Publications

The direct confrontation between Iran and Israel in June 2025, the third between them, was not a strategic surprise for the Gulf States. Although they sought to dissuade President Donald Trump from supporting an Israeli strike against Iran, in recent years, they have prepared for the possibility of war between the two rivals. These preparations have been both political and military, involving efforts to strengthen their defensive military capabilities mainly through cooperation with the United States, while maintaining as much as possible a neutral posture. This delicate balancing act was intended to distance themselves as much as possible from the line of fire, a lesson learned from the 2019 Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia, which occurred during tensions between Iran and the United States.

Indeed, during the 12-day war, all six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) expressed concern that the violence would spill into their territories, issued strong condemnations against Israel, and emphasized their neutral stance. The condemnations—including from countries that are signatories to the Abraham Accords—did not reflect alignment with Tehran but rather a clear desire to preserve their own security and send a message of non-involvement. The Gulf States are adjacent to Iran’s border, and the continuation or escalation of the war risked provoking Iranian retaliatory attacks against vital infrastructure, such as oil facilities, ports, and desalination plants within their territory.

Moreover, the war tested the détente strategy that the Gulf States have pursued with Iran in recent years. Any expansion of the conflict into their territories could have jeopardized their accelerated economic development agendas (led by Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030”), which depend heavily on their sustained security and stability. Consequently, the Gulf States requested that the United States refrain from attacking Iran directly from their territory in order to avoid being seen as partners in the strike. They also urged Washington not to expand its attacks beyond nuclear sites and called on Israel to avoid targeting Iran’s oil facilities, fearing that such actions would provide Iran with a pretext to strike their own oil installations. At the same time, the Gulf States implemented accelerated security measures: They reinforced air defense systems, engaged in close military coordination with American forces stationed in their territory, and raised civilian preparedness levels.

Both out of concern for their own security and as part of their efforts to position themselves as key players in the region, the Gulf States swiftly launched diplomatic initiatives to mediate between Iran and the United States, aimed at halting the escalation. While Qatar ultimately served as the main mediator for the ceasefire, due to the trust it enjoys from both the Trump administration and the Iranian leadership, Saudi Arabia and Oman also served the sides by exchanging messages between the parties.

Unlike in 2019, when Iran launched an attack on oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, this time, Tehran refrained from involving the Gulf States or directly targeting their economic interests, even though the actions against Iran were significantly more severe. This restraint also underscored the durability of the détente between Iran and the Gulf States and its importance from the latter’s perspective. The only Iranian action within the Gulf States was the attack on the Central Command base in Qatar hours before the ceasefire, and both Washington and Doha were forewarned. Qatar was clearly selected as the target because of its close ties with Iran. By absorbing the symbolic blow, Qatari mediators helped facilitate a swift resolution to the confrontation while avoiding an American retaliatory response, thereby reinforcing Doha’s standing in Washington.

At the same time, the operational and technological capabilities Israel demonstrated in its attack on Iran served as a reminder of the significant gap that still exists between Israel and the Gulf States. Diplomatic sources in the Gulf, along with columnists in the state-run media in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have expressed concern about two issues: Israel’s growing military dominance in the region at the expense of the weakening Iranian axis, and what they perceive as Israel’s lack of restraint in various arenas in the region. The media discourse in the Gulf portrays Israel as a rising hegemonic power, highlighting the sharp contrast between its military posture and the Gulf States’ more diplomatic approach. The Gulf States see Israel’s actions in the region, such as its confrontation with the Houthi rebels in Yemen, as potentially risky for themselves as well. Mohammed Baharoon, the director general of b’huth, a public policy research center in Dubai, summarized this sentiment: “Israel has become the main source of instability in the region, a role it once shared with Iran.”

