Strategic Assessment

Keywords: Arab Spring, nation state, sovereignty, governance, failed state, public opinion, borders, regime stability

"The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty…has passed; its theory was never matched by reality." (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992)

Introduction

The wave of Arab protests that began in the Middle East in December 2010 was the outgrowth of longstanding tyranny and suppression that compounded existing fundamental problems in the region, headed by performance failure in most of the Arab countries, which were at various levels of state failure. Inter alia, this caused deteriorating economic situations and high unemployment rates, especially among the educated younger generation. Globalization and technological developments, including the growth of the social networks, enabled a view of life beyond the Middle East. These processes highlighted the significance of state failure and heightened the sense of frustration and despair among populations, culminating in an unprecedented groundswell in the region, which unfolded in various waves. These in turn affected the status of the nation states and intensified trends of state failure, in which failed states become even greater failures (Syria, Yemen, Libya, Lebanon, and even Egypt are prominent examples), and in particular detracted from the essence of the term "sovereignty."

For many years, sovereignty has been perceived as one of the cornerstones of the international system. The term has evolved over the years, however, with different meanings ascribed to it. Starting in the 1990s, the absolute value of the term "sovereignty" was undermined (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), mainly as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, which accelerated globalization processes (among them the substantial expansion of the European Union) and led to growing military intervention in countries by foreign actors. Another factor was growing recognition of human and civil rights (Welsh, 2004, p. 2). Activity by non-state actors, which became possible in failed states where the central government lost effective control of its country’s peripheral areas, gained momentum during these years, and undermined and weakened nation states even further.

This article analyzes the changes that occurred in the status of the nation states in the Middle East in 2010-2020 through the term "sovereignty." We offer a re-examination of the term as it appears in the theoretical discourse of political science and international relations, taking into account the reciprocal connections between sovereignty and the phenomenon of the failed state, and propose the adoption of typology reflecting the various levels and types of state sovereignty. Finally, we assess how an analysis of the region from the perspective of sovereignty can help achieve a deeper understanding of countries in the Middle East and the level of their stability.

The Concept of Sovereignty: Development, Evolution, and Limitation

The origins of the sovereign state lie in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia—the agreement that ended the Thirty Years' War. The principle of sovereignty, which means the legitimacy of the state's absolute control of the population in a defined territory, was the basis of the realistic approach in international relations from the 1950s until the 1990s, with the concept assuming various meanings over the years.

Starting in the 1990s, the absolute value of the concept of sovereignty was undermined by globalization processes (particularly apparent in the European Union, which expanded substantially and rapidly following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the adoption of a shared currency, the euro) and the growing military intervention in countries by foreign actors. Additional factors were growing recognition of the importance of human and civil rights (Welsh, 2004, p. 2) and the strengthening of non-state actors, which weakened the central government's control over state territories, mainly in the peripheral areas, and weakened the central government and its ability to govern.

In the early 2000s, it was increasingly evident that the modern Western model of a sovereign nation state is more the exception than the rule.

Weber and Biersteker defined sovereignty as "a political entity’s externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its affairs" (Weber & Biersteker, 1996, p. 2). Their definition emphasizes the external dimension of sovereignty, i.e., the independence of the state from other political entities, while Ruggie defines it as "the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains," thereby stressing the territorial aspect (Ruggie, 1983, p. 275).

In the early 2000s, it was increasingly evident that the modern Western model of a sovereign nation state is more the exception than the rule. Outside of the developed countries in the OECD, the level of statehood in most countries is limited, with sovereignty being only partial. External actors, whether state or non-state, are involved in political issues in governance (Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Lebanon are prominent examples). Yet despite the erosion in the concept of sovereignty in various cases in the Middle East, the theoretical discourse is still hostage to both a concept and fundamental assumptions that rely on the principles of the absolute or broad and effective sovereignty recognized in states with a high performance level, in contrast to failed states.

