A Qualified Assessment of the Current Situation in Iran
There’s no doubt that this is a very dramatic and violent event (including in the major cities, first and foremost Tehran), which, in my understanding, poses the greatest threat to the regime’s stability since the 1979 Revolution. It’s already pointless to estimate the number of protesters or the scope of the protest centers, but it’s clear that this is an especially broad movement. Two of the conditions we previously proposed for the development of a significant revolutionary situation that could lead to regime change (a wide scope of protesters and the joining of different sectors) are already being met, at least partially.
What still seems to be missing is information regarding the significant participation of critical economic sectors, such as workers in the oil industry. The third condition—and in my view the most important at this stage—concerns the conduct of the repression and enforcement apparatuses, particularly the existence of indications of cracks or fissures within these mechanisms (desertions, functional fatigue, unwillingness to cooperate with repression actions, and the like). At this stage, there’s no indication of that. The political elite also continues to display cohesion, at least outwardly (it’s unclear what’s happening, for example, in the deliberations of the Supreme National Security Council).
It seems appropriate to define the current situation as an “ongoing revolutionary situation,” which could continue for months and develop in several main directions:
- Effective repression by the authorities and a return to a kind of “emergency routine,” whether with the continuation of sporadic protests or with a fading until the next wave. From the regime’s perspective, this is the preferred option at this stage, but it’s possible that it will lead to further escalation and even to the realization of Trump’s threats to intervene.
- Continued expansion and further radicalization of the protest, alongside the emergence of fissures in the repression mechanisms, to the point of posing a significant threat to the regime’s stability and ultimately regime change.
- Recognition by the Iranian leadership (or at least part of it) of the loss of the ability to contain the event, leading to one of two scenarios: a takeover by elements within the security-political elite of the regime, including the possibility of “sacrificing” the leader (with his consent or by force) and the establishment of some form of military rule (temporary or permanent depending on the circumstances), or a 180-degree turn in policy, such as agreeing to meet US demands in order to reach an agreement and lift the sanctions.
In my view, a scenario of such a turn seems less likely at this stage, as long as Khamenei continues to rule in practice. In any case, even option 3 (in both of its scenarios) does not guarantee stabilization, at least in the short term.
A Qualified Assessment of the Current Situation in Iran
There’s no doubt that this is a very dramatic and violent event (including in the major cities, first and foremost Tehran), which, in my understanding, poses the greatest threat to the regime’s stability since the 1979 Revolution. It’s already pointless to estimate the number of protesters or the scope of the protest centers, but it’s clear that this is an especially broad movement. Two of the conditions we previously proposed for the development of a significant revolutionary situation that could lead to regime change (a wide scope of protesters and the joining of different sectors) are already being met, at least partially.
What still seems to be missing is information regarding the significant participation of critical economic sectors, such as workers in the oil industry. The third condition—and in my view the most important at this stage—concerns the conduct of the repression and enforcement apparatuses, particularly the existence of indications of cracks or fissures within these mechanisms (desertions, functional fatigue, unwillingness to cooperate with repression actions, and the like). At this stage, there’s no indication of that. The political elite also continues to display cohesion, at least outwardly (it’s unclear what’s happening, for example, in the deliberations of the Supreme National Security Council).
It seems appropriate to define the current situation as an “ongoing revolutionary situation,” which could continue for months and develop in several main directions:
In my view, a scenario of such a turn seems less likely at this stage, as long as Khamenei continues to rule in practice. In any case, even option 3 (in both of its scenarios) does not guarantee stabilization, at least in the short term.