Danny Citrinowicz, Senior Iran Researcher:
The military campaign did not bring about a fundamental change in Iran’s core positions regarding negotiations with the American administration.
Thus, and in light of the sense of achievement in the campaign, it is doubtful whether Iran will be willing to make substantial concessions regarding its conventional force buildup or its support for its regional proxies.
However, Tehran may demonstrate limited flexibility on the issue of enriched material, with an emphasis on diluting the material in Iran, provided that this is accompanied by compensation in the form of broad sanctions relief alongside recognition of Iran’s right to enrichment, in accordance with the fundamental worldview of Ali Khamenei.
In light of the Iranian position, the American administration faces a strategic decision: whether to adopt an arrangement essentially similar to the one that was within reach prior to the escalation, or to risk renewed deterioration into escalation and even a broader confrontation.
At the same time, Iran is very concerned about developments in Lebanon. Iran views its commitment to the “Axis of Resistance” as a fundamental component of its security doctrine, ensuring strategic depth. Accordingly, it is currently operating along a dual-track approach: on the one hand, it insists on incorporating Hezbollah into any ceasefire arrangement; on the other hand, it continues to take measured offensive steps aimed at preserving leverage, primarily through regulating movement in the Strait of Hormuz—a move intended to illustrate the global consequences of diplomatic failure, alongside threats of a possible return to fighting.
Bottom line, Tehran arrives at the talks table in Islamabad believing that it has the upper hand in the military campaign, and therefore if the expectation in the administration is for dramatic concessions on its part, the negotiations may be shorter than expected.
Eldad Shavit, Senior US Researcher:
The central challenge facing the Trump administration now is to turn a fragile ceasefire into a stable agreement, despite deep gaps with Iran on issues such as enrichment, the Strait of Hormuz, and the link between the Iranian arena and the Lebanese arena. This comes at a time when Trump has not yet achieved the clear, sharp, and unequivocal victory image he needs in order to present a distinct strategic achievement to the American public and the world. In simple terms, Trump must prove that the transition from the military campaign to the negotiating table is not perceived as an American retreat or a concession to Iran, while also managing the process in a way that leads to an agreement that will prevent the United States from being drawn back into a confrontation with Iran.
Yoel Guzansky, Senior Researcher and Head of the Gulf Program:
The war between Iran, the United States, and Israel has placed the Gulf states in a complex position and has even worsened their strategic situation. Despite the damage Iran has sustained, the regime has survived and demonstrated resilience, while maintaining key levers of pressure—especially the ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz and energy infrastructure in the Gulf. At the same time, the war has sharpened, in the eyes of the Gulf states, the limitations of the American security guarantee and the inability of alternative options—external powers, regional alliances, or self-reliance—to provide real security. As a result, it is likely that the Gulf states will continue a policy of risk hedging: combining continued reliance on the United States, deepening military buildup (especially missile and UAV defense), diversifying international partnerships, and attempting to reduce tensions with Iran. At the same time, they may promote solutions to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and, in the long term, also consider non-conventional deterrence capabilities if it becomes clear that Iran retains nuclear capabilities. In sum, the war has not resolved the Gulf states’ security problems and has even underscored that nearly all the strategic alternatives available to them are partial and problematic.
Orna Mizrahi, Senior Researcher and Head of the Lebanon Program:
Hezbollah concludes this chapter with mixed results: on the one hand, the organization fulfilled its role for Iran, drew Israel into an additional front, demonstrated relevance and a rapid recovery capability, and remained a threatening and deterrent actor in Lebanon. On the other hand, it paid a heavy price in losses, damage to infrastructure, failure to halt the IDF in southern Lebanon or to create new equations, and deepened public criticism. Despite all this, it is still not possible to eulogize Hezbollah this time as well. Even if the current campaign continues, it will not give up easily, and will resume investing, with Iran’s assistance, in its rehabilitation and the strengthening of its position, and will act with determination to prevent the implementation of President Aoun’s proposal to conduct direct negotiations with Israel.