Stephen Krasner addresses this incongruence, inter alia by proposing a more complex typology of the concept of sovereignty. He assumes that only some of the world's countries enjoy fully all types of sovereignty, which he defines according to three conditions, as follows: “A sovereign state is autonomous or independent; no external actor has authority within the state’s territorial boundaries and each sovereign state accepts the autonomy of other sovereigns. Finally, sovereign states are formally equal. Although they obviously vary with regard to size, population, resources, and wealth, every sovereign state has the right to sign treaties with others and to be free from interference by external actors” (Krasner, 2007).

Krasner distinguishes between four types of sovereignty: international sovereignty, meaning legal independence and mutual recognition of one state by another state; Westphalian sovereignty, meaning a state's ability to exclude external actors from its structural authority in a given territory, i.e., autonomy; domestic sovereignty, namely, the organization of authority in a country by the central government and its ability to wield effective control within the country's borders; and interdependence sovereignty, meaning a state’s ability to control trans-border movement of people, goods, and capital (Krasner, 2004, p. 88).

One of the prominent changes in the status of nation states is therefore linked to the idea of domestic sovereignty, which includes two key concepts: state authority and effective control.

This typology makes it possible to discuss the concept of sovereignty more precisely, and at the varying levels between one state and another in the international political system. In effect, most states in the international system feature partial sovereignty, or as Krasner and Risse say, those states are "problematic sovereigns" (Krasner, 2001; Risse, 2013). A large proportion of the countries headed by these sovereigns continue to enjoy international recognition, but their domestic sovereignty is only partial, due to the rulers' inability to control events in their country as a result of the involvement of external actors whose very actions undermine Westphalian sovereignty (Bolt, 2013). This does not mean that governance and the provision of public services do not exist in the country, rather, that external actors, whether state or non-state, also provide them, along with the central government authorities. In effect, this phenomenon is a prominent expression of a failed state, defined, inter alia, as the central government's weakness in providing the population with the range of state services for public benefit that are needed for the purpose of human security in its broader sense (Michael & Guzansky, 2017).

One of the prominent changes in the status of nation states is therefore linked to the concept of domestic sovereignty, which includes two key concepts: state authority and effective control. State authority can exist without effective control in cases in which a majority of the population voluntarily consents to the government, without the application of force (in Egypt, for example). In most cases, a combination of the two elements is involved. Failed states, or those containing areas of limited statehood, such as Somalia, are acknowledged according to the definition of "international sovereignty”; their domestic sovereignty, however, is fragmented and fragile. In other words, there are areas in these countries in which the central government's ability to enforce laws and decisions, and/or control of the means of violence and coercion is limited (Risse, 2013, p. 80). Such areas are not unique to failed or fragile countries whose domestic sovereignty has disappeared or been weakened. This distinction makes it possible to analyze cases of sovereign states containing areas, usually peripheral ones, in which domestic sovereignty is not applied or realized, and the ensuing ramifications of this lapse. Not only Somalia and Congo, defined as failed states, but also functional countries like Argentina, Indonesia, Russia, and even China contain areas in which statehood is limited or domestic sovereignty is fragmented.

Who does exercise control and governance in areas with partial domestic sovereignty? In areas in which state control exists at a high level, the central government is responsible for citizens' internal and external security (through a monopoly on force, law, and order), and the supply of goods and services for the benefit of the public through the state institutions. In other areas, surprisingly, there are situations in which services continue not through the central government, but without chaos and anarchy. In effect, this is a state of governance without government (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Risse, 2013). Health, sanitation, security, and other services are provided by non-governmental assistance organizations of various types, or through representatives of foreign countries; non-state actors, such as political institutions, religious entities, and NGOs; and violent organizations, such as terrorist and guerilla organizations, militias, criminal organizations, and gangs competing with the formal government for centers of power.

