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The violent clash in Gaza in mid-August at the Ibn Tamiyya mosque in Rafah between Hamas members and a group of al-Qaeda supporters from the Jund Ansar Allah organization, which led to the deaths of more than 20 Palestinians and the wounding of several dozen, has again demonstrated the violence, domination, and mercilessness Hamas exhibits towards its political rivals. At the same time, a volatile power struggle in the Gaza Strip was on full display, first and foremost, a struggle over Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip population. In addition, the episode dramatized the dispute among the locals about how to conduct their daily lives and what should be the nature of their government vis-à-vis both internal issues and external enemies.

Against Hamas, the (Palestinian  offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood movement) that combines an Islamic religious outlook with a Palestinian national vision favoring active participation in political life alongside the use of military power and terrorism, stands an ideological approach identified with Salafist jihadism in the Muslim world. These groups view the participation of Hamas in political activity based on rules not dictated exclusively by sharia as a deviation from the true path of Islam, to the point that the movement is accused of heresy. Unlike Hamas, these groups champion the idea of an ongoing, uncompromising war with no holds barred against anyone defined as an enemy of Islam, and demand that this approach be adopted first and foremost in the conflict with Israel.

The declaration at the mosque during the prayer service by Sheikh Abdel-Latif Moussa, the leader of Jund Ansar Allah, about the establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Palestine was an extreme public expression of this fundamental disagreement. Seen by Hamas as a major challenge to the legitimacy of its rule, the organization felt it had no choice but to respond by the violent suppression of the rebel faction.

Since elected to head the Palestinian government in 2006, Hamas has striven to have an exclusive hold over the Gaza Strip. To this end, it has demonstrated that it would not hesitate to use significant force against anyone attempting to undermine its regime. This is how Hamas met its Fatah rivals when representatives of the Palestinian Authority refused to accept the authority of the Hamas security services. As a result of the violent clash between them, Fatah was removed from every locus of power it had held in the Gaza Strip. Hamas again responded violently when it encountered objections to its rule in Gaza on the part of elements identifying themselves with al-Qaeda, such as Army of Islam members headed by the Doghmush clan, when they refused Hamas’ demand to release the kidnapped British journalist Alan Johnston. When the leaders of Hamas understood that continuing to hold Johnston would harm their image and the legitimacy of their rule in the West, they acted forcefully and determinedly to secure his release, and applied the same tactics to the members of the Doghmush clan when they refused to hand over one of their men to Hamas’ security services.

The confrontation at the mosque in Rafah is not surprising in light of the reality forming in the Gaza Strip in recent years, whereby the Salafi jihadists are making inroads among many young people who join various groups identified with al-Qaeda and global jihad. This phenomenon has been nicknamed “jaljalat,” for the blurb posted with a clip on a website in which the wave of young Muslims from all over the world joining the global jihad was described as “rolling [“jaljal”] thunder” that would rock the very foundations of the West. Among Gaza Strip groups identifying with this stream are the Army of Islam, the Army of the Nation, the Army of Believers–al-Qaeda in Palestine, Tahrir, and more. The full extent of the phenomenon and the precise number of active members in the different groups are not known, but estimates are that there are several dozen activists and some hundreds of fans and supporters for each of the large groups, and somewhat fewer for the smaller groups. The intention of the groups to generate terrorism at all costs ensures that the potential for damage is disproportionately large given their actual size.

The increased support for these groups in recent yours arises primarily from the disappointment among many young people in the Gaza Strip, including members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, that after Hamas assumed control in Gaza it did not immediately impose sharia law as the guiding principle of daily life, and that the movement has demonstrated passivity in the fight against Israel. Activists from these groups acted on their own initiative to apply sharia law against the symbols of Western secularization of the Gaza Strip. They have attacked cafés and weddings where music was being played to mixed male and female celebrants, burned internet cafés, and even tried harming foreigners.

Where Hamas – which is trying to gain legitimacy in the Arab and Western worlds – adopted a dual strategy of using force together with conducting the conflict with Israel under the protection of a short term ceasefire (tahadiya), the members of the Salafi jihadist groups saw the need to conduct an unrelenting campaign against Israel from across its borders, without limits or restraints stemming from political considerations. Even after Operation Cast Lead, they continued to try firing rockets at Israeland harming Israeli soldiers, including through a dramatic attack thwarted in June of this year at the Karni border crossing (a horse bomb attack).

At this stage, it is hard to foresee how the incident in Rafah might affect the relations between Hamas and the Salafi jihadist groups in the Gaza Strip, especially in light of the harsh criticism and the calls for revenge uttered against Hamas’ leadership. It is clear that the jihadists will take advantage of the event to enlist support for their path and stress what distinguishes them from Hamas. Despite the efforts Hamas leaders invested after the incident to restore calm and arrive at understandings with the leaders of these groups about preventing bloodshed and acts of vengeance, it seems that at best these efforts may succeed in postponing the next round of confrontations between them. However, it will not stop these groups from continuing to recruit young people and from trying to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel as a provocation that would forceIsrael to respond against Hamas and thus challenge the organization’s policy of tahadiya.

Based on cost vs. effectiveness considerations, Hamas – like other Arab regimes in the region – obstructs attempts on the part of global jihadists and al-Qaeda supporters to carry out attacks and infiltrate Israelalong its southern border. It seems that despite the challenges Hamas will face from these elements, Hamas’ policy will not change and it will continue to insist on retaining power alone, even if it must apply brutal force against those who would challenge it, no matter to what stream they  may belong.