Danny Citrinowicz, Senior Iran Researcher:
The military campaign did not bring about a fundamental change in Iran’s core positions regarding negotiations with the American administration.
Thus, and in light of the sense of achievement in the campaign, it is doubtful whether Iran will be willing to make substantial concessions regarding its conventional force buildup or its support for its regional proxies.
However, Tehran may demonstrate limited flexibility on the issue of enriched material, with an emphasis on diluting the material in Iran, provided that this is accompanied by compensation in the form of broad sanctions relief alongside recognition of Iran’s right to enrichment, in accordance with the fundamental worldview of Ali Khamenei.
In light of the Iranian position, the American administration faces a strategic decision: whether to adopt an arrangement essentially similar to the one that was within reach prior to the escalation, or to risk renewed deterioration into escalation and even a broader confrontation.
At the same time, Iran is very concerned about developments in Lebanon. Iran views its commitment to the “Axis of Resistance” as a fundamental component of its security doctrine, ensuring strategic depth. Accordingly, it is currently operating along a dual-track approach: on the one hand, it insists on incorporating Hezbollah into any ceasefire arrangement; on the other hand, it continues to take measured offensive steps aimed at preserving leverage, primarily through regulating movement in the Strait of Hormuz—a move intended to illustrate the global consequences of diplomatic failure, alongside threats of a possible return to fighting.
Eldad Shavit, Senior US Researcher:
The central challenge facing the Trump administration now is to turn a fragile ceasefire into a stable agreement, despite deep gaps with Iran on issues such as enrichment, the Strait of Hormuz, and the link between the Iranian arena and the Lebanese arena. This comes at a time when Trump has not yet achieved the clear, sharp, and unequivocal victory image he needs in order to present a distinct strategic achievement to the American public and the world. In simple terms, Trump must prove that the transition from the military campaign to the negotiating table is not perceived as an American retreat or a concession to Iran, while also managing the process in a way that leads to an agreement that will prevent the United States from being drawn back into a confrontation with Iran.
Yoel Guzansky, Senior Researcher and Head of the Gulf Program:
The war between Iran, the United States, and Israel has placed the Gulf states in a complex position and has even worsened their strategic situation. Despite the damage Iran has sustained, the regime has survived and demonstrated resilience, while maintaining key levers of pressure—especially the ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz and energy infrastructure in the Gulf. At the same time, the war has sharpened, in the eyes of the Gulf states, the limitations of the American security guarantee and the inability of alternative options—external powers, regional alliances, or self-reliance—to provide real security. As a result, it is likely that the Gulf states will continue a policy of risk hedging: combining continued reliance on the United States, deepening military buildup (especially missile and UAV defense), diversifying international partnerships, and attempting to reduce tensions with Iran. At the same time, they may promote solutions to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and, in the long term, also consider non-conventional deterrence capabilities if it becomes clear that Iran retains nuclear capabilities. In sum, the war has not resolved the Gulf states’ security problems and has even underscored that nearly all the strategic alternatives available to them are partial and problematic.
Orna Mizrahi, Senior Researcher and Head of the Lebanon Program:
Hezbollah concludes this chapter with mixed results: on the one hand, the organization fulfilled its role for Iran, drew Israel into an additional front, demonstrated relevance and a rapid recovery capability, and remained a threatening and deterrent actor in Lebanon. On the other hand, it paid a heavy price in losses, damage to infrastructure, failure to halt the IDF in southern Lebanon or to create new equations, and deepened public criticism. Despite all this, it is still not possible to eulogize Hezbollah this time as well. Even if the current campaign continues, it will not give up easily, and will resume investing, with Iran’s assistance, in its rehabilitation and the strengthening of its position, and will act with determination to prevent the implementation of President Aoun’s proposal to conduct direct negotiations with Israel.