Approaches and Conceptualizations about “Hollow Sovereignty"

Current literature offers a number of terms for describing the complexity involved, one of which is a "hybrid political order." The term refers to mixed governance applied by more than one entity (for example, a state sovereign), and includes entities from the local, national, regional, and international levels (Boege et al., 2009). From this, it can be understood that such actors do not act in isolation from the state; they conduct reciprocal relationships with it characterized by competition, and sometimes also by cooperation. These actors are also influenced by each other in the way that the organizations adopt state rhetoric and practice (insofar as non-state actors are involved, this involves a phenomenon of institutionalization; see Michael & Dostri, 2018). For their part, the states are affected by the non-state and informal agenda. If we return to Krasner's typology, a hybrid political order reflects the idea of disruption of internal and Westphalian sovereignty.

One example of an interaction of this kind can be found in the past decade in the Syrian theater, in which the combination of a "formal state apparatus" and a variety of state actors (Russia, Israel, Iran, Turkey) and non-state actors (armed rebel groups, political opposition groups, Iranian-Shiite militias, Kurds, humanitarian organizations, and other civilian movements) has created an entire language and modus operandi in the field designed to deal with the division of power between the many actors: safe zones, de-confliction zones, de-escalation zones, no-fly zones, and special security zones. Furthermore, as of early 2021, Assad controls only about 60 percent of the country's territory, and does not have complete enforcement ability or effective governance even there. The remaining areas where the central government has not succeeded in regaining control are operated as autonomous enclaves controlled by external parties competing with the central government: the Kurds in the north and northeast, rebel enclaves under Turkish sponsorship in the northwest, and rebel pockets in the south.

A term that has developed in public and research discourse with regard to the Iraqi theater is non-state (ladaula, in Arabic). The term, coined by Iraqi political sociologist Faleh A. Jabar, is meant to describe the current political struggle underway in the country since the popular uprising in Iraq in October 2019, which includes politicians, intellectuals, and journalists from all parts of the Iraqi socio-political spectrum. Jabar asserts that the term ladaula differs from terms such as “deep state” or “parallel state”; it refers to a range of configurations of actors operating from outside and within the state framework, i.e., entities that are not separate from the state. The term reflects a transition from Hobbes's Leviathan state to a weakened state, but does not refer only to a strong state becoming a weak one, but also to polarization, division, and inability to conduct an orderly decision making process in the political order (Aziz, 2020).

The "mutation" in the essence of the sovereignty concept and the degree to which sovereignty is effectively applied arouse an immediate association with failed states. The terms "state failure" and "failed state" have been recognized for many years in theory and in practice. No one disputes there are several interfaces and links between the relative effectiveness of sovereignty and state failure, and that some of the measures developed for assessing state failure can therefore also be used in order to evaluate and classify the effectiveness of sovereignty. Some examples are the monopoly on the use of organized violence; the ability to prevent terrorism or attempted takeovers and the spread of non-state actors; the ability to defeat or deter intervention by foreign actors; the level of state services; and the ability to provide personal security to citizens, in the broad meaning of the concept (Michael & Guzansky, 2017, p. 18). The overlap and interfaces between the concepts of hollow sovereignty and state failure pose the question whether the failed state concept necessarily encompasses the concept of hollow sovereignty, and whether the focus on sovereignty and its conceptualization, as renewed and updated according to the circumstances that emerged during the decade of regional upheaval, indeed provides us with an additional analytical tool.

The concept of a failed state is a broad and inclusive concept that reflects the country's institutional function, and also refers, inter alia, to parameters and dimensions pertaining to sovereignty. The weighted numerical values to calculate state failure, however, which take 12 indices into account, represent the assessment of the overall state performance. In this broad sense, the emphasis is on a state's ability to fulfill the social contract with its citizens and provide them with human security in the wide and inclusive meaning of the concept (including eight different parameters, among them employment, housing, and education, beyond personal security) (Fragile States Index, 2020).

