Publications

The Power Gap

As it enters a new decade, the State of Israel possesses impressive military, political, technological, and economic power. However, Israel is hard-pressed to translate these advantages into strategic influence and achieve its key national security objectives: mitigating threats, advancing peace, building alliances, and dictating the terms for the satisfactory conclusion of conflicts. This reality results from the limited benefit that military action can provide Israel against its main adversaries, as well as Israel’s high sensitivity to casualties and the heavy economic and social costs of war.

Even when Israel identifies and defines the challenge properly, it often has difficulty shaping an effective and relevant strategy, because an overwhelming military victory does not necessarily translate the achievements of war into political objectives. Similarly, dealing with the consequences of war on “the day after” is generally no less complex than managing military operations. The asymmetry in both the campaign’s objectives and the respective publics’ expectations (for Israel’s adversaries, not losing is victory, while the Israeli public expects decisive victory) as well as the differences in the rules of engagement make it difficult to fulfill the campaign’s objectives, or at least require their designation in minimalist terms.

The Implications of the Killing of Soleimani

The INSS strategic assessment for 2019-2020 was finalized immediately after the targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani. This development creates a new context and has the potential to mark a strategic change whose scope and parameters have yet to be determined.

* Regarding the United States, is this development evidence of a fundamental change in US policy, signaling a move toward a proactive military campaign against Iran’s regional activity? Or, was it a concrete action taken for preventive and deterrence purposes by exacting a heavy toll for the activities of pro-Iranian elements, under Soleimani’s guidance, which peaked with the death of an American citizen (December 27, 2019) and the storming of the embassy in Baghdad four days later.

Iran was forced to weigh its options in response to the American move without input from Soleimani, who had been responsible for the analytical thinking and planning of activities of this sort in the regional arena. Iran’s limited and measured response to Soleimani’s killing testifies to Tehran’s understanding that President Trump is not predictable; its awareness of its own conventional military weakness relative to the US; and its preference for political moves to push the United States out of Iraq rather than military measures. At the same time, it is too early to assess the effect of the elimination of Soleimani on Iran’s connections to its regional proxies and on the Iranian resolve and brazenness evident in recent months.

The Strategic Balance

Israel was preoccupied with two election campaigns in 2019 and barely initiated any measures to improve its strategic position. The government engaged in steps such as the celebration of the Trump administration’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights – following its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in late 2017- but there was stagnation and even significant regression regarding issues central to Israeli security. In the overall strategic picture, many elements changed for the worse.

One negative development is the narrowing of technological gaps and erosion of Israel’s qualitative advantage over its enemies. The clearest expression of this phenomenon is the Iranian precision missile project, which has established production and upgrade capabilities; Hezbollah already has dozens of precision missiles at its disposal.

The Palestinian arena can be characterized as a political stalemate, which includes a complete lack of contact between Jerusalem and Ramallah. Meanwhile, in Gaza, Hamas and Islamic Jihad continue their military buildup; Israeli communities near the Gaza border bear the toll of the ongoing conflict; and terrorist organizations threaten to paralyze daily life for over half of Israel’s population, including the Tel Aviv area. A broader perspective indicates that Israel’s relations with the Sunni Arab world are not progressing – perhaps even the opposite is true. No diplomatic breakthrough with the Gulf states was achieved in 2019; the gradual deterioration of relations with Jordan continues; and only relations with Egypt remain stable.

Israel’s budget suffers from a significant deficit, and the need to increase the defense budget due to the deterioration of Israel’s strategic situation only exacerbates the problem. Finally, looking inwards, Israeli society is divided and the government is busy with indecisive election campaigns, which leads to wasted resources, institutional paralysis, and the inability to formulate strategy and make decisions on central issues.

However, there are some positive changes in the global and regional environment that have the potential to improve Israel’s national security situation. Signs of a second wave of upheaval in the Middle East emerged in 2019, particularly the latter months, this time mainly in states oriented toward Iran (Iraq and Lebanon) and even in Iran itself. Continued economic pressure on Iran could bring about a reduction in the resources available for its nuclear and regional activities.

