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This document is the result of research conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) to examine the security threats and challenges currently facing the State of Israel. Using a number of scenarios related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the research focused on the potential Israeli response to the threats implicit in each scenario while considering the constraints and implications of each response.A team of senior researchers at INSS carried out the research, with the assistance of external experts to verify their findings. In addition, the team presented some of the research findings and insights to Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders who had been involved in the peace process in the past and who are still familiar with it today. The goal was to obtain their feedback and to validate the research processes and the drawing of conclusions.

The project focused on identifying and analyzing the security threats, responses, and implications in six scenarios that could take place within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian arena. The potential for advancing the negotiating process or arriving at a peace settlement was not discussed; rather the research team examined only the scenarios, and their feasibility, stability, and implications in relation to the possible fundamental situations in the Palestinian, regional, and international arenas.

The research team was aware of the dynamics and complex mutual relations between each of the six scenarios and the fundamental situations that could occur in the different arenas, as well as their feasibility and additional potential developments. While it was impossible to consider and analyze every potential development, the scenarios examined reflect a broad range of possibilities, without overburdening the reader and the decision maker. The research validates some insights that were considered prior to the research, weakens or negates others, and leads to new understandings, which could be valuable to decision makers in the future.

The different possible fundamental situations of the Palestinian Authority (functioning and cooperative with Israel; hostile to Israel; or failing and nonfunctioning government and therefore no relationship with Israel), which were considered in each scenario, could develop from internal processes within the Palestinian arena, in response to both its relations with Israel and regional influences. Under certain conditions, Gaza could become an independent entity, separate from the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority; this scenario was not included here, as INSS published a book in January 2018 that deals with the challenge of the crisis in Gaza and the ways of dealing with it [Anat Kurz, Udi Dekel, and Benedetta Berti, eds., Crisis in Gaza—Response and Challenge (Tel Aviv: INSS, 2018). As for the scenarios, the two-states-for-two-peoples scenario is conditional upon the willingness of the pragmatic Arab states in providing assistance to the Palestinian Authority so that it can achieve an effective level of functioning; the ability of Israel to integrate within the Middle Eastern environment; the involvement of Egypt, Jordan and perhaps other Arab states in the security arrangements; and the strengthening of cooperation with the Palestinian entity (authority or state) and the fulfillment of its security commitments. The two-state reality can be realized first in the West Bank, with implementation in Gaza being conditional upon changes to its conditions and regime.

The scenario of coordinated or unilateral steps toward separation will enable Israel to maintain its interests in the context of an impasse in the peace process. In addition, it will eliminate the ability of the Palestinians to veto the continuation or existence of the peace process. Furthermore, this scenario prevents a one-state situation, which would harm Israel’s essential interests. Should Israel take steps toward separation, it will still be possible to return to negotiations for a two-state solution; risks are involved, however, as the process will damage the status of the Palestinian Authority, which is likely to interpret these steps as simply an alternative way to perpetuate the occupation. This scenario could serve as a transitional stage toward a two-state reality and that is how it should be packaged, with emphasis on the principles of a permanent settlement. This scenario is likely to be successful as long as the Palestinian Authority is stable and functioning. In this situation, it is important that the separation between Gaza and the West Bank be maintained so that Hamas will not be strengthened and will be prevented from assuming control of the West Bank as well as to encourage genuine reconciliation between the sides that will lead the Palestinian Authority to resuming full control of the Gaza Strip and the dismantling of Hamas’ military apparatuses or its assimilation within the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatuses. The large-scale annexation scenario most likely it means that the political process has ended and will lead to a hostile Palestinian Authority or one that lets itself disintegrate and to the increasing dominance of Hamas and even to the strengthening of the Salafi-jihadi forces within Palestinian society. This scenario poses a risk to the continued control of relatively moderate elements, such as Fatah, in the Palestinian arena. The annexation scenario, should it be carried out on a major scale, will essentially lead to a one-state reality and will eliminate the possibility of realizing the idea of two states for two peoples.

Finally, all of the scenarios converge to two possible endpoints: two states (with full or limited Palestinian sovereignty) or one state (with or without full rights for all its citizens). The continuation of the status quo and the annexation scenarios lead to a situation of confusion that will not allow the establishment of two separate entities in the future and will likely lead to a one-state reality, without being explicitly declared and without thoroughly examining its implications. In all of the scenarios—except those involving one state—Israel has a vital interest in the existence of a responsible, stable, and effective Palestinian Authority, with which security cooperation is based on mutual concern of countering terror and Hamas. A Palestinian Authority that more closely resembles a state will be considered a moderating factor in this context. The agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan, their support for a framework to achieve a settlement (even if it is not a permanent settlement at first) and Jordan’s stability are of great importance. The Middle Eastern states, including the pragmatic ones, have a potential role in insulating the Israeli-Palestinian arena from negative influences while helping to establish a functioning Palestinian entity. Steps toward a settlement between Israel and Palestinians—not necessarily a permanent one—are likely to strengthen the relations between Israel and other pragmatic Sunni Arab states. Seven main insights on security that are presented in this memo are as follows:

1. Most of the threats to Israel’s security exist in all scenarios, with differing intensity and variation.
2. Israel needs to create diverse capabilities that provide a response to the different scenarios and to maintain their competence. Nonetheless, these capabilities should be used in combination, with varying intensity and capacities appropriate to each scenario, the underlying fundamental situation, as well as the dynamics and the characteristics of the relations between them.
3. Improvement and stability in the area’s security are impossible when a condition is forced upon one of the sides, without considering the interests of the other side. Therefore, it will not be enough to strive for a desired end situation; rather it is most important to pave a way that both sides find acceptable (even if they only acquiesce to it).
4. The departure of President Mahmoud Abbas from the Palestinian political leadership and his replacement with a successor who does not support his consistent opposition to the use of terror, or alternatively, the absence of an agreed-upon leadership and the subsequent struggle for control will likely lead to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority. Should this occur, Israel’s security threats potentially will increase, as will the likelihood that Israel will engage in a large-scale military response, to the point of reoccupying the West Bank.
5. There is a trade-off between the level of functioning of the Palestinian entity and its attitude toward Israel (hostile-aggressive or positiveagreeable) on the one hand and Israel’s freedom of action in the territory of the Palestinian entity in order to counter security threats, on the other.
6. It is important to view the existence of peace as a component in the security policy and in its guarantee, even if its direct contribution in this context cannot be quantified.
7. Gaza is a problem that does not have any optimal solution, and therefore the region—and in particular the control of Gaza by Hamas or by other extremist elements—is considered a potential spoiler of any move toward the area’s stabilization and its progress toward a settlement. In order to moderate the negative trends in Gaza, Israel is required to ease the closure of the Gaza Strip and regional and international efforts are needed to improve Gaza’s civil and infrastructure situation, which is referred to as the reconstruction of Gaza.

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Contents

Executive Summary

Perface

Chapter 1: Methodology and Research Process

Chapter 2: The Scenarios, the Strategic Challenge, and Israel's Response

Chapter 3: A Comparative Mapping of the Security Threats and the Israeli Responses

Conclusion: The Main Insights