Presumably a high negative correlation was found between the level of state failure and the state's level of domestic sovereignty, because fragmented and hollow domestic sovereignty is necessarily correlated with the state's functional capability in the fulfillment of its social contract. This correlation, however, does not render discussion of the concept of sovereignty and its typology superfluous. For example, Syria, as a failed state in fourth place in the 2020 Fragile States Index, is still a country that exercises relatively effective domestic sovereignty in parts of its sovereign territory through the use of repressive mechanisms and with the help of foreign actors. In order to understand the level of Syria's performance in general, and the level of its sovereignty in particular, classifying it as a failed state is therefore not enough. The discussion of the concept of sovereignty enables us to distinguish between the failed performance level of countries and the level of their stability as state entities. If the Fragile States Index can be understood as an index focused on civilians and the institutional functioning of states, then the discussion of the concept of sovereignty expands the perspective in the direction of the regional, security, and strategic dimension.

The popular protests revealed the important role of the public space, with citizens emerging as a force motivating and shaping both internal and external processes, especially as an element capable of destabilizing the rulers' domestic sovereignty, i.e., their ability to enforce their authority and rule over the country's population within its borders.

Since this article, like the entire issue of the journal, deals with the emerging regional order and attempts to characterize the changing regional architecture, the issue of sovereignty is extremely important. Characteristics of sovereignty in each country in turn affect the regional architecture. Actually, sovereignty can be viewed as a key element in the logic that shapes the regional architecture. A thorough analysis of the differences between types of sovereignty is likely to help us characterize the regional order more accurately through its elements—states and the degree of their effective control of a territory and population, together with other countries' recognition and attitude to borders, autonomy, and legitimacy of respective countries in the management of their affairs.

Between the Arab Spring and State Sovereignty in the Middle East, 2010-2020

The Undermining of Domestic Sovereignty, 2010-2016

The initial revolutionary phase took place in 2010-2011, with a wave of public protests in the Arab world that led to the overthrow of four regimes (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen). The regime in Syria became bogged down in a bloody civil war, and there were various levels of instability in other countries (Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Sudan, and Lebanon). Until the beginning of what became know as the Arab Spring, it appeared that the political and military elites were the pivotal actors in the region. The popular protests revealed the important role of the public space, with citizens emerging as a force motivating and shaping both internal and external processes, especially as an element capable of destabilizing the rulers' domestic sovereignty, i.e., their ability to enforce their authority and rule over the country's population within its borders.

The next three years (2011-2013) saw the initial efforts by the countries in the region to cope with the changes, and their attempts to stabilize and shape a new order. The immediate expression of this was the rise of political Islam, reflected in a series of political victories and achievements by the Muslim Brotherhood movement: the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, and the strengthening of the Islamic Justice and Development Party in Morocco. These parties joined the political Islam ideological group, also represented by Turkey and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, with support from Qatar. Shortly afterwards, it emerged that these movements did not succeed in sustaining their initial political success, and the "era of political Islam" as an alternative to the secular autocratic order waned.

The rise of the Salafi-jihadi idea in 2014-2016, and its organizational manifestation in the form of the Islamic State, added to the regional complexity. It appeared that this was bound to shape the Middle East order in the coming years. Its cruelty and extremism, however, prompted a regional and international campaign against it. In addition, it encountered difficulties in the dialectic space between realization of the Islamic nation vision via violent jihad and the need for political institutionalization to improve its ability to exercise effective control of a territory and population. Ultimately, this led to the overthrow of the Islamic caliphate and weakened the power of its attraction.

 It appeared that this was bound to shape the Middle East order in the coming years. Its cruelty and extremism, however, together with the regional and international campaign against it and the difficulties that it encountered in the dialectic space between realization of the Islamic nation vision via violent jihad and the necessity for the political institutionalization process for the purpose of improving its ability to exercise effective control of a territory and population, led to the overthrow of the Islamic caliphate and weakened the power of its attraction.