The United States has not withdrawn from the Middle East entirely (bases and soldiers in the Gulf remain in place, and additional forces were deployed in the region following the killing of Soleimani), and at this stage Israel continues to enjoy relations with a friendly administration that largely sees eye to eye with it on events in the region and endorses Israeli interests. The partial isolationism embraced by the United States, despite its dangers for Israel, may ultimately raise Israel’s prestige and value in the eyes of leaders in the United States as well as pragmatic Arab states. In addition, Israel positioned itself as an essential player in the Syrian theater, and reached agreement in principle with the United States and Russia regarding the need to remove Iranian forces from Syria – although thus far the agreement has not translated into practice.

Finally, there appear to be signs of emerging understandings in the Palestinian system. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank seems to recognize that a resolution of the conflict will not be imposed by the international system, and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, has internalized that terrorism will not resolve the conflict.

Assessments

When considering and comparing the positive and negative developments of the past year, several insights emerge. The first is awareness that Israel’s strategic confusion prevents constructive political discourse on the level of national leadership. Two election campaigns in 2019 and the plethora of negotiations to form a government led to the failure to formulate up-to-date security concepts. Second is the clear understanding that having exhausted the campaign between wars in the northern arena, current Israeli conduct points toward escalation. This requires adjusting the tools, methods, arenas, and pace of operations, with the requisite modifications in preparation and allocation of resources. Third, today’s circumstances demand a discussion in principle of the relevance of a preventive attack, in particular against the Iranian precision missile project in Lebanon and Syria.

The Need for a New Israeli Grand Strategy

After a decade and a half of stagnation in strategic thinking, Israel’s grand strategy must be updated. A new Israeli government must lead a process of renewing Israel’s security concept and defense policy, with a focus on the following points:

* Recognizing the tension between importance and urgency: what is urgent (the Gaza Strip and the Iranian buildup in Syria) ought to be of a lower priority than what is important – the Iranian nuclear project and the precision missile project in Lebanon.

* In any event of deterioration or escalation, it must be clear who is to be targeted: the Iranian proxy force, the host states, or Iran itself.

* It is essential to analyze successes and failures over the past two decades; to integrate the political dimension and the legitimacy dimension into strategic thinking; to formulate communication mechanisms before a conflict erupts; to devise exit strategies and mechanisms; and to address issues of military buildup.

What follows are ten central recommendations for the new Israeli government that derive from the overview above - some requiring immediate discussion and others less urgent, though perhaps more important. Above all is the underlying recommendation for the need to formulate an updated grand strategy for Israel. Fundamental concepts such as deterrence, decision, escalation, preventive attack, and political arrangement must be clarified and validated. A new government in Israel should lead a process of renewing the security concept and the security policy.

1. Iran’s Nuclear Program

The United States withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) and the renewal of sanctions were based on the expectation that one of the following three scenarios would take place: the collapse of the Iranian regime; a change in its behavior; or an American attack on Iran in response to Iranian progress toward the nuclear threshold. These three scenarios were not realized and are unlikely to be realized in the future, even after a series of Iranian provocations in the conventional realm led the United States to attack Shiite militia bases in Iraq and Syria and kill Qasem Soleimani. Israel must prepare for more realistic scenarios – renewed negotiations (now less likely after the killing of Soleimani); Iran’s inching toward the nuclear threshold; and escalation between Iran and the United States, particularly after the targeted killing, which might include Israel. These possibilities demand that close understandings and a joint strategy be coordinated between Israel and the United States. In case of negotiations between the US and Iran, it is necessary for Israel to be in agreement with the Washington on the content of an improved nuclear deal with Iran compared to the 2015 agreement, along with reaching a “parallel agreement” on a joint policy against Iran and on a strategy for dealing with gradual Iranian progress toward nuclear weapons. In tandem, it is important to examine with the United States how to help the Iranian people who are rising up against the regime. However, Israel must prepare for the possibility that the US will be disinterested or distracted and that it will be left alone to deal with the Iran nuclear issue, and therefore it must ensure that it has a credible military option. Building such an option is a difficult process that requires diverting resources from other important matters and allocating them to strengthen offensive strike capabilities.