Against this backdrop, the Gulf States were pleased that the United States reinforced its position and strategic-military presence in the region. The American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities demonstrated how the United States can support its allies without putting boots on the ground or conducting military operations from Gulf States’ territory—an ideal model for the Gulf States, which also hope to secure US military assistance should the need arise. At the same time, the Gulf States are aware of the growing opposition in Washington, including within the Trump administration, to sustained military involvement abroad. As a result, they understand that they cannot fully depend on the United States to intervene on their behalf should the need arise.

Since the end of the war, the Gulf States have been examining its outcomes, and the question arises of whether, in light of Israel’s demonstrated superiority over Tehran, they will reassess their positions toward Iran and Israel. Despite being impressed by Israel’s military capabilities, they remain concerned about potential shifts in Iranian policy. They are closely monitoring the stability of the regime in Tehran and fear that, following the blows it sustained, Iran could face upheaval. After years of fostering stable, positive relations with the Iranian regime, the Gulf States worry that more extreme elements could rise to power in Iran or that the regional neighbor could descend into instability that could affect them as well. This concern was reflected in a series of articles published in the Saudi press, which expressed hope that the current crisis would lead to significant change within the regime—without altering its structure—and encouraged it to adapt to the spirit of the times, favoring socioeconomic development over revolutionary slogans.

It appears that the war between Israel and Iran has brought the Gulf States to a crossroads: whether to continue their careful navigation, hedging between Tehran and Washington, or to “choose sides” and deepen their partnership with the United States and Israel, even if it risks a confrontation with Iran. Regardless, given the evolving dynamics, the Gulf States are compelled to reassess their regional orientation, their partnerships, and their role in shaping a new security order in the Middle East.

At this stage, it can be assumed that the Gulf States will refrain from publicly choosing sides, will maintain their cautious policy toward Iran, and will not openly align against it. Their fear of Iran has not subsided, and in their view, another confrontation between Israel and/or the United States and Iran is possible in the future, particularly if the weakened Iranian regime seeks to accelerate its nuclear development. Consequently, it is unlikely that the Gulf States will see a reason to change their delicate balancing act or the policy of détente with Iran that they have led over the past five years. Moreover, voices in the Gulf have expressed concern about Israel, particularly regarding its current government, which appears to favor the use of force over diplomatic processes as a means of pursuing Israel’s security, especially after having shifted the regional balance of power in its favor.

Nonetheless, the Israeli–American strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities was generally viewed positively in the Gulf for several reasons:

1. The weakening of Iran. Iran’s nuclear and missile programs sustained significant damage, as did its capacity to operate an effective network of proxies throughout the Middle East.
2. The strengthening of the regional position. The United States demonstrated a willingness to use military force against a regional threat, fulfill its commitments, and assist its ally, thereby reinforcing its regional standing.
3. Limited damage to Gulf States. Aside from symbolic Iranian fire at the Central Command base in Qatar, the Gulf States and their interests did not suffer any physical damage to their territory during the confrontation. However, the Iranian strike on Qatar, although calculated and symbolic, served as a reminder of the Gulf States’ vulnerability.

Conclusion

The confrontation between Israel and Iran revealed Iran’s conventional military weakness and Israel’s military and technological superiority on the battlefield. This reality may make it easier for certain Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, to deepen their ties with Israel and move toward normalization. However, the pace and scope of this process will depend mainly on the steps Israel is prepared to take on the Palestinian issue and the conclusion of the war in the Gaza Strip.

The 12-day war exposed the contradictions in Gulf policy: the desire to avoid becoming a target, while at the same time using mediation and neutrality to enhance their regional standing, contrasted with the internal and systemic need for a clear and effective American security commitment. In practice, the alignment of the Gulf States in the pro-American camp was reinforced after the decision to employ military force (following failed attempts to resolve the crisis through negotiations) against Iran. Their security now depends more than ever on Washington’s willingness to deter, act, and enforce boundaries vis-à-vis Iran. The Iranian attack on Qatar, even if calculated and symbolic, is a reminder of the Gulf States’ vulnerability amid the still unresolved Israeli–Iranian conflict.