week (30%). This also represents a slight improvement compared to the previous campaign against Iran in June 2025 (30% on June 16 and 32% on June 23, 2025).

  • Political polarization is particularly sharp: 67% of coalition voters express high trust in the government, compared to only 10% among opposition voters.
  • In the sectoral breakdown, 40% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the government, compared to only 9% among the Arab public.

• 38% of the public expresses high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, compared to 59% expressing low trust—an increase of 4 percentage points compared to the previous week (34%). This also represents a slight increase compared to the previous campaign against Iran in June 2025, when the share expressing high trust in the prime minister stood at 35% (June 16, 2025).

  • Polarization is also sharp here: 79% of coalition voters express high trust in the prime minister, compared to only 9% among opposition voters.
  • In the sectoral breakdown, 46% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the prime minister, compared to only 7% among the Arab public.

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[1] In June 2025, the question focused on trust in the reports of the IDF spokesperson on a range from 1 to 5.