2. Iran’s Consolidation in Syria and the Precision Missile Project

Israel’s success in blocking Iran’s consolidation in Syria in 2018 and 2019 is relative, temporary, and not final. It is also a mistake to maintain the same strategic framework while the reality is changing. Iranian consolidation has been largely diverted to Iraq and Lebanon, arenas where it is more difficult for Israel to operate, and has been bolstered by a response policy that is more brazen and immediate on Tehran’s part (at least until the assassination of Soleimani). It is now important to recognize the diminished relevance of the campaign between wars and to develop an operational solution against the critical elements of the consolidation in Lebanon and Iraq as well – chief among them the precision missile project. Taking steps toward that end has the potential for significant escalation.

The threat of hundreds or thousands of precision missiles from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran is a strategic threat of the first order that, if not dealt with in time, could develop into an existential threat. This is the type of threat that requires in-depth examination and should be addressed by Israel’s security concept. There are five possible strategies for dealing with it:

* Continuation of the campaign between wars – disruption and delay, in which preventing escalation is a priority, and understanding that this addresses the problem only partially and with diminishing returns.

* An active and passive defensive strategy – improving effectiveness and purchasing additional batteries and interceptors: Arrow, David’s Sling, and Iron Dome systems; and improving resilience of critical infrastructure.The clear disadvantage is the cost and fact that it does not present a comprehensive or fully effective solution.

* Deterrence – a clear and explicit threat that Israel will respond with full force to an attack on its infrastructure and the IDF. The weak point in this strategy is the enemy’s capability, after accumulating hundreds or thousands of advanced missiles, to go on a “first strike” strategy to destroy the components of IDF power that form the core of Israeli deterrence.

* Preemptive strike – an attack based on the understanding that in the near term Hezbollah is preparing to attack Israel. The drawback of this strategy is the fog of intelligence and Hezbollah’s high readiness for war at that point.

* Preventive attack – an effective, proactive surprise attack on enemy operational, production, and stockpile assets, risking escalation to a full-scale war. The legitimacy of such a step should be discussed.

None of the possibilities are exclusive, and striking the right combination of them could provide an adequate response to the most severe threat posed by the precision missile project.

3. The “First Northern War”

The IDF must ensure preparedness for a multi-arena war (“fire on all fronts scenario”) as a frame of reference. The era in which Israel would face a single adversary in a single arena is over. Accordingly, the IDF must reassess and perhaps redefine concepts like “decision,” “victory,” and denial of enemy capabilities. Political leadership must enable Israeli force buildup and the readiness to fight against three entities in the north – Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria– and simultaneously contend with the terrorist organizations from Gaza. The “fire on all fronts scenario” requires thinking about priorities and linkage between the respective arenas and fronts, and the achievement required on each front. INSS is engaged in research on the issue, and will present its findings and analysis to decision makers in the second half of 2020. In addition, effort must be channeled to update the public’s expectations regarding the threat Israel faces, and even more so – regarding the possible responses.

4. The Palestinian Authority

The INSS Plan, first published in October 2018, remains the optimal approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It includes an additional attempt at Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and, in the event that fails, pursuit of independent steps to maintain Israel’s character as a Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral state. It is crucial to prepare for the day after Mahmoud Abbas’s rule ends, while continuing to encourage economic development in the PA. Publication of the Trump plan, which will attempt to set new parameters for an agreement and recognize the reality created over the past fifty years, is highly significant.

5. The Terror Organizations in Gaza

As INSS noted in 2018, it may be possible to reach an arrangement with Hamas. In steering clear of fighting in Operation Black Belt between Israel and Islamic Jihad in November 2019, Hamas illustrated interest in an arrangement as part of its move to prioritize the economic and social situation in Gaza over another clash with Israel. That said, the organization frequently challenges Israel with low levels of rocket fire and friction along the border fence, due to domestic considerations and for the purpose of extracting concessions from Israel.

A long term ceasefire is possible only if the strategic (and not ideological) demands of both sides are reasonably met. Hamas would receive the opening of Gaza to the world and its reconstruction and development, and Israel would receive the restoration of quiet in the south, mechanisms for ensuring the prevention of terror groups’ military buildup and smuggling, and a reasonable solution to the issue of the captured and missing Israelis.

If no arrangement is reached, the INSS recommendation since 2012 has been to plan and conduct a military campaign that is fundamentally different from the campaigns of the past decade. It must surprise, maneuver, and focus vis-à-vis Hamas’s military wing – and end with a political process in order to reach an arrangement from a position of strength.

