Table of Contents:

** The survey was conducted before the start of Operation 'Lion's Roar'.

Summary of the Results

About half of the Israeli public (50.5%) supports an independent Israeli attack on Iran in the event that an agreement is signed between the United States and Iran that would prevent an American attack; a decisive majority of the public (72.5%) believes that Israel’s air defense capabilities are sufficient in the event of an Iranian attack; more than half of the public (51.5%) estimates that the transition to Phase B in the Gaza Strip does not align with Israeli interests; only 28% of the public supports a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia that involves the establishment of a Palestinian state, compared to 48% who oppose it; a majority of the public (69.5%) believes that the police do not take a uniform enforcement policy toward protesters from different sectors or political groups; 38.5% of the public doubts that the integration of women into various IDF units is carried out based on professional considerations alone.

Methodology

The survey was conducted between February 17–22, 2026, led by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Data collection was performed by the iPanel company, in which 805 men and women responded to the survey online in Hebrew and 146 in Arabic. The respondents constitute, after sectoral weighting, a representative sample of the adult Israeli population (ages 18 and over). The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ±3.18 at a 95% confidence level.

Click here to download the full survey data (in Hebrew) | Survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية | Click here to view trends among the Jewish public |

Click here to view trends among the Arab public

the complete data

Perception of Threats and Challenges

• 30% of the Israeli public assesses the current state of national security as “good” or “very good,” 31% believes it is “bad” or “very bad,” and 37% rates it as “intermediate.” The average score on a scale of 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good) is 5.7, with no significant change compared to January (5.8).

  • Sectoral gaps: Among the Jewish public, 32.5% evaluates the security situation as good, compared to only 17% among the Arab public. Conversely, 47% of the Arab public rates the situation as bad, compared to 27.5% among the Jewish public. Accordingly, the average rating stands at 5.9 among Jews versus 4.9 among Arabs. Compared to previous months, there is a noticeable increase in the sense of security among the Arab public compared to January (from 4.4 in January to 4.9 in February), while among the Jewish public, there was a slight decrease (from 6.1 in January to 5.9 in February).
  • Political gaps: 49% of coalition voters evaluate the security situation as good, compared to only 15% among opposition voters. Accordingly, 46% of right-wing voters evaluate the situation as good, compared to only 16% in the center-left camp.

• The level of concern regarding social-national tensions within Israel remains high and consistent: 84% of respondents report being concerned about social tensions, of which 42% are “somewhat concerned” and 42% are “very concerned.” Conversely, 12% reported being “not that concerned” and only 3% reported being “not concerned at all.” No significant change in the level of concern is evident compared to January, December, or November (83%). High rates of concern are evident across all population groups:

  • 85% among the Jewish public (unchanged from January), and 82% among the Arab public (an increase from 76% in January).
  • Even when segmented by politics, opposition voters expressed a higher level of concern (94%) than coalition voters (76%).

• The public also expresses concern regarding external security threats to Israel, although at a lower intensity compared to domestic threats. 72% of the public reports being concerned about external security threats, of which 54% is “somewhat concerned” and 19% is “very concerned.” Conversely, 20% of the public is “not that concerned” and 6% is “not concerned at all.” Compared to January, the rate of those concerned slightly increased in February (from 69% to 72%).
• All population groups have expressed a high rate of concern, but slight gaps were observed:

  • Across sectors, the rate of those concerned about external threats stands at 72% among the Jewish public (a slight increase from 69% in January), compared to 75% among the Arab public (an increase from 66% in January).
  • When segmented politically, the gaps are more prominent: 80% of opposition voters are concerned about external threats, compared to only 65% among coalition voters.

• The public’s sense of personal security is not particularly high. 30% of respondents report having a high or very high sense of security, 45% claim an intermediate sense of security, and 24% report a low or very low sense of security. The average score on a scale of 1 (very low sense of security) to 10 (very high sense of security) is 5.9, similar to January, December, and November (5.8, 5.9 and 5.9, respectively). Significant gaps were observed between population groups:

  • 35% of the Jewish public reports having high personal security, while 17% claims having low security (average score 6.3 compared to 6.1 in January). In contrast, only 10% of the Arab public reports high personal security, while 49% reports having low or very low security (average score 4.6 compared to 4.5 in January).
  • By political affiliation, 48% of coalition voters report having high personal security, compared to only 16% among opposition voters.

