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In her opening statement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller discussed the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the context of her comments on nonproliferation, she noted that "universal adherence to the NPT itself – including by India, Israel,Pakistan, and North Korea – also remains a fundamental objective of the United States."

This sentence caused an immediate flurry of reactions in the Israeli media over whether this signified a change in the US position onIsrael, and whether we could now expect increased pressure from the US in this regard. Coming in the somewhat charged period of new governments in both the US and Israel, and the sense of new pressures on Israel regarding the Palestinian question, this quick (over)reaction is perhaps not surprising. However, the immediate context of the statement underscores that it does not in itself indicate a break with past positions. The timing of the speech was determined by the NPT PrepCom cycle, and within this context it is standard USpractice to express support for the NPT, including the hope that all states eventually join.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to disconnect Gottemoeller's words from the broader disarmament agenda that President Obama has embraced of late, especially with regard to the expressed need for greater balance of emphasis among the three pillars of the NPT. A central theme of the new disarmament agenda in the US – that began with the famous Wall Street Journal articles by Kissinger, Shultz, Perry, and Nunn – is that the nuclear states must necessarily be much more serious about their own disarmament commitments in order to enhance the legitimacy of their demand for a reversal of the nuclear courses in Iran and North Korea. This is essentially a call for equality among states in the nuclear realm, without regard to their different situations and contexts. Placing states on equal footing in the nuclear realm, per their NPT commitments, and downplaying the important differences among them is a theme that could have problematic implications for Israel down the road, and is in and of itself flawed.

Because of their strategic value, and in light of the different goals states strive for in the nuclear realm, whether deterrence, enhanced influence or destruction, nuclear weapons cannot be disconnected from the state context within which they are embedded. Domestic factors also create differences among states, as can be seen with regard to the current "holdouts": Pakistan presents a challenge not comparable to India and Israel due to its deteriorating domestic situation. Indeed, when Obama himself talks about working toward disarmament, he is not likely to advocate a move to zero any time soon because of the perceived threats that the US still faces and might face down the road. And finally, the cases of Iran and North Korea drive home that when states have a strong incentive to proliferate, even if they have joined an international treaty that prohibits this, some will nevertheless ignore commitments and work to achieve a nuclear capability.

In its quest to strengthen the NPT, an important question will be the degree to which the US ensures that its policies continue to address these significant political realities. While it is normatively attractive to support an equal standard for all states in the nuclear realm, the hard cases of nuclear proliferation today clearly defy this logic. The primary challenge of nonproliferation currently focuses on states that are striving to achieve (or have achieved) nuclear status clandestinely, while party to the NPT. If the five declared nuclear states were to disarm, and all "holdouts" were to join the NPT as non-nuclear states, there is no guarantee that determined proliferators would follow suit. These states are noteworthy for having cheated on their past commitments; moreover, they are seeking nuclear weapons not only for their security value but to wield influence over other states, if not to directly threaten their security and existence. Indeed, the primary concern in these cases is not the weapons per se, rather the threat that these states pose to other states in their region and beyond.

How the Obama administration will juggle the normative pull toward equality and the reality of significant differences that exist among states is still not fully clear. In this environment of uncertainty, statements such as Gottemoeller's could raise some concern in Israel: not in the straightforward sense of impending pressure on Israel to adhere to the NPT, but rather in terms of possible implications for efforts to confront Iran, specifically as far as contributing to the legitimization of comparisons between Iran and Israel in the nuclear realm.

Because proliferation issues are strategic and political, equating Israel with Iran is highly problematic. There are many important differences that distinguish between these two states, not least the fact that Iran cheated for years on its commitment to remain non-nuclear: according to the 2007 NIE, it was actively working on a nuclear weapons program from the 1980s up until at least 2003, while party to the NPT. Moreover, not only has Iran targeted Israel as a state it would like to see eliminated (whereas Israel has never issued any such threats), but it is threatening to disrupt the entire region due to its hegemonic agenda. Israel's nuclear deterrent is a central linchpin of its defense against an existential threat that Iran is seeking to put in place with its own nuclear activity.

Within the global discourse on nuclear proliferation, Iran is currently attempting to deflect attention away from itself by focusing on others, especially Israel. This is Iran's intention with regard to the NPT PrepComs and this trend will no doubt continue to the Review Conference next year. By not clearly challenging Iran's attempts – and in fact underscoring the need for greater balance in the different pillars of the NPT – the US could be perceived as leaning more toward the imperative of across-the-board equality in the nuclear realm, and implicitly strengthening Iran's claims.