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Home Publications INSS Insight What’s the Fuss Over Greenland?

What’s the Fuss Over Greenland?

Why is President Donald Trump so determined to purchase the giant ice island?

INSS Insight No. 2015, July 15, 2025

עברית
Paul Weisko

American President Donald Trump has apparently made the acquisition of mineral rich Greenland a key part of American foreign policy. However, the Greenlandic people, following mixed experiences under Danish rule, want to be independent. If Greenland is acquired by the United States, it will set a dangerous precedent for Israel, while not doing much to help Israeli high tech’s resource security.


Much ado has been made about Greenland in recent years. Located in the Arctic between Iceland and Canada, Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Denmark provides Greenland with a critical annual block grant, an annual financial subsidy of approximately $600 million, which accounts for around 20% of its GDP and over half of its government budget. Despite being rich in minerals, including aluminum and rare earth elements, Greenland remains economically underdeveloped, and the average Greenlander has only one-half to one-third the disposable income of Alaska’s.

Greenland’s population of around 57,000 is slightly larger than that of Eilat. Yet, this small population lives on the world’s largest island, which spans over two million square kilometers. The vast majority of the island is covered by snow and glaciers, which are melting at alarming rates, releasing every year the equivalent weight of 26,000 Eiffel Towers in water into the ocean. This melting is uncovering not only valuable natural resources previously inaccessible due to thick ice cover but also ancient pathogens that modern humans have not encountered and to which we may have no immunity. The exposure of these materials and Greenland’s strategic location in the Arctic have turned the island into a focal point of 21st-century geopolitics.

The history of Greenland stretches back roughly 4,500 years, beginning with the arrival of Paleo-Eskimo peoples, followed by successive waves of settlers including the Thule civilization, ancestors of today’s Inuit. Norse settlers, led by Erik the Red, arrived in 985 CE but eventually vanished. In 1721, Denmark, eager to expand as a colonial power, sent missionary Hans Egede to Greenland to “re-Christianize” the presumed pagan or Catholic Norse descendants. Finding them long dead, he preached to the Inuit instead. Denmark attempted to profit from Greenland through trade and export of seal blubber but soon settled into a relatively benign colonial relationship that built the myth of the Danes as “nice imperialists.”

During World War II, after Denmark was occupied by Germany, the Danish ambassador in Washington allowed the United States to take control of Greenland, initiating an American military presence that persists to this day. After the war, the Danes regained control over the island and allowed the Americans to establish military bases there, while turning down an American offer of $100 million in gold for the island. The United States established 17 bases, including Camp Century, a failed nuclear-powered ice base that left radioactive waste behind. Another disaster occurred when an American B-52 bomber crashed near Thule Air Base, scattering nuclear material. These incidents violated basic norms of sovereignty, as the Danes had a nuclear free zone policy, which meant that the US military was breaking Danish law on Danish soil

Meanwhile, after World War II, Denmark engaged in practices in Greenland that today would qualify as genocide. These included non-consensual sterilizations of Greenlandic women and the semi-forced relocation of children into Danish homes which erased their language and culture. During the 1970s, Greenlanders began reclaiming control. In 1979, they achieved home rule, and in the late 2000s, “self-government,” which granted control over internal affairs but not on foreign policy, defense, and monetary policy, although Greenland can act in international matters affecting only itself.

Despite a desire for independence, supported by over 80% of Greenlanders under the right conditions, reality complicates the dream. Greenland relies on Denmark for over half its budget and essential services like cancer treatment. Independence without support would be economically and logistically unsustainable. A potential solution could be a Compact of Free Association (COFA), offering independence in exchange for defense responsibilities and financial aid from a partner nation. However, Denmark has rejected such an arrangement, maintaining that it is for the people of Greenland to determine their own future, without any portion of that future being dictated by a foreign power. Thus, Greenlanders are left with a stark choice: continued dependence on Denmark or fragile, uncertain independence.

Greenland’s trajectory toward independence is deeply entwined with superpower rivalries, especially between the United States and China. Due to Denmark’s resistance to supporting Greenlandic independence under a COFA, Greenlanders know that if they want to remove foreign control, they will need to replace the Danish block grant. To do this, they have turned to exploiting their vast natural resources, which are increasingly accessible due to climate change.

This resource pivot has attracted significant attention from China. Chinese firms have repeatedly attempted to gain a foothold through mining ventures, targeting Greenlandic zinc, iron, copper, and rare earth elements. They also sought to renovate three airports and purchase a decommissioned Danish naval base. However, every one of these attempts has failed: High financial risks sank the Chinese copper mine; price drops helped to derail the iron mine project; a better American offer undercut the Chinese zinc deal; the rare earths project—entangled with uranium extraction—became politically toxic during the 2021 elections, leading the victorious party to ban uranium, oil, and gas mining outright; the airport renovations were blocked under US pressure in 2019; and the naval base sale was pulled and the head of the Chinese company involved was blacklisted in China itself. Ultimately, these failed investments made Washington extremely nervous.