6. The United States

The US elections could alter the current reality by replacing an administration that is friendly toward Israel with one that is problematic. In the face of American isolationism, which crosses party lines, Israel must repeatedly emphasize that it does not want the United States to fight and shed blood in its defense; as a strategic asset and reliable ally for Washington, it is in the US interest to back it militarily and politically. Israel must do everything it can to return to its status as an issue of broad consensus among Democrats and Republicans alike. Israel must also make a significant effort to restore close relations with the large segment of the American Jewish population that has become alienated in part as a result of Israeli policies that are not sensitive to the variety of denominations of Judaism in the United States.

7. Russia and China

Russia is not an enemy of Israel, and the strategic dialogue between them must be continued to prevent a collision in places where the two countries’ military forces operate in close proximity and where their interests diverge. As an ally of two of Israel’s enemies, Iran and Syria, Russia turns a blind eye to Hezbollah’s buildup. Follow-through on Russia’s promise to remove Iranian forces from Syria could signify the potential for closer relations between Russia and Syria, possibly resulting in greater limitations on Israel’s freedom of action in Syria. In any event, as is the case with China, Israel must work openly and in close cooperation with the United States on matters pertaining to Russia.

Indeed, Israel’s development of economic relations with China requires deep coordination with Washington, so as not to allow the former to cause friction in its important and special relationship with the latter. In recent years, INSS has pointed to a developing crisis with the United States regarding Israel’s relations with China and the need to strengthen risk management mechanisms.

8. The Regional System

To break the glass ceiling in its relations with the pragmatic Sunni world, especially the Gulf states, Israel must adapt two parallel efforts: one is marketing Israel’s technological, economic, and defense capabilities that could help these states in their struggle against destabilizing factors like Iran and in coping with economic and innovation challenges in their transformation to the 21st century. The second is making significant progress on the Palestinian issue, which would enable these states to develop deeper and more public relations with Israel.

In parallel and of supreme importance is revitalizing relations with Jordan. Here too, the “fruits of peace” (water, security, gas, and joint projects) demand political advances with the Palestinians. Such steps would be instrumental in overcoming the lowest point in relations between the two states since the peace agreement was signed in 1994.

9. Boosting IDF Readiness and Increasing the Defense Budget

Given Iran’s increasing brazenness and its continued entrenchment in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon, it is necessary to improve the IDF’s readiness for conflicts in all theaters – Iran, Hezbollah, Syria, and the Palestinian front – all of which are volatile to varying degrees. It is important to finalize and fund the IDF’s multi-year plan, to begin acquisitions using FMS funds (which has been delayed for two years), to strengthen capabilities for eliminating Iran’s nuclear program, to reinforce training and fill stockpiles, and in particular, to work toward formulating suitable operational plans and strategies vis-à-vis capabilities and modes of action developed by Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.

10. Maintaining Superiority

An essential traditional component of Israel’s defense doctrine is maintaining intelligence, air, and technological superiority over its enemies. Israel must continue to strengthen its relative advantage over its adversaries in cyber security and artificial intelligence technology, as a way of enhancing Israel’s qualitative military edge and as a central component of strengthening its deterrence, soft power, economy, and international standing.

Conclusion

After several years of improvement in Israel’s strategic situation, the strategic “window of opportunity,” which was not utilized sufficiently, appears to be closing. Growing threats require rethinking Israel’s security concept, defense policy, allocation of resources, and up-to-date strategies.

There are two possible approaches to Israel’s strategy: one is cautious and stabilizing – emphasizing dialogue, arrangements, and coming to terms with existing and developing threats, in order to neutralize them so that they are not realized; the second is proactive and preventive-offensive, and addresses and removes the threats but could lead to war in multiple arenas.

A prerequisite for choosing the right approach is a cohesive internal foundation within Israel, with an emphasis on social and national solidarity and resilience. At the end of a year of divisive rhetoric, incitement, and increasing distance between the sectors of Israeli society, the time has come for a different policy. There must be a focus on action to restore confidence in the institutions of governance, heal rifts, bring different camps together, increase solidarity, and launch an organized effort to enhance existing social resilience mechanisms and build new ones.

The next Israeli government must formulate an integrated approach that addresses the emergence of significant threats while simultaneously launching political processes and reaching arrangements to reduce tensions. This will make it possible to prepare for the significant challenges that threaten the future security and prosperity of Israel.