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After a long meeting that exceeded its scheduled time, President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke with the press together yet addressed completely different audiences. President Obama spoke to the international community and the Arab states. With the exception of some small audiences in the United States, it is hard to imagine that the American public was waiting for the outcome of the meeting with bated breath. By contrast, Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke to approximately fifty – or fewer – Members of Knesset who are in his coalition. The fact that the two leaders came to the meeting with different objectives and presented the meeting in different lights allowed each of them to emerge from the first meeting between them feeling satisfied: President Obama appeared as the responsible superpower leader possessing an international view, while Netanyahu did not get himself into hot water in this first test. There is a feeling that there are differences of opinion but no crisis in the bilateral relations, and none of the government ministers in Israel has any reason to resign.

If what was said publicly by the two on May 18 truly reflects what was discussed in the one-on-one conversation, the main disagreements focus on the Palestinian issue, whereas the differences on the Iranian issues are less pronounced and so far have not created any friction between the two countries.

Following the meeting, the president suggested the outline of the new administration’s political vision. In his speech in Cairo on June 4 it will be explained in greater detail, but the salient points are as follows:

· A solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the two-state solution, while making use of the fundamentals of the Roadmap

· Israeli-Palestinian negotiations parallel to engaging in the Iranian nuclear issue

· Encouraging Arab states to advance the process of normalization with Israel even before agreements are signed and certainly before their implementation

· Halting settlement activity

· Strengthening the security mechanisms of the Palestinian Authority

· Attending to the humanitarian situation in Gaza

Despite the fact that President Obama explicitly stressed a solution on the basis of the “two states for two peoples” principle, and one may assume that he will expand on this point in his speech in Cairo, no crisis will arise in the bilateral relations; this is not what will impede the resumption of negotiations. The use of the Roadmap and  possible vague formulations by the Israeli government (“the establishment of two states is one possible outcome of the negotiations” or “Israel will agree to negotiations about any solution that will take its interests into account”) will allow Israel to avoid such a crisis. During the press conference, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that except for a few areas of authority whose transfer into Palestinian hands is liable to endanger Israel, the Palestinians could completely rule themselves. In a certain sense, this is a rather far-reaching formulation.

Both President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu avoided mentioning the Syrian-Israeli track and the Arab initiative. It is hard to believe that the first issue was not discussed at all. At this stage, neither the United States nor Israel – for different reasons – is likely interested in sending a positive message to President Asad. It is possible that Washington is also waiting for the results of the Lebanese elections, scheduled for June 7, the Iranian election results, and the results of an American-Iranian dialogue, should it take place, before formulating a policy with regard to the Iran-Syria-Hizbollah axis.

The fact that President Obama did not mention the Arab initiative in his remarks is interesting and provides Netanyahu with a measure of comfort. The initiative in its current outline does not completely coincide with stated United States policy and certainly not with written American obligations such as the 1969 Rogers plan that specifically referred to inconsequential changes in the 1967 borders or President Bush’s letter to Prime Minister Sharon of April 24, 2004. President Clinton’s December 2000 proposal also differs from the 2002 Arab initiative. Nonetheless, President Obama will likely refer to this initiative in positive terms in his June 4 speech in Cairo, even if he does not adopt it wholesale.

When speaking to reporters, Netanyahu said that in any negotiations Israel would demand Arab recognition of the State of Israel as a Jewish state. In his opening sentence, Obama said that theUnited States seeks to ensure the security of Israel as an independent Jewish state. The two sentences are not identical, and should Israelinsist on its demand and the Palestinians and/or Arab states continue their refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, the United States is liable to find itself in an embarrassing situation. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine formulations to bridge the gap on this issue.

President Obama’s extensive reference to the Iranian issue was instructive, and one may assume that it reflects the experience and qualifications of Dennis Ross, the President’s special advisor onIran. President Obama both succeeded in showering Iran with praise and sending it a clear message that he has no intention of becoming entangled in endless negotiations. He expressed identification with the Israeli concern to present the Iranian issue as one threatening not onlyIsrael but also the entire region, and refused to relate to what may happen if and when a dialogue with Iran fails, beyond making a statement about international sanctions. Tehran may criticize the president’s statements, but it will likely not slam the door in the face of a dialogue. In Moscow and Beijing there is no reason at all to disagree with President Obama. The Arab states, in particular the Gulf states, are certainly satisfied with the restrained and calculated message, andIsrael at this point has no reason to grumble about President Obama’s formulation. At the end of 2009, when the American administration makes its assessments regarding the outcome of the dialogue withIran, a disagreement with Israel might erupt over the interpretation of “significant benefits,” to use President Obama’s phrase after the meeting. (For those looking for signals and symbolism: in 1967, Israelembarked on a war against Egypt's naval blockade in the Red Sea and its concentration of forces in the Sinai because of America’s failure or lack of desire to make good on the promise the Eisenhower administration had given Israel in 1957 to prevent just such a situation. What will happen if and when there are no results forthcoming from a dialogue with Iran?)

Netanyahu made an interesting and surprising concession to Obama with regard to linkage between negotiations with the Palestinians and the Iranian issue, by agreeing to simultaneity and parallelism between the two issues. Does Netanyahu envision a failure of an Iranian-American dialogue that would release him from negotiations with the Palestinians, or is he assuming that in any case, nothing is about to happen on the Palestinian track (as long as the rift between Hamas and Fatah is not mended) before the dialogue with Iran gets under way? One may assume that Netanyahu understands that unequivocal success in a dialogue with Iran, one that cannot be interpreted in different ways, will exert heavy pressure on Israel to undertake far-reaching concessions on both the Syrian and Palestinian tracks.

The recourse to sports metaphors in analyzing events such as the meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu is trite but almost inevitable. Baseball is America's national pastime, and barring a tie game that goes into extra innings, includes nine innings a game. The May 18 meeting was just the first inning of many others expected down the road. Between innings, the American all-star team will play in exhibition games, in the form of meetings between President Obama and Presidents Abu Mazen and Mubarak and the speech in Cairo, but the game between Israel and the United Statesremains to be played out.