In 2025, the Trump administration revived a long-standing American ambition: to acquire Greenland outright. Since 1867, the United States has made at least five serious attempts to buy Greenland—once after purchasing Alaska; again before World War I (when the United States instead bought the Virgin Islands on condition of recognizing Danish sovereignty over Greenland); a third and fourth time after World War II with an offer of $100 million in gold; and most recently in 2019. That last attempt ended diplomatically sour when the Danish prime minister publicly dismissed the idea, prompting Trump to cancel his state visit.

Importantly, the Greenlanders themselves do not want to become American. Polls show only about 6% support for US annexation—less than 4,000 people on the entire island. The majority seek independence, as Greenlanders prefer independence and view incorporation into the United States as a threat to the autonomy they already have under Denmark. Despite these local preferences, Greenland remains vital to American national security. In Greenland, the United States operates its northernmost military base, Pituffik Space Base. Established under a treaty requiring the United States to provide the bulk of Greenland’s security, the base hosts early-warning radar coverage critical to monitoring Russian—and now potentially Chinese—ballistic missile activity. The GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-UK) gap—an area in the northern Atlantic Ocean—is also essential to NATO maritime defense, especially as it monitors submarine traffic and protects transatlantic data cables. Furthermore, Greenland’s rare earth reserves are a strategic prize as the United States seeks to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains.

Yet the economic realities complicate this ambition. The rare earths mined in Greenland would still be processed in China, which has a stranglehold over the market, with the Chinese processing over 90% of the rare earths brought to market. Even if Greenland came under American control, this dynamic is unlikely to change. Rare earths processing is extremely polluting, and as a result, environmentally friendly countries face significant obstacles entering the market of rare earth smelting. Additionally, according to some geologists, the acquisition of Greenland by the United States would do little to challenge China’s dominance in this sector. Thus, bringing Greenland under American control might not significantly enhance American resource security.

The geopolitical tension, however, could backfire. The American pressure campaign has already prompted Greenland to reach out for alternative diplomatic and investment partners, including China. Ironically, US efforts to prevent Chinese encroachment could create a self-fulfilling prophecy, pushing Greenland toward the very power Washington wants to keep out. While the Greenlandic government remains cautious about Chinese influence, it has made clear that the Americans are only welcome as partners, not as sovereigns.

The Danes, for their part, have also sought help from other powers. France, with the strongest NATO navy in Europe, has voiced public support for Denmark’s and Greenland’s territorial integrity. Meanwhile, US attempts to woo Greenland have complicated internal politics. Although a pro-American party came in second in Greenland’s most recent election, its policies were so out of step with the rest of the political spectrum that it was excluded from coalition talks.

Israel does have an interest in the Greenland saga. Setting the precedent that borders can be changed by force, especially when unprovoked, is a dangerous norm to establish. For a country like Israel, which already faces challenges with international recognition and disputed territories, legitimizing forced territorial acquisition could become a double-edged sword. Any erosion of the rules-based order is a strategic risk. If the United States were to take control of Greenland—despite having a treaty that designates it as Greenland’s primary defense partner—it could set a precedent. Other countries seeking to assert control over disputed territories, such as Israel, might then find greater diplomatic cover when justifying their actions on the international stage. Additionally, the idea of a country violating a defense treaty by invading one of its partners could potentially lessen the credibility of future defense treaties—such as those Israel might want to sign with the Americans.

In conclusion, Greenland is no longer a frozen outpost—it is a locus of great power competition, a bellwether for how the United States manages 21st-century diplomacy, and a test case in how small nations assert agency under pressure. It is likely to move toward independence, possibly under a COFA, assuming no illegal or coercive move by the United States derails that path. China has so far been blocked from gaining a strategic toehold on the island, but the efforts to do so have shaped American policy, European involvement, and potentially, the diplomatic alignments of future Arctic states. For Israel, the Greenland saga is a warning and a window: How America treats its allies and upholds its professed values will ripple far beyond the ice cap.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Paul Weisko
Paul Weisko is a Diane and Guilford Glazer Israel-China Policy Center Research Associate. His foci are China in the Arctic and China in the Pacific Islands. He has a Master’s degree in International Affairs from The George Washington University. He has Bachelor’s degrees in Global Studies, History, and Asian Studies from University of Maryland, Baltimore County. He was previously a Research Fellow at University of Haifa's Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center.
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