Saudi Arabia is facing mounting military and economic pressure, perhaps among the most severe it has experienced in years. To the east, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is impairing its ability to export oil; to the north, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq threaten its territory and infrastructure; the East–West Pipeline, designed to allow it to bypass Hormuz, has been damaged and shut down; and to the south, the Houthis are intensifying their attacks and threatening the Bab el-Mandeb region. What previously seemed like threats emanating from different arenas is now converging into a strategic chokehold around the Kingdom and its export arteries.
Throughout the war, Mohammed bin Salman has sought to avoid direct involvement, keep channels with Tehran open, and prevent Saudi Arabia from being drawn back into the war in Yemen. Yet as the pressure mounts and outside assistance remains limited, Riyadh’s room for maneuver is narrowing. The United States has thus far failed to provide the response Riyadh is seeking; the United Arab Emirates is no longer the military partner it was during the previous campaign in Yemen; and the new security frameworks established by Saudi Arabia have yet to prove themselves in a moment of crisis.
This poses a significant danger to Israel and the United States: the more isolated and vulnerable Saudi Arabia feels, the greater its incentive to reach an arrangement specifically with Iran. Riyadh does not need to trust Tehran. It needs Iran to help reopen Hormuz, exert its influence on the Houthis, and help alleviate the pressure from the militias in Iraq.
In return, Tehran may demand a political price: Saudi Arabia distancing itself from the US position against Iran, opposing further military action against it, acquiescing to a stronger Houthi position in Yemen, and accepting the status quo in Hormuz. In doing so, Iran can attempt to convert military pressure into political gains that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve.
From Riyadh’s perspective, this would not necessarily constitute a shift in camps or a reconciliation with Iran, but rather a cold calculation of interests. Its immediate interest is to stop the attacks, reopen its export arteries, and break free from the chokehold—even at the cost of "ugly arrangements."
Israel and the United States therefore have a clear interest in ensuring that the kingdom is not left without alternatives. Assisting Saudi Arabia is not merely a matter of supporting an ally in distress; it is also a means of reducing Iran’s leverage over it.
Iran does not need Saudi Arabia to like it. The pressure just has to be heavy enough to convince Riyadh that the way out runs through Tehran.
Saudi Arabia is facing mounting military and economic pressure, perhaps among the most severe it has experienced in years. To the east, disruption in the Strait of Hormuz is impairing its ability to export oil; to the north, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq threaten its territory and infrastructure; the East–West Pipeline, designed to allow it to bypass Hormuz, has been damaged and shut down; and to the south, the Houthis are intensifying their attacks and threatening the Bab el-Mandeb region. What previously seemed like threats emanating from different arenas is now converging into a strategic chokehold around the Kingdom and its export arteries.
Throughout the war, Mohammed bin Salman has sought to avoid direct involvement, keep channels with Tehran open, and prevent Saudi Arabia from being drawn back into the war in Yemen. Yet as the pressure mounts and outside assistance remains limited, Riyadh’s room for maneuver is narrowing. The United States has thus far failed to provide the response Riyadh is seeking; the United Arab Emirates is no longer the military partner it was during the previous campaign in Yemen; and the new security frameworks established by Saudi Arabia have yet to prove themselves in a moment of crisis.
This poses a significant danger to Israel and the United States: the more isolated and vulnerable Saudi Arabia feels, the greater its incentive to reach an arrangement specifically with Iran. Riyadh does not need to trust Tehran. It needs Iran to help reopen Hormuz, exert its influence on the Houthis, and help alleviate the pressure from the militias in Iraq.
In return, Tehran may demand a political price: Saudi Arabia distancing itself from the US position against Iran, opposing further military action against it, acquiescing to a stronger Houthi position in Yemen, and accepting the status quo in Hormuz. In doing so, Iran can attempt to convert military pressure into political gains that would otherwise have been difficult to achieve.
From Riyadh’s perspective, this would not necessarily constitute a shift in camps or a reconciliation with Iran, but rather a cold calculation of interests. Its immediate interest is to stop the attacks, reopen its export arteries, and break free from the chokehold—even at the cost of "ugly arrangements."
Israel and the United States therefore have a clear interest in ensuring that the kingdom is not left without alternatives. Assisting Saudi Arabia is not merely a matter of supporting an ally in distress; it is also a means of reducing Iran’s leverage over it.
Iran does not need Saudi Arabia to like it. The pressure just has to be heavy enough to convince Riyadh that the way out runs through Tehran.