Trust in Persons and Institutions

The level of public trust in the security echelon remains relatively high, although gaps are evident between population groups and political camps.

• A majority of the Israeli public (76%) expresses high trust in the IDF (38% to a large extent and 37% to a fairly large extent), compared to only 23% reporting low trust. Compared to January, a slight increase was recorded in the rate of those reporting high trust (from 73% to 76%).

  • By sectoral division, a sharp gap is evident: 85% of the Jewish public has very high trust in the IDF, compared to only 38% (with 59% reporting low trust).
  • By political segmentation, relatively moderate gaps are apparent between coalition voters (85%) and opposition voters (79%), but by political camp division, trust in the IDF is higher on the right (87%) than in the center-left camp (70%).

• A majority of the Israeli public (79%) has high trust in the Air Force (47% to a large extent and 32% to a fairly large extent), compared to a minority (18%) reporting low trust. Relative to January, the rate of high trust increased from 75% to 79%.

  • Here too, a sectoral gap is evident: 87% of the Jewish public expresses high trust, compared to only 48% among the Arab public.
  • In terms of political breakdown, the level of trust is high among both coalition voters (84%) and opposition voters (86%).

• A majority of the Israeli public (82%) has high trust in the Home Front Command (40% to a large extent and 42% to a fairly large extent), compared to 16% reporting low trust.

  • By sectoral division, a sharp gap is evident: 90% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the Home Front Command, compared to 51% among the Arab public.
  • By political affiliation, the gaps are moderate: 90% of coalition voters express high trust, compared to 87% among opposition voters.

• 63% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, compared to only 28% reporting low trust and 9% who answered, “don’t know.” Relative to January, the rate of high trust increased slightly from 61% to 63%.

  • 73% of the Jewish public has high trust in the chief of staff, compared to only 25% among the Arab public.
  • A gap is evident when it comes to political segmentation: 69% among coalition voters express high trust compared to 73% among opposition voters.

The level of public trust in the political echelon is low and characterized by sharp sectoral gaps, alongside clear polarization between political camps.

• Only 30% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the government, compared to 69% reporting low trust in the government. Relative to January, the rate of those reporting high trust increased slightly from 27% to 30%.

  • By sectoral breakdown, 33% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the government, while the gap is even more pronounced among the Arab public, with only 16% reporting high trust.
  • By political affiliation, the gaps are particularly sharp: 58% of coalition voters express high trust in the government, compared to only 7% of opposition voters.

• Only 34% of the Israeli public has high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, compared to 64% reporting low trust in him. Compared to January, a slight decrease was recorded in the rate of those reporting high trust (from 36% in January to 34% in February).

  • By sector, 41% of the Jewish public has high trust in the prime minister, compared to only 8% among the Arab public.
  • By political affiliation, the polarization is particularly sharp: 71% of coalition voters express high trust in the prime minister, compared to only 8% of opposition voters. Accordingly, 63% of the right-wing camp express high trust in him, compared to only 8% in the center-left camp.

Security-Political Threats and Challenges

The Various Arenas

Iran and Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are at the top of the Israeli public’s security concerns, while Yemen and Syria are ranked at the bottom.

• The public concern with the Iranian arena continues to increase—from 67% in December and 74% in January, to 78% in February. The Judea and Samaria arena follows, troubling 65% of the public, while 58% are concerned about Gaza, and 51% are troubled by Lebanon. At the bottom of the list are Syria (36%) and Yemen (31%).
• By sector, the gap regarding Judea and Samaria is prominent: 71% of the Jewish public reports being troubled by the situation in this arena, compared to only 37% among the Arab public. Significant gaps are also evident regarding the Gaza arena, which troubles 63% of Jews but only 36% of Arabs, and the Lebanese arena, which concerns 54% of Jews compared to 40% of Arabs. As for Iran, concern is high in both sectors (80% among Jews, 69% among Arabs).
• Gaps are also apparent by political affiliation: In the Iranian arena, 85% of opposition voters report a sense of concern, compared to 75% of coalition voters. In the Gaza arena, 67% of opposition voters are troubled by the security situation, compared to 58% of coalition voters. When segmented by political camps, the rate of those troubled by the Iranian arena is almost identical—77% in the right-wing camp and 78% in the center-left camp.

Iran

• Regarding Iran, 36% of the public thinks the nuclear project is the most urgent issue, 29% the ballistic missile array, 18% the Ayatollah regime, and 8% the organizations supported by the regime, while another 9% answered “don’t know.”

