The claim that an American withdrawal from the Gulf — a view that has recently gained both journalistic and academic traction — would enable long-term stability between Iran and the Gulf states rests on an overly optimistic assumption regarding the nature of the regime in Tehran and its patterns of conduct over the past four decades. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has established its regional position through a combination of deterrence, military pressure, the activation of proxy forces, and political subversion in neighboring states. Given this pattern of behavior, the assumption that removing the American military presence from the Gulf would lead to Iranian moderation is not supported by historical experience. On the contrary: the American presence in the region, through military bases in Gulf states, has for years been the primary factor constraining Iran’s ability to translate its regional ambitions into actual hegemony.
It is true that American bases have at times become targets of Iranian threats and even attacks, but their very existence has created a critical deterrent component. In their absence, the regional balance of power could shift rapidly in Tehran’s favor. In such a reality, Iran might gradually intensify pressure on Gulf states: from escalating threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, through increased activity by emissaries and proxy organizations, to acts of sabotage, cyber operations, and political subversion within the states themselves. Over time, the absence of an external deterrent could even encourage Tehran to test more aggressive measures, including attempts to seize disputed territories (such as Bahrain) or apply direct military pressure.
The central problem is not tactical but fundamental: the ideological nature of the current Iranian regime. As long as this regime remains in place, it is difficult to assume it will adopt a regional outlook based on stability, equality, and mutual sovereignty. It is possible that in the future, following a profound political change in Iran and the rise of leadership genuinely committed to regional cooperation and peace, new regional security frameworks— and even a gradual reduction of the American military presence— could be considered. However, under current conditions, dismantling the existing security architecture in the Gulf — foremost among it the American presence — is not a recipe for stability. On the contrary: it could open the door to a far more dangerous regional reality, in which Iran is freer to dictate the security agenda of the Arab Gulf and exert increasing pressure on its neighbors.
The claim that an American withdrawal from the Gulf — a view that has recently gained both journalistic and academic traction — would enable long-term stability between Iran and the Gulf states rests on an overly optimistic assumption regarding the nature of the regime in Tehran and its patterns of conduct over the past four decades. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has established its regional position through a combination of deterrence, military pressure, the activation of proxy forces, and political subversion in neighboring states. Given this pattern of behavior, the assumption that removing the American military presence from the Gulf would lead to Iranian moderation is not supported by historical experience. On the contrary: the American presence in the region, through military bases in Gulf states, has for years been the primary factor constraining Iran’s ability to translate its regional ambitions into actual hegemony.
It is true that American bases have at times become targets of Iranian threats and even attacks, but their very existence has created a critical deterrent component. In their absence, the regional balance of power could shift rapidly in Tehran’s favor. In such a reality, Iran might gradually intensify pressure on Gulf states: from escalating threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, through increased activity by emissaries and proxy organizations, to acts of sabotage, cyber operations, and political subversion within the states themselves. Over time, the absence of an external deterrent could even encourage Tehran to test more aggressive measures, including attempts to seize disputed territories (such as Bahrain) or apply direct military pressure.
The central problem is not tactical but fundamental: the ideological nature of the current Iranian regime. As long as this regime remains in place, it is difficult to assume it will adopt a regional outlook based on stability, equality, and mutual sovereignty. It is possible that in the future, following a profound political change in Iran and the rise of leadership genuinely committed to regional cooperation and peace, new regional security frameworks— and even a gradual reduction of the American military presence— could be considered. However, under current conditions, dismantling the existing security architecture in the Gulf — foremost among it the American presence — is not a recipe for stability. On the contrary: it could open the door to a far more dangerous regional reality, in which Iran is freer to dictate the security agenda of the Arab Gulf and exert increasing pressure on its neighbors.