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This article examines the conduct of Israel’s military leadership prior to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War from the perspective of risk management and by looking at recently disclosed documents. From an analysis of the events, it appears that the chief of staff, David Elazar, had a clear risk management approach. On October 5, 1973, a day before the war, he put the regular army on high alert and reinforced the front lines. He did this despite the assessment of the head of Military Intelligence that the likelihood of war was extremely low.  However, Lieutenant General Elazar’s decision was far from being sufficient to withstand the attack that broke out the following day at 1:50 pm, in part because both he and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan failed to properly assess the risk that the regular army would struggle to contain the offensive before the arrival of reserve forces. In addition, Defense Minister Dayan and Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected the chief of staff’s suggestion made the next morning to carry out a preemptive air strike against the enemies, as they were concerned about the diplomatic risk involved, which made it even more difficult for the standing army. The lessons learned from this sequence of events are that risk management is an essential part of the role of statesmen and military leaders, and the military and diplomatic risks on the strategic level should be managed jointly and should be subject to policy goals. The IDF and the other defense forces must map out the risks involved in achieving their objectives and do what they can to reduce them—together with the political echelon—and by cooperating with them, the National Security Council, and the relevant government ministries.