  • By political breakdown: Among coalition voters, 43% indicate that the nuclear project is the most urgent issue, compared to 29% among opposition voters.
  • When segmented by political affiliation: 43% of the public on the right thinks the nuclear project is most urgent, compared to 26% in the center-left camp, where a higher rate identifies the ballistic missile array (33%).

• 50.5% of the public supports an independent Israeli attack in the event of an agreement between the United States and Iran that prevents an American attack on Iran (27% “somewhat supports” and 23.5% “strongly supports”), compared to 36.5% opposed.

  • The sectoral gap is prominent: 56.5% of the Jewish public supports an independent attack, compared to only 26.5% of the Arab public, among whom a majority of 61.5% opposes the move.
  • Polarization is also evident in terms of political segmentation: 69% of coalition voters support an independent attack, compared to only 40% of opposition voters.

• A large majority of the public (72.5%) believes that Israel’s air defense capabilities are sufficient in the event of an attack from Iran, compared to 21.5% who thinks they are sufficient to a low or very low extent.

  • By sector: 77% of the Jewish public believes capabilities are sufficient, compared to 53% among the Arab public.
  • By political breakdown: 82% of coalition voters believe so compared to 68% of opposition voters.

• A decisive majority (88%) reports that Home Front Command instructions are clear to them today in the event of a missile attack alert. This rate has remained high over time and is similar to data from June 2025 (89%).

  • By sector: 91% of the Jewish public reports clarity compared to 74% of the Arab public.
  • By political segmentation: There are high levels of clarity among both coalition (92%) and opposition voters (90%).

Gaza

• The majority of the public believes that the transition to Phase B in Gaza does not align with Israeli interests: 51.5% answered that the move “does not really align” or “does not align at all,” compared to 31.5% who believe it is “somewhat aligned” or “very much aligned.”

  • By sectoral segmentation: Opposition rates are slightly higher among the Jewish public (53.5%) than the Arab public (44.5%), but among the Arab public, the rate of “don’t know” is relatively high (22.5%).
  • By political breakdown, 55% of opposition voters believe that the transition to Phase B does not align with Israeli interests, compared to 52% of coalition voters. When divided by political camp, 55% on the right hold this view, compared to 47% in the center-left camp.

Judea and Samaria

• 40% of the public reports that they fear escalation in the security situation in Judea and Samaria, (of whom 29% is very concerned and 11% very much concerned), compared to 41% of the respondents who are somewhat concerned and 11% who are not concerned at all.

  • By sector: 52.5% of the Arab public fears escalation, compared to 37% of the Jewish public.
  • When segmented politically, the gaps are moderate: 37% of coalition voters are worried about escalation compared to 40% of opposition voters, and when segmented by political camp, 39% on the right fear escalation compared to 41% on the center-left.

Lebanon

• A majority of the public (56%) believes that the security situation in the north necessitates a return to fighting: 43% believes there should be a return to limited fighting without a ground maneuver, and 13% supports a return to intensive fighting including a ground maneuver. Conversely, 27.5% of the public thinks the situation in the north allows for security for residents.

  • By sector: 33.5% of the Arab public believes the situation allows for security, compared to 26% of the Jewish public.
  • By political segmentation: 31% of opposition voters believe that the current situation enables security, compared to 26% of coalition voters. Conversely, the rate of support for a return to intensive fighting is higher among coalition voters (17%) than among opposition voters (7%). By political camp, 62% on the right believe that fighting should be resumed (whether limited or intensive), compared to 49% in the center-left camp.

Normalization and resolving the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

• The public tends to oppose a peace agreement with Saudi Arabia involving the establishment of a Palestinian state: 28% supports the agreement (12% strongly supports it and 16% somewhat supports it), compared to 47% who opposes it (17% somewhat opposes it and 30% strongly opposes it). Another 19% neither supports nor opposes while 6% “don’t know.”

  • By sector, the gap is apparent: 22% among the Jewish public supports the agreement compared to 48% among the Arab public. Conversely, 57% of the Jewish public opposes it compared to 14% among the Arab public.

By political segmentation, polarization is evident: 71.5% of coalition voters oppose the agreement, compared to 33.5% of opposition voters. By political camp, 74% on the right oppose the agreement, compared to only 23% in the center-left camp, where the level of support is high (51%).

