Kobi Michael

How can the potential inherent in the American president’s plan for the day after the war be realized in a way that aligns with Israeli interests?

When Israel faces two bad options in the Gaza Strip, researchers of the Palestinian arena at the INSS propose an alternative path that combines the military and political dimensions

The option of occupation and the imposition of military administration versus other alternatives for ending the war

An examination of General Staff appointments over the past five decades reveals a frequent selection of individuals from the Paratroopers and Sayeret Matkal units for key positions. What are the implications of this—and what should the new chief of staff learn from it?

An analysis of the final statement in Arabic from the conference on formulating a framework for Gaza's “day after” presents a troubling picture, suggesting little change or understanding of the post-October 7 reality

The relationship and discourse between the military and the political echelons serve as the crucible for national strategy. This interaction generates the necessary friction between military imperatives and political logic, fostering the joint learning processes required to develop a knowledge base essential for its formulation. When this vital discourse is disrupted, the state’s ability to define national aims, translate them into clear political directives, and ultimately achieve the objectives of war is severely compromised. This article utilizes the “discourse space” as a meta-analytical concept to examine the disruption of the diagnostic-strategic learning process within the political and military echelons. The analysis focuses on the decision-making surrounding the war that commenced following the October 7, 2023 massacre. Since a learning process inherently includes a process of conceptualization, we chose to analyze the use of the terms “responsibility” and “failure” by the political and military echelons. These terms hold the potential to influence the framing of “reality” and to reflect the profound chasm and crisis of trust between these echelons. This, in turn, manifests in their impact on the formation of a closed discourse space between the leadership tiers—that is, a discourse space that inhibits strategic learning and disrupts any possibility for a diagnostic-strategic learning process, which is an integral part of decision-making, particularly during wartime. The political echelon’s insistence on focusing specifically on military investigations (conducted as part of an internal organizational review) and confining them solely to the military sphere without treating them as a necessary prelude to investigating the political failure or as a foundation for a joint learning process, eroded trust. This, coupled with the political leadership’s clear reservations about and avoidance of establishing a state commission of inquiry to examine broad governmental responsibility for the attack, destroyed the essence of shared responsibility. Trust and shared responsibility are two necessary conditions for an open discourse space between the echelons. In its absence, the joint strategic learning process was disrupted and as a result, a gap has emerged between the military’s micro-level conceptualization and the political echelon’s macro-level conceptualization of events, particularly regarding the military nature of the failure, as well as in the disparity between the echelons regarding the concept of responsibility itself. Both these factors preclude the capacity for macro-level inquiry.