In the three phases described above, the prevalent assumption was that states in the Middle East were in a process of collapsing. At this stage, not only was domestic sovereignty fragmented, but a threat to Westphalian sovereignty—the ability of a state to exclude external actors from the state's structural authority in a specific territory—began to emerge. This conceptual framework made it possible to explain the following cases: Syria, a country then at the peak of a bloody civil war, saw control divided among the regime, the rebels, and jihad groups, with intervention by regional and international actors in the background. Iraq, which was effectively split into three entities—Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish—was subject to the growing influence of Iran on the one hand and an American presence on the other. Libya, divided into two rival state entities, has been unable to stabilize itself since the overthrow of Qaddafi. It is under the control of clans and gangs, and has become a theater of struggle between regional actors (Turkey, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) and international actors (Russia, France). South Sudan, which underwent a violent and bloody civil war, has maintained its dubious high position on the list of the world's most fragile states (third place in the Fund for Peace index for 2020), and Yemen experienced a coup d’état, with the Houthis (an ethnic group affiliated with the Zaidis, a Shiite sect) seizing control of the central government.

Even countries that did not fall apart during this period (Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan) experienced prolonged instability and severe internal distress that undermined their domestic sovereignty.

The collapsing states thesis rested primarily on the historical explanation, whereby most of the nation states in the region were relatively new creations of the past 100 years—the result of Anglo-French imperialism. Britain and France divided up the remains of the Ottoman Empire into regions of influence in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, and later at the San Remo Conference in 1920, which ratified the Sykes-Picot Agreement and expanded it into an agreement giving the two countries a mandate to control various areas. The artificial borders of the states founded under this mandate ignored the fragile ethnic, religious, and tribal composition of the region. This unstable starting point, the difficult underlying conditions, and especially deep state failure, featuring continual erosion of the social contract between the regimes and the public, are what led to the undermining of the various types of state sovereignty in the region.

One of the main factors that aggravated the decline of internal and Westphalian sovereignty in the region's states is the growing proliferation of non-state actors in the Middle East. Although this is not a new phenomenon, it has increased in extent and force (Del Sarto et al., 2019, pp. 12-14). In addition to the violent non-state actors that have operated in the region in recent decades, such as Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah, which has challenged Lebanese sovereignty and which functions as an Iranian proxy in the fighting in Syria and other theaters, new militant organizations have joined the violent regional landscape. Some of these are jihad organizations officially affiliated with al-Qaeda, while others are independent.

In June 2014, the ISIS organization—the Islamic State (formerly the al-Qaeda branch in Iraq) declared the founding of a caliphate in areas in western Iraq and eastern Syria, and called for other factions around the world to swear fealty to it. This development not only further eroded internal state sovereignty, but also challenged the border between the two countries and the map of the entire Middle East. This led to increased involvement by external actors in the two countries' affairs in the name of fighting terrorism. The result was disruption of both Westphalian sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty, i.e., the central government's ability to control movements of capital, populations, ideas, and so on from outside the state's borders towards another country.

"Strengthening" Domestic Sovereignty at the Expense of Westphalian Sovereignty, 2016-2019

In subsequent years, it appeared that the trend toward the rise of popular and religious movements (the Muslim Brotherhood, followed by the Islamic State) ebbed. As if to close a circle, states in the region began to resume their functioning as important actors in control of political processes, together with growing intervention by international actors, primarily Russia and the United States, in the regional turmoil. The cyclical dynamic that had seemingly ended repositioned the nation states as the most significant unit for analysis, while the influence of popular opinion as a catalyst for political change accordingly waned. This led many scholars in the Middle East and the rest of the world to assume that the upheaval had ended.

Two events in the Middle East during those years—the defeat of the Islamic State and the imminent end of the war in Syria (or at least the stage of major fighting there)—underlie the idea that the Middle East is headed for a new and more stable era, whose main characteristic will be the rejuvenation of the nation state and the strengthening of all aspects of state sovereignty. Egypt, where President el-Sisi seeks to give the impression that the situation is now "normal," is cited as an example. In general, it appeared that the Middle East was again engaged in day-to-day matters, with the regional agenda determined by state actors.