Internal Societal Threats and Challenges

Civil–Military Relations

• The majority of the Jewish public supports allowing women to be screened for all combat units based on professional criteria alone: 77% of the Jewish public supports this (35% strongly agree and 42% somewhat agree) compared to 18% opposed (10% somewhat disagree and 8% strongly disagree). Another 5% “don’t know.” The current support rate is high compared to previous years; in July 2025, support stood at 69%, and in November 2023, it was 70%.

• By gender breakdown among the Jewish public, support is higher among women (80%) than men (74%). Conversely, the rate of opposition is higher among men (24%) than among women (13%).
• According to the level of religiosity among the Jewish public, a sharp gap is evident: 92% of secular Jews support this option, compared to 79% of traditional (Masorti), 49.5% of religious, and 36% of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi). At the same time, the opposition rate rises as the level of religiosity increases: 5.5% among secular, 15% among traditional, 47% among religious, and 53% among ultra-Orthodox.
• By political breakdown, there is a sharp gap: 87% of opposition voters support this, compared to 65% among coalition voters. When divided by political camps, 80% in the center-left camp support it, compared to 68% on the right.

• A minority of the public (38.5%) doubts that the integration of women into various IDF units is carried out based on professional considerations alone, while 53% agrees with the claim that integration is based on professional considerations alone (39% somewhat agrees and 14% strongly agrees). Conversely, 38.5% of the public does not agree (24% somewhat disagrees and 14.5% strongly disagrees). Another 8.5% of the public does not know.

  • By a breakdown of gender among the Jewish public, 55% of men agree with the statement, compared to 50% of women; the rate of those who disagree is nearly identical (38% among men and 39% among women).
  • By level of religiosity among the Jewish public, the variance is evident: 65% of secular Jews agree with the statement, compared to 54% of traditional, 33% of religious, and 18% of ultra-Orthodox (Haredi). Conversely, the rate of those who disagree is higher among the religious and ultra-Orthodox (63% and 68%, respectively) compared to the secular public (28%).
  • By political segmentation, parity was recorded among coalition voters between those who agree and those who disagree (46% on each side), while among opposition voters, a majority agrees (62%) compared to 28% of opposition voters who disagree. When divided by political camps, 57% in the center-left camp agrees, compared to 48% on the right.

Police–Society Relations

A majority of the public disagrees with the claim that the Israel Police apply a uniform enforcement policy toward protesters from different sectors or political groups: 69.5% disagrees with the claim (40.5% strongly disagrees and 29% somewhat disagrees), compared to 25% of the public who agrees with it (19% somewhat agrees and 5.5% strongly agrees).

• By sectoral breakdown, 71.5% of the Jewish public disagree, compared to 60% of the Arab public (among the Arab public, the rate of respondents who reply “don’t know” is higher—12%).
• By political segmentation, a gap is evident: 77.5% of opposition voters disagree, compared to 63.5% of coalition voters.

Crime in the Arab Sector

• The Israeli public disagrees on the main factor responsible for failing to stop the rise in crime in Arab society: 27.5% points to the Arab public, 23.5% to the Ministry of National Security, 15% to the Israel Police, 15% to the Arab leadership, 8% to the Prime Minister’s Office, and 4% to the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet).
• By sectoral breakdown, sharp gaps are evident: 33% of the Jewish public identifies the Arab public as the primary factor, while only 8% of the Arab public thinks this is the case. Conversely, 34% of the Arab public cites the Israel Police and 27% points to the Ministry of National Security, while only 10% of the Jewish public cites the Israel Police and 23% points to the Ministry of National Security.
• There is also a clear gap by political segmentation: 42% of coalition voters place the primary responsibility on the Arab public, compared to 15% among opposition voters. Conversely, 41% of opposition voters cite the Ministry of National Security, compared to only 8% among coalition voters.

Resilience of Israeli Society

66% of the Israeli public believes that solidarity within Israeli society does not exist at all or that there is very little (53% believes there is little solidarity and 13% thinks there is none). In contrast, 28% of the public thinks that there is a tremendous amount of solidarity. These figures remain stable compared to January, when the rate of those reporting low or no solidarity was 65%.

• By sectoral breakdown, 68% of the Arab public believes that there is no or very little solidarity, compared to 66% among the Jewish public.
• By political segmentation, a significant gap is apparent: 80% of opposition voters hold this view, compared to only 53% among coalition voters. When segmented by political camps, 76% of those in the center-left camp believe that solidarity is non-existent or very little, compared to 56% in the right-wing camp.