Publications

In December 2011, Syrian military forces held several exercises with live ammunition. These exercises were – not in typical fashion – well covered by the Syrian media.

On December 4, it was reported that an armored corps exercise and a missile force exercise had taken place. A Syrian television broadcast showed a number of launches of all types of Syrian long range ballistic missiles: a Scud launch (it was impossible to tell the model), a FROG rocket, an SS-21 missile, and the first showing of the launch of a solid fuel-powered ballistic missile, almost certainly the M-600. In addition, the broadcast showed the launches of heavy rockets (220 mm and 302 mm).

On December 20, the Syrian media reported two additional exercises, one of the air force and the air defense, and the second of the navy. Here too, Syrian television showed launches of surface-to-air and coastal anti-ship missiles.

Exercises of such scope and with such media prominence are unusual in Syria and are clearly meant to serve as a message of resilience on the part of Bashar Assad’s regime, which is currently under heavy international pressure as a result of the riots ongoing in Syria since last spring. The regime is concerned about an attack by NATO forces, as in Libya, which eventually brought about the downfall of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime. The Syrians’ major fear is an operation led by Turkey, which as early as August expressed its dissatisfaction with events in Syria during a special visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Recently, the pressure on Syria has increased and now includes the Arab nations, which in early November decided to suspend Syria from the Arab League.

Official Syrian spokespeople have avoided saying outright that the military exercises were intended as a message to a particular object, but it is clear they were meant to show resolve and determination and serve as a deterrent towards anyone considering attacking Syria. Several months ago Bashar Assad already issued a warning that any attempted foreign intervention in Syria would “cause an earthquake in the whole region.” He also explicitly declared that in any such event Israel would suffer the consequences.

Against the backdrop of the exercises described above and the threats against Israel, three related aspects should be noted. First, during the exercise of the air force and air defense, launchers of the Buk M2 SAM system (better known in the West as the SA-17) were photographed for the first time in Syria. In the past there were reports of Syrian interest in this system, but there was no verification from open sources that it had in fact been delivered. Two other air defense systems that previous reports claimed had reached Syria – the Pantsyr-S1 and the Strelets – were not on display.

The Buk M2 system is the heir to the old Kub / Kvadrat (better known in the West as the SA-6). This is a self-propelled surface-to-air missile meant for ground force defense. This system was significantly enhanced over its older version. With these systems, the launchers are equipped with automatic launch and tracking capabilities and are independent of a fire control center to guide the missiles (making them much more difficult to suppress).

At the same time, it is clear is that the old SA-6 missiles remain part of the ORBAT. Despite the capabilities afforded the Syrian aerial defenses with a system such as the Buk, a comprehensive view of Syria’s ability to defend its skies (using its air force and aerial defense systems) reveals the modest contribution of this system.

Second, the launch of a Yakhont missile from a land-based Bastion launch system was photographed during the naval exercise. This is a supersonic cruise missile with a 300-km range, and has versions that can be launched from ships, submarines, and planes. The version Syria received – the Bastion system – is used from the shore; the missile’s high speed and trajectory make it difficult to discover and intercept. Its placement along the Syrian coastline may threaten Israeli naval activity – both military and civilian – almost all the way to the Tel Aviv line. From the information available in open sources, it is unclear if the system also has capabilities against land-based targets or targets within ports. The system is radar guided and it is usually hard for such systems to lock onto land-based targets. There is also concern that such a system could fall into the hands of Hizbollah, just as the C-802 system did. The deployment of the system in southern Lebanon would place Israel’s entire coastline and that of the Gaza Strip within its missile range. One way or another, the appearance of the system in the arena is a very significant challenge, although it does not necessarily mean that the Israeli navy (or the IDF in general) is left without a response to the problem

Third,Russia continues to see Syria as an important strategic partner and views the collapse of Assad’s regime with growing concern. Cooperation with Syria gives Russia important political advantages in its rivalry with Western powers over its global standing, and also brings important military advantages. Syria allows Russia to use military infrastructures for its benefit, such as the port in Tartus, which has become a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean.

Security relations between Syria and Russia were tightened anew in 2005 after the chill following the fall of the USSR, when Syria was the Soviet Union’s main ally in the Middle East. This thaw was assisted by Russia forgiving most of Syria’s old debt. Since then, the two nations have signed multiple arms deals that included anti-tank missile systems, aerial defense systems (with at least one component of these deals was identified in the recent exercise), and shore defense systems. (Other deals, such as for the purchase of combat planes, were apparently not completed.) For the most part, Russia has been careful not to supply arms systems that would upset the balance, such as the S-300 surface-to-air missile or the Iskandar-E surface-to-surface missile. Thus the supply of the Yakhont missile at present is puzzling.

With the spread of the popular revolt in Syria, Russia’s concern that Assad's regime may well collapse even without external interference is growing, and this is a possibility Russia is working hard to prevent. Therefore, in tandem with its ongoing effort to provide Assad with maximal backing, Russia is endorsing controlled international pressure to restrain the Syrian regime. At the same time, Moscow is in contact with opposition and other elements likely to take power in Syria as an alternative to the failing regime. Russia is thereby preparing for the cooperation with a future Syrian leadership while hoping to preserve its critical achievements there.