A wave of articles about political science and the Middle East appeared in the scholarly literature citing the strengthening of nation states and all types of their sovereignty as the outstanding characteristic in the present time. Egyptian scholar Abdel Monem Said Aly wrote in December 2018,

The Middle East has passed its bleakest moments since the Arab Spring and has moved toward greater stability. At the root of this change is the return of the nation-state and the relative decline of non-state actors, and the return of the nation-state has coincided with the return of geo-politics as the basis for interstate interactions in the region….Although these positive tendencies will come up against a number of serious challenges, there are compelling reasons to believe that the region’s states will successfully address and overcome them. (Said Aly, 2018)

Geoffrey Aronson, a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute, expressed similar views, writing, "The assumption that the national identities forged from Sykes-Picot’s template over the last century could be swept away like so much dust [following the events of the Arab Spring] was, shall we say, premature." He adopts the example of the American assistance for defeating ISIS in Iraq as a measure that strengthened the central government in Baghdad and enabled it to rebuff the Kurdish demand for independence, and the example of Russian support for Assad as returning him to center stage, and especially causing both the United States and Russia to agree for the first time that Syria should remain united (Aronson, 2018).

The thesis about the dismantling of the state order and the collapse of the Sykes-Picot framework has been disproved—Iraq, Syria, and even Yemen and Libya have not disappeared and have remained state entities, albeit crumbling and failed, and the borders between the states have not changed. At the same time, it is essential to distinguish between the external boundaries and the state framework on the one hand and what is underway inside the country on the other

According to the scholars, these developments indicate the resilience of international and Westphalian sovereignty, as well as partial and limited strengthening of domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty, which have remained relatively unstable.

Questions about State Sovereignty in the Middle East, from 2020 Onwards

The current phase (since 2019) shows the limits of the analytical paradigms for those seeking to understand the Middle East dynamic from a linear and overall perspective. The thesis about the dismantling of the state order and the collapse of the Sykes-Picot framework has been disproved—Iraq, Syria, and even Yemen and Libya remained state entities, albeit crumbling and failed. At the same time, it is essential to distinguish between the external boundaries and the state framework on the one hand and what is underway inside the country on the other, and between the types of sovereignty realized in the state framework.

Since late 2010, domestic sovereignty in most of the Middle East republics has been weakened, and in the combat theaters (Libya, Syria, Yemen), Westphalian sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty have been fragmented. On the other hand, as this article goes to press, the international sovereignty (i.e., the external and legal recognition of the state's borders) has remained as before in all Middle East countries. The exclusive reliance on this type of sovereignty is liable to distort the evaluation of the status of countries in the region, including where the level of their stability is concerned. Furthermore, in Syria, the regime has successfully acted as a sovereign to some extent in the center and west of the country, but the levels of sovereignty and effective governance vary from one area to another (relatively high in Damascus, compared with an inability to rule in Daraa in the south of the country). The situation is even more complex in a country divided into two entities, like Libya, and in the Palestinian theater, in which two separate and even competing entities have operated since 2007.

The analytical conclusion is that there is a need to differentiate between types of sovereignty and the effectiveness of governance in a given country, and in the ability to make comparisons between countries and between different regions in the same country by creating categories relevant to the comparison that can characterize the changing regional architecture and help observers understand the significance and developing trends resulting from the changes in that architecture.

Adopting this conceptual framework is likely to help us avoid deterministic and linear assessments in the future whereby the Arab Spring has ended because popular opinion prefers stability to chaos. We should recognize the persistent weakness of domestic sovereignty in countries in the region, which has maintained, and will probably maintain in the future, the lack of satisfaction among the public, which in turn fosters internal weakness. As of now, a decade after the onset of the upheaval, the internal theater in most Middle East countries is more unstable and fragile than in any other period. More waves of upheaval began in 2019, led by public pressure that prompted the resignation of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in April; the overthrowing of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir after four months of protests that originally focused on an increase in bread prices, but which highlighted the people's difficult economic situation in much broader fashion; the outbreak of the "WhatsApp protests" in Lebanon in response to the government's failure to find solutions to the economic crisis in the country during the preceding year; a series of protests in Iraq against corruption, unemployment, and inefficient public services; and the resumption of violent riots in Iran in November in protest against a steep hike in the price of gasoline, which are continuing at various levels of intensity. All of these reflect to an increasing extent the weakness of domestic sovereignty in these countries.

