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In his book Under the Knife: A History of Surgery in 28 Remarkable Operations, Arnold van de Laar applies the distinction between healing and curing to different medical practitioners. In his view, surgeons deal with healing, i.e., in fixing a problem, they bring relief to the patient. They cut into living flesh, isolate the diseased or broken part, locate the tumor, fracture, or decay, and focus on a surgical solution to the problem. By contrast, physicians deal with curing. They diagnose diseases and treat them – in an effort to eliminate them - with medications. In contrast to the surgeon’s surgical approach, the physician’s approach is therapeutic.

Given that medical procedures look toward health, there is often an inherent contradiction in medical terms that are applied to military and political moves. A “surgical strike” is simultaneously an offensive attack that is meant to stress the intention and practical attempt to demarcate the harm to the enemy and restrict it to what is deemed the necessary minimum. The IDF, in accordance with international law, is careful to distinguish between combatants and uninvolved non-combatants, and the Israeli Air Force uses “roof knocking” in the effort to reduce civilian casualties. Reducing damage to the absolute minimum is the only moral justification for using medical terminology in the context of warfare.

Subject to this caveat, one may distinguish between two manifestations of political and military strategy: surgical strategy versus therapeutic strategy.

This distinction helps in examining Israel’s strategy toward Hezbollah on the one hand, and Hamas on the other. How should Israel act against these enemies? Vis-à-vis Hezbollah, Israel should adopt a surgical strategy; vis-à-vis Hamas, Israel should adopt a therapeutic approach.

In the struggle against Hezbollah, Israel’s prime interest is to drive a wedge between Hezbollah’s Lebanese identity and the fact that it is a Shiite tool driven by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. The more Hezbollah integrates into Lebanese politics, the more it becomes a partner with those responsible for Lebanon, casting its own destiny with that of the nation. By contrast, the more Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah operates on behalf of Iranian interests, the more he gambles with, and risks, Lebanon’s security and wellbeing.

Since the end of the Second Lebanon War in August 2006, the objective of Israel’s policy of deterrence against Hezbollah - and of a war should that deterrence collapse - is unequivocally to force Nasrallah to choose his Lebanese identity over his commitment to the Revolutionary Guards. The military means to achieve this is a credible threat of expanding the “Dahiya doctrine,” to incorporate damage to civilian infrastructures providing combat assistance in Lebanon, with minimum harm to human life among uninvolved inhabitants.

Therefore, and contrary to the simplistic US legal position, which condemns the Lebanese government for providing a foothold for Hezbollah in the Lebanese political system because Hezbollah is defined as a terrorist organization, Israel’s interest, ironically and to the contrary, lies in deepening Hezbollah’s governing commitment in and to Lebanon.

Given that in Lebanon, some civilian infrastructures support combat, they are a legitimate military target for a surgical strike. By contrast, in the Gaza Strip, Israel’s policy must work in the opposite direction: to rebuild the infrastructures, even at the risk that Hamas will use them for both civilian and military ends. In other words, in the case of Hamas, Israel must adopt a therapeutic rather than a surgical approach.

In the Gaza Strip, Israel’s longstanding policy of closure, siege, and weakening the civilian population was based on the hope that the territory would see the outbreak of a civilian revolt against Hamas rule. However, this policy has failed. The resentment and despair among Gaza’s uninvolved civilian population are evidenced by the emigration of educated young people, while the Hamas iron fist quashes any popular resistance to its rule. In contrast to Hezbollah, which is challenged by a diverse Lebanese opposition, Hamas is challenged primarily by factions more extreme than itself, such as Islamic Jihad, and has so far avoided taking the risk of allowing a civilian rebellion to occur.

The recurring boxing matches between Israel on the one hand, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad on the other, are pointless exercises that usually slam into brick walls. There are no victories by knockout, or even by points. After the last round in early May, which was – like its predecessors – cyclical, ill-defined, and followed by a fragile calm, it is incumbent upon Israel to flip a strategic switch.

Israel should begin by accelerating moves toward an arrangement vis-à-vis Gaza; a comprehensive arrangement will best serve Israel’s interests. The practical solutions are familiar to all: seaport, airport, desalination plant, and other constructive measures. However, a breakthrough is possible only after civilians experience significant improvements to their quality of life.

A massive improvement to the quality of life in Gaza will expose Hamas to increasing criticism, both domestically and internationally, and to warnings against risking any new achievement by resuming fighting with Israel. The more money is invested in infrastructure and business projects, the more Gaza’s children enjoy better health and education, and the more the population has to lose, the more the formerly uninvolved may prove themselves to be quite involved and influential. Economic growth and higher employment rates stand to diminish jihadist incitement. Islamic Jihad will be marginalized and the Gaza Strip, now a pit of despair, may become a wellspring of hope.

Dr. Shmuel Harlap, chairman of Colmobil, is a senior member of the INSS Israeli Board of Trustees.