When we discuss the survival of the state order in the Middle East, it is therefore important to distinguish between the state framework and the country's borders (embodied in international, Westphalian, and interdependence sovereignty) and what is underway within the country (domestic sovereignty), which is a reflection of the state failure phenomenon. International recognition of the state's borders and its territorial integrity are no guarantee of the level of sovereignty inside the country in the functional sense. Following a decade of upheaval, the regional situation has undermined the substance of internal state sovereignty, and has accelerated state failure processes. In turn, these processes have increased the involvement of external actors and non-state actors in the countries' sovereign territory (Michael & Guzansky, 2017, pp. 39-40). Furthermore, in certain countries, such as Syria and Libya, the ability of the regime (two regimes, in the case of Libya) to exercise even partial domestic sovereignty depends on aid from external actors. For example, the Syrian regime receives aid from Russia and Iran, while the government of Field Marshall Haftar in Libya receives assistance from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others. Theoretically, Westphalian sovereignty in Syria and Libya has been weakened with the consent of the central regime, which is unable to manage the state's affairs independently. The obvious question in these contexts is what substance this sovereignty, which depends on aid from external foreign actors, consists of. Do we have here a new pattern of sovereignty, and if so, what is its significance for those countries and their domestic sovereignty?

Conclusion and Recommendations

More than a dichotomous perspective of weakness versus strength of state sovereignty, this article proposes a more complex evaluation of the region, based on a model of nation states that do not meet the definition of functioning sovereign nation states; they feature fragmented, unstable, fragile, and hollow sovereignty.

Building on Krasner's typology, this article seeks to add a clearer analysis of the term "state sovereignty." If sovereignty is defined as effective control by the state or the central government over the population in a given territory, then a look at the region suggests that a distinction can be made not only between the existing types of sovereignty, but also between different levels and ranks of domestic sovereignty across countries and within countries in order to achieve a better evaluation of their performance and stability.

When one state entity embodies different effectiveness levels of sovereignty, the conceptualization of fragmented or hollow sovereignty is likely to be of assistance in achieving a better understanding of the complex situation.

For example, in the Middle East context, an axis can be sketched that ranges from the value of effective domestic sovereignty on one end, which can be found in the Gulf monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman, to minimal sovereignty on the other end, such as in Yemen. The various countries in the region can be positioned along the axis, with their location on the axis representing different values of sovereignty. Libya can be placed close to the end of the axis representing an absence of sovereignty, Syria not far from there, Egypt in the middle of the axis, and so on.

Beyond this, different levels of domestic sovereignty within a given country can be distinguished in order to explain more precisely the extent of control in the country, including its stability. For example, a distinction can be made between effective state sovereignty by a given regime in core areas, in contrast to weak sovereignty in the country's peripheral areas—Syria and Iraq are possible examples. In these cases, when one state entity embodies different effectiveness levels of sovereignty, the conceptualization of fragmented or hollow sovereignty is likely to be of assistance in achieving a better understanding of the complex situation.

Despite the uncertainty typical of the Middle East, the region will presumably continue to suffer from instability, identity, and legitimacy crises, and ongoing deterioration, violence, and authoritarianism in the coming years. All of this obviously has implications for the status of the countries' sovereignty. As Cook writes, "If authoritarian stability was once a hallmark of the Middle East, the future may well be authoritarian instability" (Cook, 2020). Authoritarian conduct of the region's countries, which tends to concentrate all political authority in these state hands, does not guarantee the integrity of the state's sovereignty. On the contrary; the historical tendency of regimes in the region, and of authoritarian regimes in general, to concentrate political authority in their hands encounters difficulties resulting from a lack of resources, the need to prioritize governance, and competing entities operating in their territory.

Future research should analyze the term "sovereignty" more deeply, while starting from the assumption that the term represents more of an ideal type than something that describes the existing and empirical state of affairs. The regional and international political order in recent decades has featured countries in which sovereignty is relative, and is sometimes no more than hollow sovereignty.

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